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63

No. _____

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT.

Subject: Russia: relations with
Turkey: General

2662

See also: Russo-Turkish Treaty of Dec. 1925
" Commercial Treaty, 1927.
" " Treaty of March 16, 1921.

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

3916. VS.

CABLEGRAM.

DECYPHER FROM

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICER,
LONDON.SENT 13.11.42. 8.35 p.m.
RECD. 14.11.42.IMMEDIATE.No. S.144.

Most secret. Turkey.

Dominions Office telegram G.137 November 6,
paragraph 2.

Head of the Southern Department today emphasised the trouble given by the Turks in the last few weeks. They had been less than frank with the British over chrome negotiations and it had been necessary to talk to them more plainly than at any time before. He thought this had had some effect. At any rate the Turks had not yet signed the proposed Chrome Agreement with Germany, which they had allowed to get tied up with their armaments negotiations. It now seemed clear that about a month ago German pressure on Turkey had been heavy and a good deal of German infiltration, with technicians et cetera, had been going on.

The Turkish President's statement on November 1, regarding the trouble and discontent in Turkey had caused considerable surprise here. Howard said that his own first reaction had been that President Inonu was playing up Turkey's troubles in order to obtain more supplies from the British. The British Ambassador at Ankara has now reported that the Prime Minister had complained to him of "a certain amount of German inspired political intrigue by retired generals and journalists" with a view to upsetting the Government and the President. It is not yet clear however whether this intrigue is confined to Quislings. The British Ambassador states on the surface there is no evidence of any important political agitation but there is an uneasy atmosphere and the Turkish Government undoubtedly have an awkward winter to face in view of the economic situation, bread being the main problem.

The Ambassador has not yet reported as to the significance of the press report that all Army leave has been cancelled but Howard commented that it seemed obvious that if Hitler proposed to take some counter action to the Allies landings in North Africa, entry into Turkey - or Spain - was the most probable course.

Turkey-Soviet relations remain as before, dominated by distrust, but the respective Ambassadors have at last returned to their posts and at the moment there is a lull.

Stirling.

Copy to P.M.,
Min. E.A.,
Defence.
14/11/42.

Turkey Russia

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

DECYPHER FROM -
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DEPT.
LONDON.

J.P. 2096.

Received: 27/8/42.
9.40p.m.

No. 5.91.

Date Recd.: 28/8/42.

MOST SECRET.

Turkey.

In view of the importance of Turkey at the present stage, mid-way between the Egyptian and South Russian fronts, I was glad to find that the attitude of the Turkish Ambassador, with whom I had conversation last night, remains sound as regards the British alliance.

In the course of a long private talk he showed considerable pessimism with regard to the present position of Russia, though allowance has to be made for Turkish wishful thinking. He said that he thought it probable that the Germans would break through to the Volga and the Caspian and this might well have the effect of breaking up the unity of Russia. He spoke of large numbers of Ukrainians, Georgians, White Russians and nationals of the other component republics of the Soviet Union, whom the Germans had long been training in Germany for "liberation" movements. When the Germans had completely overrun the southern part of the U.S.S.R. they would set up a number of puppet states, the movement might easily spread (my own feeling about this is that the Russian Government would make short shrift of all potential Quislings in the areas in question) and thus eventually achieve disintegration of the whole of the Union.

From the above the Ambassador drew the conclusion that we were wasting our time in diverting tanks and aircraft to Russia and said it would pay us much better to concentrate these on the Middle East including Turkey.

This is the first time I have known the Ambassador to take a line of this kind which is naturally enough directed to what he considers to be Turkey's own urgent needs.

The main point however is that throughout the conversation there was not the slightest hint that if we did not supply her needs Turkey would go over to Germany, or be forced to submit to German demands. In this regard the Ambassador's attitude is very firm and he was emphatic that if Germany turned on the Turks they would resist come what may.

BRUCE.

Copy to - Prime Minister.
Minister E.A.
Dept. of Defence.

28/8/42

for

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CABLEGRAM.

HB/IB

DECYPhER FROM:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.

SECRET

I. 24542/

CE 91/177

DATED 23rd June, 1942.

9.45 p.m.

RECEIVED 24th June, 1942.

Circular D. No.310.

SECRET

Following for the Prime Minister.

Egypt.

1. Public which have hitherto shown comparatively little concern at events in Libya are reported to be seriously disquieted. The Prime Minister has assured His Majesty's Ambassador of full co-operation in dealing with such dangers as fifth columnists and scaremongers.

Persia.

2. Persian Government have accepted invitation for a Persian military mission to visit Russia.

Turkey.

3. My telegram 2nd June, D.No.305, the Turkish Government were informed of terms of Anglo-Soviet Treaty immediately before signature. At the same time we reaffirmed assurances given to Turkish Government on 10th August 1941.

(1) that we respect Montreux Convention and have no aggressive intentions or claims against the Straits

(2) that we and Soviet Government are prepared to observe territorial integrity of the Turkish Republic.

(3) that we and Soviet Government are prepared to send to Turkey all help in the event of her being attacked by any European Power.

Soviet Government also reaffirmed orally assurances of 10th August, 1941, but we have no details of language used.

Copy to War Cabinet.
Defence.
E.A.
War Advisory Council.

24/6/42.



PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CABLEGRAM.

PJC/MIL.


DECRYPTED from -

High Commissioner's Office,
LONDON

L.304. *Secret.* Following for the Prime Minister.

Surley Russia
H. M. Ambassador at Kulbyshev reports much increased friendliness on part of Molotov since his return. He showed satisfaction with results of his journey and appreciation of frankness with which our position had been explained to him, particularly by the Prime Minister, who had deeply impressed him. The Treaty appears to have been welcomed in Russia and have improved Russian attitude towards us.

The Free French report that during his visit Molotov had cordial talk with De Gaulle whom he assured of Russian support for Free French movement. He stated that the Soviet Government did not wish to impose Communist regime on France after war but hoped for a strong France able to choose the Government best suited to herself.



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CABLEGRAM.

I.24300
CB.40

SECRET
Sent 22nd June, 1942.

Recd. 22nd June, 1942.

PJC/MIL.

DECYPHER from -

High Commissioner's Office,
LONDON

D.304. Secret Following for the Prime Minister.

Subject - Treaty with Russia and Turkey.

Second line under Turkey should read (my telegram
6th June D.280)

Copy to - Defence
External Affairs.

24th June, 1942.



PP

CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

Turkey-Russia

NRW/IB

I. 24385.

DECYPHER FROM:

GE 73/159

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.DATED 22nd June, 1942.
11 p.m.
RECEIVED 23rd June, 1942.

D.No. 307.

SECRET.

Following for the Prime Minister.

Turkey. My telegram 21st June, D. No. 304.

His Majesty's Ambassador saw President on 20th June and in view of Turkish apprehension assured him that our policy towards Turkey was not merely a war-time policy; we wished to strengthen our policy and economic relations with Turkey and to collaborate still more closely after the war. The President agreed, reiterated his loyalty to Anglo-Turkish connection and expressed confidence in our policy and sympathy with it.

As regards Germany, the President and Minister for Foreign Affairs said they were alive to the dangers of present economic manoeuvres and their propaganda effect. So far as active counter-measures were concerned the Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to military roads, aerodromes and supply bases which the Turks were constructing with our assistance.

As regards Russia the President reaffirmed satisfaction with Anglo-Soviet treaty and friendliest intentions towards Russia, but took the familiar line that there was no initiative which Turkey could take to improve Turco-Russian relations. At our instance however, the Minister for Foreign Affairs has agreed to communicate to Soviet Government assurances of Turkey's friendly feelings.

Copy to War Cabinet.
War Advisory Council
Defence.
E.A.

23/6/42.



Extract from
S.M.C. STATE

D.244
11.5.42

PERSIA

1. My telegram of 5th. May D.238/

*Turkey
Russia*

The Turkish Government who have received sensational reports about Rezaikh have communicated an aide memoire to H.M. Embassy at Angora attributing the disturbances to Russian connivance. We do not however propose to take up this matter with the Soviet Government on behalf of the Turkish Government, part as the Soviet Government are reported to have agreed to the dispatch of Persian troops.



Extract from
88.
D 238
5.5.18



Wrote 29th April. Both Russians and Turks had previously adopted more helpful attitude and atmosphere continues to improve.

*Turkey
Russia*



Turkey. 2. My telegram of 15th March, No.D.146, in connection with the Angora bomb outrage. Turkish Authorities brought to trial 4 persons including 2 Soviet citizens attached to the Soviet Trade Delegation at Istanbul. The Turkish Government, while showing somewhat tiresome rigidity in regard to certain Soviet requests, have maintained an attitude of correct impartiality and Turkish press has observed official instructions to report the proceedings objectively. The Soviet Government, however, have issued sharp communique questioning impartiality of Turkish Courts and the Soviet press has followed suit. The Turkish Government are concerned at Soviet attitude and chronic anti-Russian feeling is reported to be breaking out among Turkish public. We are urging moderation on both parties.

F

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CABLEGRAM.

MdeC/SMCM.

SECRET

I. 10944.

CE 15.

Sent on 15th March, 1942.
10.55. p.m.
Received 16th March, 1942.

DECYPHER FROM -

SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.

CIRCULAR D.146. SECRET. Following for the
Prime Minister.

TURKEY.

Turkey
1. My Circular D.132 of 9th March, paragraph
2. Vyshinsky has told the Turkish Ambassador at Kuibyshev
that the Soviet Government were surprised at the arrests of
Soviet employees in Turkey but the Ambassador gained the
impression that Vyshinsky did not wish to make a protest.
He ascribes Soviet mildness to a strong desire to maintain the
recent improvement in Turkish-Soviet relations.

S.S.

D132

9.3.42



TURKEY.

2. My Circular D.125 of 6th March paragraph 1. A minor official of the Commerce Department of the Soviet Embassy and two persons in the Soviet Consulate at Istanbul have been arrested. The Secretary-General has informed His Majesty's Ambassador at Ankara that measures would be taken against certain foreigners but details have not yet been worked out. His Majesty's Ambassador has been instructed to urge the Turkish Government not to allow the Germans to exploit the incident to the detriment of Turko-Soviet relations. The attitude of the Soviet Ambassador has been helpful to the Turkish Government.

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CABLEGRAM.

Extract

JW/TMC.

DECYPHER FROM:

SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.



L.9698
Ce 76
6th March, 1942.
2380
7th March, 1942.

SECRET

Circular D.125. SECRET.

Following for the Prime Minister.

Turkey.

1. The Turkish Government have informed His Majesty's Ambassador that investigation of the recent bomb outrage at Ankara has established that the act was committed by a Yugo Slav nationalised Turk with various Yugo Slav accomplices but that certain persons attached to the Soviet Embassy were also involved and the Turkish Government intend to take measures against them. The Secretary General states however that the Turkish Government wish to avoid political complications. F

S. S.
D123
6.3.42



Turkey

*Russia
Turkey*

2. Despite official protestations of friendship from Sofia Bulgarian propaganda is increasing the Turkish Government's suspicions of Bulgaria's intentions. On the other hand the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs informed H.M. Ambassador on 27th February that Turco-Soviet relations were better. The Soviet Government had practically denuded the Turkish frontier of troops and the Soviet Ambassador was maintaining adequate contact with him.

F

Russia - Turkey

TURKEY.



The Turkish Government is still concerned at the possibility of an attack by Germany in the Spring. (No. 27 from Mr. Bruce to the Prime Minister). Turkish relations with Russia, which were disturbed by Russian activities in Northern Iran, have improved as a result of the easing of the situation there, and as a result of the release of oil supplies from the Soviet to Turkey (79 from Stirling). The Turkish Government was also concerned at the conversations in Moscow between Mr. Eden and the Soviet Government, but they have accepted British and Russian assurances that no bargain was entered into at Turkish expense (79 from Stirling).

F

*Extract from
S.S.
D38*

26-1-92

Turkey.

Handwritten
3. My telegram D.33 of 22nd January Paragraph 3. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed His Majesty's Ambassador at Ankara that the Turkish Ambassador in Kuibyshev has received from the Soviet Government aide memoire containing assurances that the Soviets are not encouraging trouble in Persia and Azerbaijan and that there is no reason for any Turkish anxiety. His Majesty's Ambassador states that the Minister for Foreign Affairs told him recently that Russian action (my telegram D.33 of 22nd January paragraph 2 and D.36 of 24th January, paragraph 2) had improved the Turkish Government's feeling towards the Soviet Government.

F

Russia - Turkey

CE 98/191

DECYPhER FROM -

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON

2nd January, 1942.

8.15 P.M.

RECEIVED 23rd January, 1942.

CABLEGRAM.

CIRCULAR D. 33.

SECRET. Following for the Prime Minister.

EGYPT.

1. Ali Maher is reported to have been intriguing with King Farouk to secure dismissal of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister. King Farouk has severely reprimanded the Minister for Foreign Affairs for breach with Vichy but the Prime Minister appears to have intervened courteously and successfully on behalf of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

TURKEY.

2. On the return of H.M. Ambassador from Moscow the Turkish Government showed profound curiosity and some suspicion about Anglo-Soviet conversations. The President and the Minister for Foreign Affairs have expressed themselves entirely satisfied of our account of what passed. The Soviet Ambassador has given further information indicating friendly intentions of the Soviet Government towards Turkey.

3. My Circular D.30 of 19th January although the Turkish Government complain that their previous representations to the Soviet Government about the situation in Azerbaijan have only provoked discourteous replies we are pressing them to represent their misgivings direct to the Soviet Government and no through us. At the same time we are pointing out to the Soviet Government that Turkey's natural interest in maintaining status quo in that area makes it essential to allay the Turkish Government's fears if their determination to resist a German attack is not passively undermined. We are moreover suggesting that the Persian Government should be allowed to maintain asayesh police and gendarmerie in Azerbaijan as they consider necessary and should be allowed to support them with reasonable number of troops. Also that the local Soviet Authorities should be instructed to co-operate with the Persian Authorities in restoring order.

Govt. - War Cabinet
Advisory Council
Defence Co-Ord.
E.A.

23.1.42

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CABLEGRAM.



RE

DECYPhER FROM -

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.

CE 105/214

DATED 26th November, 1941.
2205
RECEIVED 27th November, 1941.

CIRCULAR TELEGRAM D.712.

SECRET.

Following for the Prime Minister.

DENMARK.

1. The Germans are reported to have demanded mobilization of the Danish Army for service in Russia and conscription of Danes between 18 and 30. The Danish Government is said to be divided on this issue.

SPANISH MOROCCO.

2. Weygand's departure is reported to be easing the High Commissioner anxiety lest the Germans should now fail to support Spanish claims in French Morocco. Increased numbers of Spanish troops have been arriving from the Peninsula.

TURKEY.

3. My circular D.695 of 18th November. The Secretary General has informed His Majesty's Ambassador that the Turkish Government do not propose to react strongly against the recent incidents concerning Russian agents.

Copy - War Cabinet
Defence Co-Ord.
E.A.

27.11.41

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs.

Referred.

Henry J.
Secretary.

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CABLEGRAM.

I. 24328



Ce 65

DECYPHER FROM :
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.

Dated - 18th Nov., 1941.
12.45 a.m.
Received - 18th Nov., 1941.

Circular D.695. SECRET.

Following for the Prime Minister.

TURKEY.

SECRET

1. My telegram of 12th November, D.688.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed His Majesty's Ambassador that the Turkish Government have received a somewhat curt reply to their protest to the Soviet Government about one of the incidents involving a Russian spy. Enquiry into the sinking of a Turkish ship is continuing and no protest has yet been made to the Soviet Government. Contrasting Turkish behaviour with such Soviet activities, the Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that several boat-loads of refugees arrived at a Turkish port from Sebastopol and had been well treated.

2. A delegation from German Propaganda Ministry is expected to visit Turkey this week. The Minister for Foreign Affairs states that the Turkish Government were not consulted.

3. His Majesty's Ambassador considers that Turkish attitude is fundamentally governed by the following considerations:-

- (a) Self-defence;
- (b) Desperate desire to avoid war.
- (c) Determination to resist encroachment by any power on Turkish sovereignty and vital interests.

He believes Turkey has no wish to lean towards Germany, that concessions to Germany have been consistent with the Turkish desire to avoid provoking her without giving away anything vital and have afforded Germany nothing like the tangible advantages which we enjoy, e.g. the presence in Turkey of British Service Instructors, advisers, technicians, etc.

He reports growing appreciation of German difficulties in the Russian campaign and corresponding improvements in Turkish morale though official circles maintain their conviction that Turkey will have to face the crisis in the Spring.

War Cabinet
Defence
E.A.
18.11.41.

R

SECRET

CABLEGRAM.

I.23764

Ce 6

DATED: 12th November, 1941
1920

RECD: 13th November, 1941

DECYPHER FROM:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION
AFFAIRS,
LONDON.

Circular telegram D.688.

SECRET.

Following for the Prime Minister.

FAR EAST.

1. His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokyo has reported instances of friction between Germans and Japanese in Japan e.g., Japanese police action against German State Railways Office in Tokyo on account of espionage activities. He considers, however, that Japan would not hesitate to fulfil her obligations under the tripartite pact should such action suit her interests though there is for the moment no sign that the present Japanese Cabinet would be any more enthusiastic than its predecessor about implementing Article 2.

TURKEY.

2. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed His Majesty's Ambassador of three recent cases in which Russian agents have penetrated into eastern Turkey. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs who during the past month have shown no disposition to modify their attitude of reserve towards the Russians, take serious view of these incidents. They also allege that a Russian submarine was responsible for the recent sinking of a Turkish boat in the Black Sea.

PERSIA.

3. His Majesty's Minister has reported conditions on which the Persian Government would sign the treaty. We are considering these. The Persian Government showed particular anxiety for some guarantee of assistance in the event of any attack by Turkey. It appears that if satisfied in other directions they might now accept the word "alliance."

Copy - WAR CABINET
DEFENCE
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

13.11.41



PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CABLEGRAM. *SECRET*

DECYPHER FROM -
SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON

K.27354
CE 65
DATED 8th December, 1941
2508
RECEIVED 9th December, 1941

Circular D.729. *SECRET*.

Following for the Prime Minister.

FRENCH EMPIRE

My Circular D.723. In response to our representations the United States Under Secretary of State informed H.M. Ambassador on 5th December that the U.S. Ambassador hoped to continue to suspend supplies to North Africa until they received an account of Petain's meeting with Goering.

PERSIA

2. H.M. Minister considers that the new cabinet in particular the Minister of Communications and the Minister of the Interior should prove more satisfactory to us than their predecessors.

3. H.M. Consul at Kermanshah reports improvement in public security and decrease in brigandage; the situation as regards food and Kurds is unchanged.

TURKEY

4. My Circular D.724 Russian tankers have so far discharged 25,000 tons of oil and are expected to discharge further 40,000 tons odd. H.M. Ambassador learns from the Soviet Ambassador that not more than a total of 15,000 tons is intended for Turkey and that of the remainder part is to be stored in Istanbul for fuelling of Russian ships, while the rest will be taken to Vladivostock. Although arrival of the oil was entirely unexpected, the Turkish Government have asked H.M. Ambassador to do his best to see that Turkey's expectations of receiving all the oil are fulfilled. H.M. Ambassador has made representations to the Soviet Ambassador.

5. My Circular D.725 of 7th December. The Secretary General informed the Secretary of State on 5th December that unless Kurdish activities in North Persia decreased the Turkish Government would be obliged to send troops to their Eastern frontier.

Copy sent to - War Cabinet
Defence
E.A.
9.12.41

TELEPRINT.

F

Russia - Turkey
PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

DECYPHER FROM -
SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.

I.26981
CR 116/
DATED 5th December, 1941.
8.40 p.m.
RECEIVED 6th December, 1941.



CIRCULAR D.724.

SECRET.

Following for the Prime Minister.

BALKANS.

1. The Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs informs His Majesty's Ambassador that the arrival of oil supplies from Russia has created a good impression on the Turkish Government. The German Embassy are showing concern.

2. The Minister for Foreign Affairs says that some time ago the Italian Government proposed to the Turkish Government a comprehensive political agreement and that Bulgaria and Roumania recently made similar proposals. The Turkish Government will be doing nothing to encourage these approaches. Turkish-Italian commercial negotiations are reported to be making little progress, but the commercial agreement between Turkey and Roumania is under discussion.

Copy - WarCabinet
Defence
External Affairs

7.12.41

F

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

DECYPHER FROM EXTERNAL / PAIRS OFFICER, LONDON.

No. 701

Date Sent: 8.3. p.m. - 10 OCT 1941

MOST SECRET

Date Recd: 8th October,

RECD

**MOST
SECRET**

TURKEY

My telegram No. 668 September 10th.

Howard, Head of the Southern Department, this evening described relations with Turkey as in the circumstances satisfactory although the Turks were being difficult in various ways. He said that the continuance of "staff talks" - on level of service attaches at Angora - was the most satisfactory feature of the Anglo-Turkish relations; although only at the stage of proposals they were very comprehensive and the Turks appeared to welcome them warmly.

Howard said that the negotiations for Turkish chrome up to 1943, as to which Dominions Office have kept you advised, had been troublesome. The Americans had co-operated - if anything almost too vigorously - in making it clear to the Turkish Government that the chrome question was the test case in the attitude of United States Government towards the supply of war materials to Turkey. State Department had sent for the Turkish Ambassador and the American Ambassador at Angora had talked severally to Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Minister for Foreign Affairs had described the American attitude as "fanatical", but the Turkish General Staff had been much gratified recently by the arrival of American howitzers at Angora.

Latest United Kingdom proposals regarding the chrome position after 1943, summarized in Dominions Office telegram D.No.598, have made no headway; latest report from Huggesson suggests that the Turks will refuse.

Clodius has delayed his departure from Angora partly to save face over his failure to get all he expected and probably also because he is still trying to get a supplementary treaty dealing with supplies of chrome after 1943.

Despite reports as to his supersession by Kollinger, Papen has now returned to Turkey. The Turks profess confidence that they will keep out of the war during the winter.

Huggesson reports that Hitler's speech apparently full rather flat in Turkey. Turkish official circles regarded it as defensive and attached some significance to the reference to friendship he had so ardently desired with England.

A month ago there were reports of decrease in the British populace in Turkey particularly in the Smyrna district owing to British action in Persia and efforts of German propaganda. British Ambassador was at great pains over his visit to the Smyrna Fair which seems to have been a success, and it is believed tendency has been checked.

United Kingdom Commercial Corporation is working hard to stimulate Anglo-Turkish trade; a London firm has obtained a large contract for the reconstruction of the harbours of Alexandretta and Mersina.

2.

2681

Turks are having Budget difficulties and have asked for British financial help. Request is before Treasury at the moment and will probably take the form of a further credit or extension of the present credit arrangement.

Turkish relations with Russia are still governed by suspicion. Turks are alarmed lest the Armenians of Persia, Azerbaijan, and on the Turkish-Persian border become incorporated in the Soviet Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Turkish Government has also expressed anxiety at Russians allowing the Kurds *on* the Persian side of Turkey-Persia-Iraq to arm themselves (my telegram 685 (3)).

No developments in Turkish-Italian relations. Rumours of sale of six Italian destroyers to Bulgaria seem to have been circulated by Axis as a feaver to test Turkey's attitude re the Straits, and in the hope of troubling the Anglo-Turkish relations.

For Turkish attitude re Bulgaria see my telegram 682.

STIRLING

Copy to:

War Cabinet: War Advisory Council: Defence Co-ord.
9/10/41.

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CABLEGRAM. **SECRET**

I. 19333.

CE 21.

Sent on 29th September, 1941.

12.15. a.m.

Received 29th September, 1941.

DECYPHER FROM -

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
L O N D O N .

Circular D.587. SECRET. Following for
Prime Minister.

R U S S I A .

Molotov has informed His Majesty's Ambassador
that Litvinov and Golikov will participate in the Moscow
Conference. His Majesty's Ambassador had privately suggested
Litvinov as more suitable interpreter than the usual Kremlin
official.

T U R K E Y .

My Circular D.585, 27th September.

The Turkish Government state that the reaction
of the German Delegation to Turkey's intimation regarding
chrome has so far not been violent but they anticipate
renewal of pressure when fresh instructions arrive from Berlin.

SECRET.

His Majesty's Commercial Counsellor has been
asked by his Soviet colleague to help to exchange Turkish
copper against Soviet petrol. The Turkish Minister of
Commerce is consulting his colleagues. He complains that
so far the Soviet commercial attaché has shown inexplicable
lack of frankness, and says that Turkey could exchange
certain products needed by Russia, such as mohair and live-
stock, but there would be no exportable surplus possible
if agreement with Germany was signed.

Full Cabinet.
Defence.
E. A.

29.9.41.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs.

Referred.

Shahen
Secretary

F

Germany Turkey
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

TURKEY.

CONFIDENTIAL

September 23, 1941.

SECTION 2

[R 8640/179/44]

Copy No. 070

Mr. Eden to Sir R. I. Campbell (Washington).

(No. 731.)

Foreign Office, September 23, 1941.

Sir, THE United States Ambassador came to see me this afternoon, when we discussed Turkey and the German demand for chrome. His Excellency showed me copies of telegrams which had been passing between Mr. Hull and the United States Ambassador in Angora. As a result of these the United States Ambassador in Angora had been instructed to speak firmly to the Turkish Government. I told Mr. Winant that we warmly welcomed this action and gave him an account of the interview which I had had this morning with Dr. Aras. At my suggestion his Excellency undertook to see Dr. Aras himself and to underline my representations.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

[21-77]

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CABLEGRAM.



**MOST
SECRET**

DECYPHER FROM -
SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON

I.15636
CE 32
DATED 21st August, 1941
7.50p.m.
RECEIVED 22nd August, 1941

Circular M.252.

MOST SECRET. Following for the Prime Minister.

TURKEY

The Anglo-Soviet démarche of 10th August, mostly left the Turkish Government pleased but anxious lest the German Government receive the impression that the Turkish Government asked for assistance. This attitude has been reflected in the Turkish press. The Anglo-Soviet démarche of 16th August regarding Persia and subsequent conversations with the Minister for Foreign Affairs appear to have gone somewhat to remove his doubts about our intentions, but he still mistrusts the Soviet Government. We are making every effort both here and at Ankara;

a. to reassure the Turkish Government that our sole object is to check infiltration of Germans into Persia and to prevent the German Government eventually using those there to establish German domination in Persia;

b. to impress upon the Turkish Government the importance of rapprochement between Turkey and the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile the Soviet Government have indicated to the Turkish Government that they will do their best to supply oil to Turkey (my circular M.255 of 11/8/41) but that transport presents difficulties.

Copy sent to - Full Cabinet
Defence
E.A.
22.8.41

E

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CABLEGRAM.



DECYPHER FROM -

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.

DATED 11th August, 1941,
1915
RECEIVED 12th August, 1941.

Circular M.285.

MOST SECRET.

Following for the Prime Minister.

TURKEY.

My Circular M.284 of 10th August.

His Majesty's Ambassador and the Soviet Ambassador were after all able to present the declarations on 10th August. The Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed great satisfaction to both. Since he would apparently welcome publication, we are agreeing, subject to Soviet concurrence. The Minister for Foreign Affairs raised with the Soviet Ambassador the question of Turkey receiving new oil supplies from Russia.

The Soviet Ambassador is consulting Moscow but foresees difficulties. He is hoping for some Turkish reaction now towards closer co-operation.

COPY TO FULL CABINET
DEPT. DEFENCE CO.
THE SECRETARY, " E.A.
DEPT. OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. TELEPRINTED TO C.O.
12/8/1941

REFERRED.

Broome
SECRETARY.

see Turkey filing

Russia Turkey
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT



July 12, 1941.

TURKEY.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION 1.

[R 6832/236/44]

Copy No. 063

Mr. Eden to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 99.)

Sir,

AS I informed you in my telegram No. 1515 of the 6th July, the Turkish Ambassador, in the course of a conversation with the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State on the 5th July, said that suspicions were rife in the minds of some Turkish Deputies about the Prime Minister's words in his speech of the 22nd June, when he had said that the Russians were deprived of their share of the fruits of victory in the last war. Mr. Butler replied that he had had an indication from your Excellency that suspicions aroused by this remark had now been dissipated by the obvious explanation that there was no intention that the Soviet Union should be compensated at the expense of Turkey, for which assurance Dr. Aras expressed his warmest thanks.

2. Mr. Butler went on to say that it would be possible for him to adopt a more critical and, indeed, angry attitude toward anyone who supposed that any such thought could have been in the mind of a British statesman. It was his Excellency's task as ambassador in this country, and Mr. Butler's, in his position, to help clear away difficulties, however small. It was fortunate to have had an occasion such as this to remove this difficulty from among all the other questions arising between our two countries.

3. Dr. Aras proceeded to ask questions about the degree of co-operation between His Majesty's Government and the Government of the Soviet Union, and it became clear that his Excellency had come with the object of being able to send a message to his Government on this subject. Mr. Butler pointed out that this co-operation was on a purely practical basis. Dr. Aras and Mr. Butler agreed about the bad behaviour of the Soviet Union before the outbreak of hostilities between themselves and Germany. Dr. Aras complained of M. Molotov's handling of foreign affairs in the Soviet Union, considering that he had been very short-sighted. He added that on the outbreak of hostilities he had seen M. Maisky and asked him to arrange for the Soviet Ambassador in Turkey to return to his post. This had now been done. Much as his countrymen had resented the Soviet attitude towards themselves, they still felt it was necessary to maintain relations with the Soviet Union. Mr. Butler observed that this was obviously sensible.

4. The Turkish Ambassador remarked that while it must be difficult for anyone interested in western civilisation to have a close union of spirit with the Soviet Union, he understood the need for practical support of Soviet resistance. He made an exception, however, in the case of M. Maisky, with whom he found himself in tune.

5. On leaving the ambassador protested that the Turkish alliance with this country stood on a solid basis, but Mr. Butler warned him of the delusions of thinking that fair words would in any way safeguard Turkey from the danger of a German onslaught if Germany desired to turn her attention to attacking Turkey.

6. A copy of this despatch is being sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow.

I am, &c.
ANTHONY EDEN.

[19-73]

Minister
Copy to Minister

6/11/41 *BB*.

TURKEY.

CONFIDENTIAL

July 12, 1941.

SECTION 1



[R 6832/236/44]

Copy No. 070

Mr. Eden to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 99.)

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I am, &c.
ANTHONY EDEN.

[19-73]

NAA: A981, SOV 63

Handwritten
PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT

SECRET

CABLEGRAM.

I. 14491. EX-1186
CE 65.

11 AUG 1941

Sent on 7th August, 1941.
9.40. p.m.
Received 8th August, 1941.

DECYPHER FROM -

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.

Circular M. 221.

MOST SECRET.

My Circulars M's. 216 and 220.

I R A N.

The Soviet Union agree with our programme for making joint diplomatic demarche to the Iranian Government and state that their forces, approximately double ours, will be ready by Mid-August.

We have emphasised the danger of embarrassing Turkey by requesting rights of transit from the Iranian Government and have explained that we propose that the representations should take the form of a request rather than an ultimatum. We are also considering a simultaneous financial offer to the Iranian Government.

T U R K E Y.

My Circular M.180, paragraph 3. The Soviet Government agree to proceed with exchanges of assurances with Turkey on the lines suggested by us but including support for Turkey against German attack or pressure. They favour simultaneous British and Soviet demarches at Angora. M. Maisky is being instructed to concert details of the approach here.

War Cabinet.
Defence.
E. A.

8.8.41.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs.

Referred.

Myers
Secretary

E



Turkey, Ankara
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

MOST
SECRET

CABLEGRAM.

DECYPhER FROM
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICER,
LONDON.

Date sent 23rd July, 1941
8.5 p.m.
Received 24th July, 1941.

No. 573. MOST SECRET.

Turkey. My telegram 525.

Following based on talk with Bowker, Acting Head of the Southern Department this evening :

(1) Relations with United Kingdom. As yet no marked reactions by the Turks to Allied occupation of Syria, except their request to deal in future on Syrian questions with the British, and not the Free French (Tel. No. 526). United Kingdom Government will probably reply that the Turks should for the present deal with military authorities (i.e. General Wilson), basing this attitude on the existence of martial law in Syria.

Despite their recent treaty with the Germans the Turks have performed many services for the British of a highly un-neutral character, such as allowing British troops from Greece and Crete to pass through Turkish territory; their attitude over "St. Didier" (Tel. 516); the handing over to the British, unopened, of papers found in German and Italian aircraft which had made forced landings in Turkey and allowing the British to see the aircraft equipment; the holding up of telegrams sent to German and Italian Consuls.

(You will appreciate the extra secrecy of the preceding paragraph).

Question of chrome is of great importance as United States are making their attitude in regard to supplies to Turkey under Lease Lend Act dependent on whether or not the Turks furnish chrome to Germany. (Chrome at present supplied by the Turks to the United Kingdom is all passed on to the United States).

Turks have twice assured the United Kingdom that they will not send chrome to Germany. Present Anglo-Turkish agreement re chrome expires in January 1942 and the United Kingdom have given notice of the desire to renew.

Chief difficulty for United Kingdom at present is getting chrome out of Turkey as chrome ports in the south-west of Turkey cannot be used because of their proximity to Rhodes etc.

(2) Germany. There does not appear to be intensive German pressure at the moment. There are reports of troop concentrations in Bulgaria but the Turks are not disturbed by these, or affecting not to be, attributing them to "war of nerves."

Press reports state that Clodius, "the German Laith Ross" is undertaking a mission to Ankara.

(3) U.S.S.R. United Kingdom are still trying to improve Turkish-Russian relations. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has suggested to Maisky, also to Cripps, that Russia should give Turkey assurances, that they will respect Turkish integrity.

(4) Italy. So far as is known there have been no further Italian overtures to Turkey. STIRLING.

Copy to - War Cabinet
Defence Co-ordination. 24.7.41.

E

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM. 1475

DECYPHER FROM EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICER, LONDON.

No. 420.

Date Sent: 9.10 p.m. - 10/6/41.
Date Recd: 11th June, 1941.

U.S.S.R.

My telegram No. 341.

1. Position of Finland. Clear that there has been heavy pressure by Germany on Finland whose Government has of late been much less forthcoming in its dealings with the United Kingdom.
2. Sweden. Foreign Office view is that the Swedes view the present situation with such calmness that it seems certain that the Germans have been "talking to them" already and they feel confident that German demands on them in the event of war with Russia will not be heavy, perhaps no more than the use of the Island of Gotland.
3. Turkey. So far as is known nothing is going on at the present time between Russia and Turkey on the political side. The latter still refuses to make any approach to Russia and the Secretary of State has decided to desist efforts to persuade them. Learned from "secret sources" however, that the Turks are continuing commercial talks in Moscow.
4. Middle East. No signs of any unusual Russian activity in the direction of Iran or Afghanistan. One view here is that while the Germans may well have offered Russia's division of spoils in the Middle East Russia's share was to be very small indeed.
5. Far East. Vague reports of movements of Russian troops away from the Far East frontier have come in but nothing in the least concrete.
6. U.S.A. have apparently made no move with regard to the U.S.S.R. British Ambassador at Washington was recently asked for a report on Umansky-Hull interview (my telegram No. 341) but nothing has yet been received.

STIRLING.

Copies to:

War Cabinet; Defence Co-ord; Capt. Bracegirdle; Mr. Sedgwick. 11/6/41.

CABLEGRAM.

DECYPHER FROM

Cable 194/39 W 143

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.DATED 4th June, 1941
2040

RECEIVED 5th June, 1941

SECRET

CIRCULAR D. 325. SECRET

Following for the Prime Minister.

I R A Q.

1. All German aircraft and pilots at Mosul are reported to have left for Syria on 31st May.
2. On 3rd June, Bagdad was reported calm on the surface, strongly picketed with troops; 5 p.m. curfew is being maintained.
3. The Iraqi Government have decided to expel from Iraq, all undesirable foreigners, especially Syrians, Palestinians and Egyptians. The Government are also rounding up supporters of Rashid Ali and eliminating unsuitable officers from the Army.

U. S. S. R.

4. We have made clear to the Soviet Ambassador our determination to preserve our position throughout the Middle East, including Iran and Afghanistan, and pointed out that German intrigues to bring British and Soviet units there into conflict can be frustrated, provided that -

- (1) no misunderstanding exists between the Soviet Government and ourselves, and -
- (2) the Soviet Government also remain determined to maintain their present position in the Middle East and disclaim intention to expand at the expense of any third power.

We have sought assurance on this point. We have drawn the Soviet Ambassador's attention to our information in regard to German concentrations against the Soviet Union and explained that with our increasing military strength in the Middle East, we would be ready to take useful offensive action to relieve possible German pressure on Soviet Union.

The Soviet Ambassador responded with appeal for settlement of the Baltic question. While showing anxiety to ascertain the present position of the Turkish Government, the Ambassador doubted the Turkish Government would welcome any Soviet approach and deprecated any British soundings on behalf of the Soviet Government.

COPY TO - FULL CABINET
DEFENCE CO.
E. A.
5. 6. 41.

TELEPRINT

CABLEGRAM. **SECRET**

DECYPHER FROM

CE 17 XBO 11 X 5

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.DATED 12th May, 1941
5-39 a.m.

RECEIVED 12th May, 1941

CIRCULAR TELEGRAM D.275. **SECRET**

Following for the Prime Minister.

TURKEY.

1. **SECRET.** Soviet Government have shown signs of more forthcoming attitude towards Turkey, which the Turkish Government have done little to develop. His Majesty's Ambassador at Ankara has been instructed to impress upon the Turkish Government the importance of their trying now to obtain all possible assistance from the Soviet Government, particularly by applying for military supplies and by suggesting a common defence.

U. S. S. R.

2. **SECRET.** There is reason to believe that the Soviet Government may shortly establish diplomatic relations with Iraq. They appear, however, to have rejected the original Iraqi stipulation that they should recognise independence of other Arab countries.

SPAIN.

3. **SECRET.** His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid reports that changes in the administration announced on 10th May have included the transfer of two key posts from Senor Suner's incumbents to two soldiers of high military and moral reputation; new civilian governors represent mainly military and non-party appointments. These changes, together with re-imposition of censorship on Falange papers have provoked outburst of temper on the part of the Falange. Sir Samuel Hoare does not, however, believe that this reaction will at present come to anything, since hostile movement would mean breach with Franco, author of appointments, and neither Germans nor discontented Falangists appear ready to face this.

THAILAND.

4. His Majesty's Ambassador at Bangkok has been authorised to inform the Thai Prime Minister that we are endeavouring to arrange two shipments, totalling about 15,000 tons of oil products, for Thailand, in appreciation of the manner in which he received our representations and in anticipation that concrete results will emerge from the projected discussions.

CHINA.

5. **SECRET.** His Majesty's Ambassador at Chungking has been authorized to reassure General Chiang Kai Shek of our loyalty to his cause; while explaining frankly limitations of our ability to help China, he is authorized to draw attention to the assistance we are already affording, viz.

(1) despatch some time ago, of a high military officer to

- 1 -

CABLEGRAM.

L. 7,499

- 2 -

Chungking to offer general advice and to prepare for collaboration in the event of Anglo-Japanese war;

- (2) currency stabilisation and export credits;
- (3) schemes for improving Chinese supply routes, including share in construction of the Burma-Yunan railway;
- (4) diversion of 100 United States aircraft to China, and -
- (5) decision to permit assembly of aircraft in Burma and construction and assembly in India for the Chinese Government.

COPY TO - FULL CABINET
DEFENCE CO.
E.A.
13.5.41.

Decipher from -
SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT. 5,7040
Imp W 3 CE 1
CABLEGRAM DATED 5th May, 1941
12.55 p.m.
RECEIVED 6th May, 1941

Russia Turkey
Circular D.261. SECRET. Following for the Prime Minister.

U.S.S.R.

1. My circular D.257 of 2nd May paragraph 2. Regarding the recent prohibition on transit of war material through the U.S.S.R. H.M. Ambassador at Moscow, envisages three possibilities. It may be designed (1) to help Japan to evade agreement entailing transfer of ships to Germany; (2) as support if the Chinese protest against transit war materials to Japan from Germany. (3) to diminish trans-Siberian traffic eastward and possibly to some extent westward by depriving Germany of movements of traffic with such materials for imports. He does not regard it as aimed primarily at Turkey.

FAR EAST.

2. My circular D.240 26th April paragraphs 4 and 5. The deadlock is reported to continue owing to the Thai refusal to offer more than a third of the amount demanded by the French as compensation.

S mutilated.

Copy sent to - Full Cabinet
Defence
E.A.
Mr. Moore
Mr. Murphy
Mr. McFarlane
Mr. Brigden.

6.5.41

F

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
~~SECRET~~
CABLEGRAM.

DECYPHER FROM

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICER, LONDON.

Date sent: 3rd May, 1941.

10.15 p.m.

Received: 4th May, 1941.

No. 293.

MOST SECRET.

Turkey-U.S.S.R. My telegram No. 278. Last paragraph. On 16th April British Ambassador in Turkey reported that according to Turkish Secretary-General for Foreign Affairs, Numaty, recent Soviet action (my telegram 261) was due "solely to their desire to create favourable opinion in Turkey without doing anything".

On April 28th, Numaty told the British Ambassador that the Soviet had informed the Turkish Ambassador at Moscow that certain supplies of materials were being let through from Sweden but "not the supplies which the Turks wanted".

According to the British Ambassador to Moscow however, Numaty's information was not correct. There had been no refusal on the part of the Soviet.

On May 1st Cripps expressed his view that the Turkish Government were doing nothing to get help from Russia. He said that though it might be too late now, in view of the Balkan situation, he would still like the Turks (a) to apply to the Soviet for military supplies of all kinds immediately; (b) to suggest common defensive action if either country were attacked; (c) at least to suggest common defence now.

Foreign Office are ready to urge the Turks to apply for all possible assistance from the Soviet but before doing so have asked Cripps, in consultation with Turkish colleagues, to clear up the question whether goods from Sweden, i.e., war material, are now allowed through Russia despite new Soviet decree - Dominions Office telegram D.No. 287.

They have also asked Cripps' views on object of the decree.

This decree published April 29th was dated March 18th.

STIRLING.

Copies to:

War Cabinet
Def. Co-ord. Dept.
Sedgwick
Bracegirdle.
5.5.41.

Russia's True Story

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. **1027.**
DECYPHER FROM EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICE. Date sent: 7.30 p.m. 2/4/41
LONDON. Date recd.: 29/4/41

No. 277.

MOST SECRET.

U.S.S.R.

My telegram No. 276. Collier to-day said that evidence that Germany seriously contemplates an attack on U.S.S.R. has recently increased. He now puts probability of attack at "about 50-50", though he admits that military authorities rate it rather less. (Dominions Office will have reported views recently expressed by Italian Ambassador at Moscow in this connection.) Germany may, of course, hesitate to take on further commitments, at present time, over wide area which would be involved. Fear that the whole Russian structure would collapse on Germany's hands may also act as a deterrent.

The test will probably be whether Germany is satisfied with what Russia is supplying to her. Ministry of Economic Warfare estimates that recent oil agreement (my telegram No. 267) if carried will give her at least as much oil as last year. Russia has also recently undertaken to supply a number of railway trucks by trans Siberian route. Germany may, however, lose patience with Russian technical inability to produce all she requires and decide to take over Ukraine and parts of the Caucasus area. There is evidence that she is collecting a number of white Russians together presumably to help her run these areas.

Cripps inclines to the view that Russia might consent to receive German technicians at any rate temporarily but Collier considers that Russia would reject such a demand.

As for the time of attack, those who think likely in near future are divided into two schools. Some say in May, others later on in the summer, but not later than July as it would be before the harvest, which is in August. Collier thinks that U.K. can do little at the moment.

Cripps who has recently sent three communications to various Soviet authorities has now been asked not to take any further steps of that kind lest they be put down to fear on the part of U.K.

Russians are themselves lying low both as regards Finland, Turkey and apparently (despite reports to the contrary) Iran as well. They have not taken any further steps with regard to the Turks since those reported in my telegram No. 261.

Copies to: War Cabinet,
Defence
P.M's Dept.
Mr. Sedgwick 29/4/41.
Capt. Bracegirdle

J

SECRET

947.

CABLEGRAM.

DECIPHER FROM - EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICER, Date sent: 16th April, 1941.
10th APRIL 1941. 7.5 p.m.
LONDON. Received: 17th April, 1941.

No. 261.

U.S.S.R. Supplementary Dominions Office telegram
16th April. Facts are that Turkish Ambassador to Moscow told
Cripps that he had quite unexpectedly received letter from
Molotov on 13th April saying "he had had time to review
situation", with regard to transit of various goods required by
Turkey from Sweden (many of them munitions) and had discovered
there was no objection to transit and had consequently given
orders to that effect. An hour or two later Turkish Ambassador
was telephone and told the certain visas for staff which had
been refused some time ago had been granted. STIRLING.

Copies to:

War Cabinet
P.M.'s Dept.
Def. Co-ord. Dept.
Mr. Sedgwick
Capt. Bracegirdle.
17.4.41.

F

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT Imperial W 177

CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

DECYPHER FROM
SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.

Sent 15th April, 1941, 10 p.m.

Received 16th April, 1941.

Circular D. 206.

SECRET

Following for the Prime Minister -

TURKEY.

(1) The Soviet Government have suddenly adopted more favourable attitude towards Turkey as regards transit of goods including Munitions from Sweden to Turkey, also in respect of visas requested by the Turkish Ambassador.

Copy sent to War Cabinet - TELEPRINTED.

Def. Co-ord.,

E.A.

16/4/41.

Priority
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

MOST CABLEGRAM

748

DECYPHER FROM EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICER, LONDON.

No. 210.

Date Sent: 9.40 p.m. - 24/3/41.

MOST SECRET

Date Recd: 25th March, 1941.

U.S.S.R.

I had a long conversation this morning with Collier. He began by referring to widespread rumours of German plans to attack U.S.S.R. There is still no reason to suppose that such a move is likely - at any rate for some considerable time to come. These rumours are, no doubt, spread by the Germans themselves, as part of the war of nerves, with the objects of:

(a) deterring the Soviet from stiffening the backs of Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece by some action similar to the Vyshinski communiqué, and

(b) rendering the Soviet more compliant to future demands in respect of the Straits.

Collier's view is that it is almost certain that the Germans have over-played their hand with Russia, at any rate with regard to the Balkans, and have now frightened the Soviet Government to such a degree that the latter will not help them, for the present at all events, in putting pressure on Turkey.

It seems clear that the complete overrunning of Bulgaria and the sudden belated realization by the Soviet of what this means to the Black Sea area are the main causes of the Soviet's changed attitude; probably the passing of the Lease and Land Bill and President Roosevelt's speech and Eden's visit to Turkey have also had some influence.

Change is seen principally in the Soviet's exchange of declarations with Turkey, report of which has now been confirmed by Cripps. This is a step further than Vyshinski's first assurance to the Turkish Ambassador at Moscow (my telegram No. 192). Eden has urged great caution with regard to the declarations lest the Soviet Government draw in their horns and issue a denunci.

There is apparently no evidence of any increase in Russian troops in the Caucasus directed against Turkey, nor is there any confirmation of Afghan Minister at Angora's report that Russia was contemplating action against Iran.

According to one secret source change in the Soviet's attitude is largely due to Zhdenov whose influence with Stalin is great. This same source adds that Zhdenov has not only counselled concentration of Russian forces in South West but also urged conclusion of an agreement with Japan in order to free their hands in the East.

Collier considers that Matsukawa's visit to Moscow may result in Russian-Japanese economic agreement but that a political agreement is unlikely - unless Japan is ready to make some very substantial offer, such as cession of the Southern half of Sakhalin.

F

Recent exchange of notes establishing diplomatic relations between U.S.S.R. and Thailand is not to be regarded as done to please Japan. According to a "secret but reliable" source, Matsukata expressed displeasure and advised that the move be discouraged.

Collier does not expect that Russia will be prepared to do very much to stiffen Yugoslavia. Vyshinski admitted to Cripps that he was perturbed by the situation but he did not indicate that any action would be taken. The Soviet Government may make a declaration similar to that in the case of Bulgaria.

In the north Russians are lying low. There are no troop movements near the Finnish frontier and no evidence that a further Russian attack is contemplated by this spring. Furthermore the Russians have dropped their previous threatening attitude to the Finns regarding Petsamo nickel concession. On the other hand, probably owing to lack of Soviet administrative co-ordination, Russian wireless still continues to attack Finland. Cripps is being instructed to ask Vyshinski to stop this.

Dominions Office telegram D.143 reported increase of German influence in Finland. Yesterday Finnish Minister assured Collier that Finland would not adhere to Axis Pact, also, for what it is worth, that no further German troops would be let into Finland.

Sweden's scare of a German attack (Dominions Office telegram D.143) seems to have abated.

STIRLING.

Copies to:
War Cabinet: P.M.'s Dept; Defence Co-ord; Capt.
Bracegirdle: Mr. Sedgwick. - 25/3/41.

Russia-Turkey
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

I.4449

DECYpher FROM -
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.

Dated: 24th March 1941
7.45 p.m.
Received 25th March 1941.

(Received through U.K. High Commissioner.)

IMPORTANT. Circular Z.81 SECRET.

Following may be useful for the guidance of the press.

Foreign Office. It is considered undesirable to
emphasise or embroider reports of Soviet assurances to Turkey
which should speak for themselves. Such emphasis can only result
in the Soviet Government retracting by issuing démenti.

Copy to War Cabinet, Dept. Defence Co-ord., Information, E.A. 25/3/41

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

I.4173

CABLE 383/47 X 72

DECYPHER FROM
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS.
LONDON.

DATED 19th March, 1941. - 1.5 sz
RCVD. 19th March, 1941.

Circular telegram D. 149.

SECRET. Following telegram for the Prime Minister.

U.S.S.R. - TURKEY

My Circular D.142. The Turkish Government have replied to the Soviet Government thanking them cordially for the recent assurances and declaring that these apply mutatis mutandis to the attitude of Turkey towards U.S.S.R. if the latter country found itself in a situation similar to that covered by the Soviet assurances.

19th March, 1941. —

COPIES TO: War Cabinet
Def. Co-ord.
External Affairs.

F

CABLEGRAM. I.4038.

Via Cable W 273 CE 155/ CE 59

DECYPHER FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS, LONDON.

Circular D 141.

Date sent: 16th March, 1941, 4.15 a.m.
Date recd: 16th March, 1941.

SECRET

Following for the Prime Minister:-

U.S.S.R. - TURKEY.

The Soviet Ambassador at Angora called upon His Majesty's Ambassador on 11th March and asked about German movements in the Balkans. His Majesty's Ambassador stressed the value of the recent assurances by Monsieur VYSHINSKI to the Turkish Ambassador at Moscow to the effect that if Turkey were attacked by any foreign power and were obliged to defend her territory she could count on full understanding and neutrality of the Soviet Government. He pointed out that Turkey was doing the work both of herself and of the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Ambassador said that there had never been question of the U.S.S.R. making difficulties for Turkey.

In response to an enquiry, His Majesty's Ambassador refuted the suggestion that we would invade Syria and hand part of it to Turkey after the war. He explained that our loyalty to the French prevented us from making difficulties for them in Syria and only if outside circumstances rendered it necessary, should we contemplate action contrary to French interests.

His Majesty's Ambassador mentioned the desirability of the Soviet Ambassador maintaining close contact with the Turkish Government.

Copies to: War Cabinet; Dept. Def. Co-ord.; E.A. 17.3.41.
TELEPRINT SYDNEY.

F

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.
1.3370

Via Cable X 10 OF 42/216
CABLEGRAM.

DATED 4th March, 1941.

UNCRYPTED FROM =

2147

RECEIVED 3rd March, 1941.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS.

LONDON.

Circular telegram D.113.

SECRET

SECRET.

Following for the Prime Minister =

FRENCH EMPIRE.

I. The Germans are reported to be working for the control of air fields and petrol supplies in French Morocco, besides initiative propaganda among the Moors.

TURKEY.

II. The closing of the Straits by the Turkish Government on 26th February prohibits navigation at night and allows navigation by day only with pilotage.

III. H.M. Ambassador at Ankara and Moscow, having urged upon the Soviet Ambassador at Ankara the importance of closer Soviet-Turkish understanding the latter said that if the Turkish Government were prepared to make definite proposals, the Soviet Government would be ready to talk. He indicated that the Soviet Government would consider any Turkish overtures for war materials.

IV. On 2nd March, H.M. Minister at Sofia, having complained strongly of the action by Bulgarian Police against employees of H.M. Legation and against Bulgarian friendship "shown" to us, impressed upon King Boris that Bulgarian co-operation in the most recent German move including the partial mobilization of the Bulgarian Army, the posting of troops on the Turkish frontier and preparations for the reception of Germans had brought our relations with Bulgaria to a critical stage. H.M. Minister pointed to the slavery which awaited Bulgaria under Germany, indicated that Bulgaria would now find it difficult to avoid unfavourable consequences from the Peace Treaty and finally warned King Boris that the Germans in Bulgaria were threatening our allies and we had ready airoft for attacking our enemies on all fronts. King Boris, who appeared most friendly, replied unconvincingly that he had worked to keep Bulgaria out of war, but that Bulgaria had not been fairly treated and was now the victim of world events.

V. On March 3rd, the Germans were entering Sofia in increasing numbers. From statement by the President of the Council it is now clear that Bulgaria is openly siding a German attack or at least serious military threat to Bulgaria.

VI. My circular D.111, the Belgian, Polish and Netherlands East Indies representatives have instructions to leave simultaneously with H.M. Minister.

Copy sent to - War Cabinet
Defence Co-Ord.
S.A.

TELEPRINT, MELBOURNE.

F

FILE COPY.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MOST

CABLEGRAM

SECRET

DECYPHER FROM
HIGH COMMISSIONER,
LONDON.

387
Date sent 13th February, 1941.
7.30 p.m.
Received 13th February, 1941.

No.120.

FOR ACTING PRIME MINISTER. MOST SECRET.

U.S.S.R. relations with Turkey. In reply to an inquiry by the British Ambassador, Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs has described the Soviet attitude as "neither satisfactory nor unsatisfactory." On one matter they are amenable and on next obstructive but they have never followed up Minister for Foreign Affairs' suggestion as regards a wider understanding and Minister seems dissatisfied.

Soviet Ambassador angrily questioned the British Ambassador on February 12th with regard to the Turkey-Bulgaria negotiations. Was the object to facilitate German advance through Bulgaria? Was it the case that Turkey would not resist German advance through Western Bulgaria? British Ambassador denied both suggestions and gave the impression of his conviction of Turkish firmness. BRUCE.

Copy to P.M's. Dept. 13.2.41.

Mr. Sedgwick
Capt. Bracegirdle.

SECRET
PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

I.2184.

CABLEGRAM.

PP 180 3 CR 33 203 W 191

DATED 12th February, 1941.

11. 8. M.

RECEIVED 13th February, 1941.

DECYPHER FROM -

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
DOMINION AFFAIRS.

L O N D O N.

Circular D.68.

SECRET.

Following for the Prime Minister. -

R U M A N I A.

(1) The Norwegian Minister at Bucharest has been instructed to go to Belgrade where he is also accredited, without breaking off relations with Rumania. The Belgian Minister is being instructed to leave with His Majesty's Minister.

Y U G O - S L A V I A.

(2) According to His Majesty's Minister at Belgrade the Yugo-Slav Government have recently been subjected to increasing German pressure involving a campaign against our economic efforts.

T U R K E Y.

(3) In response to our enquiry the United States' Government have agreed to take over British interests in Turkey in the event of invasion by Germany Italy or the U.S.S.R.

(4) The present Soviet attitude towards Turkey appears to be strictly negative. The Soviet Government have so far disregarded the Turkish Government's intimation of their readiness to examine any Soviet proposals for extending the Turco-Soviet Treaty of friendship (my Circular D.630 paragraph 2).

(5) My Circular D.639 paragraph 4. The United States' Government have sent message to the United States' representatives at Belgrade and Sofia emphasising their determination to give all possible help to us and their faith in our victory.

(6) My Circular D.639 paragraph 3. The Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs maintains that the Turkish attitude has been made absolutely clear to the Yugo-Slav Government and expresses dissatisfaction with their response.

Copy sent to - War Cabinet
Defence Co-Ord.
R. A.

13/2/41

TELEPRINT SYDNEY & MELBOURNE

Turkey-Russia

SECRET

F. 12,538

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

Via Imperial CB 654/10 W 226

DECYPHER FROM

CABLEGRAM.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.

AT 29th December, 1940
6-20 p.m.

RECEIVED 30th December, 1940

CIRCULAR D. 630

SECRET

Following for the Prime Minister.

HUNGARY

1. The Secretary General has admitted to His Majesty's Minister at Budapest that the Hungarian Government have agreed to Germany's request for permission to station German Transport Officers at Hungarian railway centres.

TURKEY

2. In connection with the Turkish and Soviet approaches to Bulgaria, the Turkish Ambassador at Moscow recently remarked to Molotov that Turkey would take no step without previously informing the U.S.S.R.

The Soviet Ambassador at Ankara thereafter inquired whether the Turkish Government would confirm this in writing.

The Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs has now informed His Majesty's Ambassador that the Turkish Government have decided to reply that they note from recent conversations (in Moscow) that the Soviet-Turkish Agreement (presumably Protocol 1929, extending the Turko-Soviet Agreement of 1925, whereby both sides undertook not to conclude a political agreement with any immediate neighbour of the other without the other's consent) is regarded by both sides as still in force, also that the Soviet Government have expressed a desire to extend the agreement.

If this is true, the Turkish Government are ready to examine any Soviet proposal, provided that it rests on a reciprocal basis.

COPY - WAR CABINET
DEF. CO-ORD.
E.A.
30.12.40.

TELEPRINTED

Brown-throated
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

DECYPHER FROM:

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICER,
LONDON.

No. 1100

DATE SENT: 6.55 p.m.
18/12/40

SECRET

RECEIVED: 19/12/40

U.S.S.R. Following based on talk today with Collier head of Northern Department (who has been away for some weeks after the destruction by the bombs of his house), may serve as convenient summary of position.

(1) Anglo-Soviet trade relations. British Ambassador is now out of patience with lack of response by Soviet and has proposed that he should send a letter to Mikoyan withdrawing all offers. Foreign Office however consider that letter should be in less uncompromising terms.

(2) Baltic Ships. United Kingdom are now about to utilize the ships and compensation money will be paid not to the Soviet Government but into a blocked account. View here is that Soviet Government are not greatly interested in this matter and that Maisky has been making unnecessary difficulties on his own account (Dominions Office telegram D602). Ambassador is being instructed that future developments should be handled solely at the Moscow end.

(3) On political side Collier thinks it now seems clear that Molotov evaded commitments during his Berlin visit in particular the commitment to put pressure on Turkey. (Germans for their part will give Russia no assistance with regard to Finland).

On the other hand Molotov committed himself to increased economic assistance to Germany, especially oil.

(4) Since then Russia's main political step has been her approach to Bulgaria (Dominions Office telegram D601 and M102), ostensibly because of the possible threat from Turkey to Bulgaria but actually directed to try to keep Bulgaria from falling completely into the hands of Germany.

STIRLING.

Copies to: P.M.'s Dept. for War Cabinet
& Dept. of Def. Co-ord.

Capt. Bracegirdle
Mr. Sedgwick 19/12/40

Y

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

I. 10233.

Imp 76/8.

DECYPHER FROM
SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
L O N D O N .

Sent 9th November, 1940
12.10 p.m.
Received 10th November, 1940.

Circular B. 150.
Following for Prime Minister --
T U R K E Y .

The Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs informs His Majesty's Ambassador at Ankara that the Turkish Government have not asked the Soviet Government for war material. He indicates that any Turkish request would have to be made on a commercial basis.

The Secretary,
Dept. External Affairs.

Copy sent to War Cabinet, Def. Co-ord., E.A. TELEPRINTED.
Referred. 10/11/40

Anthony
Secretary.

F

Russia-Turkey

671.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

TELEGRAM FROM
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICER,
LONDON.

Sent 1st November, 1940
5.58 p.m.
Received 2nd November, 1940.

S.200.

Chugai editorial 30th October wonders how smoothly and speedily British and Turkish assistance will be given Greece. Unless Britain gives immense practical assistance Greece will be overcome. Greek war not so much clash between Axis and Greco-Turkish camp as between Axis and Britain. Chugai commentator says for New Order it was necessary sooner or later for Axis to liquidate remaining elements relying on Britain. Axis must be cautious because Britain will take opportunity to create split between them and Russia over Turkey.

Kokumin says Britain wants to test Triple Alliance and Japan must be careful.

Yomiuri correspondent Istanbul says Turkey and Soviet will not come in, but Soviet has promised Turkey help if Germany attacks her.

Transocean report Japanese Foreign Office spokesman stated Wednesday in view Italo-Greek situation not being a Japan so far refraining from active measures but closely watching developments. Spokesman declined answer whether Japan informed beforehand of Italy's step.

Domei report that Sawado, Japanese Ambassador to France, has arrived Japan. He said France's war entry quite likely as result Hitler-Laval meeting Moscow.

Press Thursday reported arrival Wednesday German Delegation led by Schnurre "to discuss progress of fulfilment of Soviet-German Economic Agreement".

Word omitted.

Turkey Russia
PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT. I.9480

VIA IMP. CE 40/335

DECYPHER FROM -

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.

DATED 22nd October, 1940,
11.10 p.m.
RECEIVED 23rd October, 1940.

Circular D.536. SECRET.

Following for the Prime Minister.

Following is a fuller account of the points of importance in the interview between Mr. Molotov and the Turkish Ambassador at Moscow on 17th October, at which the latter found the former most cordial and apparently quite sincere:-

(a) Molotov expressed great pleasure at the thorough preparations made by Greece in Thrace;

(b) He did not think that Italy would dare to attack Greece in view of these;

(c) He reaffirmed the Soviet Government's friendship and loyalty to Turkey;

(d) He said that it was as yet too early to say what the Germans were going to do in Roumania. He confirmed that the Germans had given the Soviet Government no indications whatever that they were sending troops to Roumania "for instructional purposes" and stated that at the appropriate moment they would demand an explanation from the Germans.

(e) He stated that the Axis-Japanese Pact only made clear to the world the line-up of Great Britain and the United States on the one side, against the Axis and Japan on the other.

(f) He said that if this Pact had been made three months ago it might have been more significant in its statement as to the partition of the world into spheres of interest, but that since the check Germany had received, it was of very little importance since it was only a still strong victorious group who could dictate such matters.

/ (g)

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PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CABLEGRAM.

I.9480

2.

(g) He took particular note of Turkey's statement that His Majesty's Government were fully satisfied with their choice of friends and that they were now confident that they would be in the winning group; as also of her declaration that if their vital interests were touched they would fight and that they considered that Thrace was the greatest vital interest of theirs; he agreed that while it was not yet time to lead the animal out openly with any fresh treaty with Turkey, it would be good to make their economic association closer. The Ambassador will see Mikoyan on this question.

(h) No allusion whatever was made to the question of military intelligence.

COPY TO WAR CABINET
DEPT. DEFENCE CO.
" E.A.

25/10/1940.

Turkey - Rumania

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CABLEGRAM.

9586

DECIPHER OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, LONDON.

Date: 18th October, 1940. Lodged 6 p.m.
No. 928. Received 8.40 a.m. 19.10.40.

FOR PRIME MINISTER. MOST SECRET.

**MOST
SECRET**

Turkey.

British Ambassador saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs on Wednesday after the Turkish Cabinet meeting. Letter said his Government thought the object of the Germans was in the first instance local, i.e. to consolidate themselves in Rumania and not certain of the process; (2) aimed against Russia against whom Germans might proceed subsequently by seizing Straits or direct attack; (3) (though less likely) ostentatious attack on Turkey or demand for passage through Turkey. This would take the form of propaganda and diplomatic campaign and finally, if this failed, of military action.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that there was no question of Turkey yielding to either propaganda campaign or direct attack. He then set out the various Turkish desiderata (a) direct contact by land with British forces in Middle East i.e. through Syria as soon as hostilities opened. (b) Help from R.A.F. (c) common action in naval sphere, and asked if extensive British help could be indicated as soon as possible.

In general Minister for Foreign Affairs appeared very firm.

Re U.S.S.R. Minister for Foreign Affairs said no news yet from Turkish Ambassador at Moscow. He thought it was impossible to count on the Soviet for anything owing to her intense fear of

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PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CABLEGRAM.

I. 8825

-2-

Germany. He also thought, however, that recent German action in Rumania had made the Soviet more inclined to turn in our direction. He gathered that German advance had been started without any prior communication to the Soviet.

BRUCE.

E. A.
COPY - WAR CABINET
MR. SMEDLEY
19.10.1940.

Teleprinted.

Turkey, Rumania,
**MOST
SECRET**

FILE COPY.

572/

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM

DECYPHER FROM: HIGH COMMISSIONER, LONDON.

Date sent: 7.17 p.m. 20.10.40.

No. 931.

Date recd. 12 noon 21.10.40.

FOR THE PRIME MINISTER. MOST SECRET.

Turkey - U.S.S.R.

Cripps has been told by Turkish Ambassador at Moscow that he had had most satisfactory interview with Molotov on 17th October. Molotov expressed pleasure at the thorough preparations made by Turks in Thrace, and he did not think the Italians would dare to attack Greece in view of these. He reaffirmed the Soviet Government's friendship and loyalty to Turkey and said Germans had given the Soviet Government no indication whatever that they were sending troops to Rumania. At the appropriate time the Soviet would demand an explanation from the Germans. He stated that the Axis-Japanese pact only made clear world line up of Great Britain and America on the one side against the Axis and Japan on the other, and added that if the pact had been made three months ago it might have had more significance in its statement concerning partitioning of world into spheres of interest, but that since the check Germany had received it was of very little importance. No allusion was made to the question of the Straits.

BRUCE.

Copy to - P.M's Dept. 21.10.40.

Copies to: Mr. Sedgwick.
Capt. Bracegirdle.
21.10.40.

Russia - Turkey
PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CABLEGRAM.

I.9353.

Via Cable CE 37/8.

DECYPHER FROM

DATED 19th October 1940.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE RECEIVED 20th October 1940.
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.

**MOST
SECRET**

Circular telegram D.529.

MOST SECRET.

Following for the Prime Minister.

SPAIN.

(1) Senor Suner has replaced Colonel Reigbeder as Minister for Foreign Affairs and secured the appointment of his own nominee to the Ministry of Commerce.

General Franco takes over the Ministry of Interior. While the change indicates concession by General Franco to German pressure and may have sinister implications, there are signs that its effect on Spanish Policy may be less than might be expected.

(2) The Turkish Ambassador at Moscow has had a satisfactory interview with Molotov in which the latter expressed great pleasure at Turkey's preparations in Thrace which he thought would deter Italy from attacking Greece; re-affirmed the Soviet's Government friendship and loyalty to Turkey; and agreed that while the time was not yet ripe to come out openly with any fresh treaty with Turkey, it would be good to develop closer economic association.

Copy sent to -
War Cabinet
Defence Co-ordination
E.A.
20/10/40.

Telesprinted.

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Handwriting
**MOST
SECRET**

507.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

DECYPHER OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM HIGH COMMISSIONER, LONDON.

Date: 12/10/40 Lodged 6.51 p.m.

No. 912 Recd. 9 a.m. 13/10/40

FOR PRIME MINISTER. MOST SECRET.
U.S.S.R.

Cripps had long talk with Vyshinski on Wednesday evening re detention of Baltic ships. Vyshinski expressed himself as anxious to settle this question apart from that of the Baltic gold. He did not seem to offer any objection when Cripps spoke of the United Kingdom's power to requisition the ships (under the right of Angary) but merely referred to the question of payment of compensation.

The United Kingdom Government are prepared to make an offer to the Soviet down the following lines:- to requisition shipping and to pay the usual charter rates to the Soviet provided that this does not prejudice their position in regard either to the recognition of the Soviet's acquisition of the Baltic States or to the question of Baltic gold.

The United Kingdom do not want to get out of step with the United States in the matter. They have telegraphed Lothian yesterday (Friday) pointing out that the possibility of improving relations with the Soviet is obviously very uncertain having regard to Stalin's anxiety not to embroil himself with Germany. Therefore as the Soviet is in a position to exercise so vital an influence on Turkey, whose position in turn is so vital to the Mediterranean position, (and also with the Far East reactions very present to their minds), the United Kingdom Government ^{are} reluctant to leave any chance untried

Lothian is to sound the State Department as quickly as possible and see whether they have any objections

to/

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to proposed offer; also whether the United States Government would be willing to consider similar scheme for Baltic shipping in the United States ports.

Cripps telegraphed yesterday evening that general opinion of his neutral colleagues is that the Soviet will shortly conclude a non-aggression pact with Japan but that this will be a mere defensive measure against the Axis pressure and will have no great significance as regards the fundamental attitude of the Soviet Government who desire to improve their relations with Great Britain the United States and other non-Axis Powers but cannot afford to show it. This Cripps considers is borne out by Vyshinski's attitude in regard to trade talks. "The Soviet Government appear anxious to find some means of keeping the United Kingdom Government in play, fearing the effect on Anglo-Soviet relations of conclusion of a non-aggression pact with Japan".

His neutral colleagues are also generally agreed that in a number of small matters the Soviet Government have recently evinced desire to improve relations with their neighbours e.g. Iran and Turkey and with Yugo-Slavia.

As regards German drive in the Balkans they agree that Turkey will be attacked before long and will resist but they do not agree as to method and the precise direction of the attack.

BRUCE.

*Thinking. Known
31.*
**MOST
SECRET**

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

DECYPHER OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, LONDON.

oct
Dated 1st September, 1940.

Lodged 7 p.m.

No. 854.

Received 8.30 a.m.
2.10.40.

FOR THE PRIME MINISTER. MOST SECRET.

TURKEY-SOVIET.

Telegram No. 846. British Ambassador at Ankara has had meeting with Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Turkish Ambassador to the Soviet Union, prior to the latter's return to Moscow.

He conveyed the following suggestions from United Kingdom Government as possible instructions for the Turkish Government to give their Ambassador :

- (I) The Soviet Government should be left in no doubt of Turkey's intention to act as a loyal ally to the United Kingdom Government; that they have made their choice and intend to stand by it.
- (II) The Ambassador should as soon as he returns inform the Soviet Government confidentially that the fate of Greece is a vital interest to Turkey.
- (III) He should make it plain to the Soviet on all occasions that the Turks consider Great Britain cannot be beaten.
- (IV) He should inform the Soviet Government that the future of Iran is a matter of vital interest to Turkey.

The Turks accepted all except (IV). The Turkish Ambassador said that his Iranian colleague in Moscow was already taking the line with the Soviet Government that Turkish-Iranian relations were closely connected.

Minister for Foreign Affairs seemed hopeful of prospects of improving relations with the Soviet. He instanced the prompt appointment of the new Soviet Ambassador to Turkey, Vinogradoff.

Turkish/

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Turkish Ambassador at Moscow had been very favourably impressed by him. The Minister for Foreign Affairs also cited as a good sign a recent Tass communiqué contradicting reports that the Soviet Government were trying to secure his own dismissal.

Bruce.

Turkey, Russia

SECRET

347.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

DECYPHER OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICER, LONDON.

Date: 26th September, 1940. Lodged: 6.40 p.m.

No. 846

Recd.: 11.30 a.m. 27/9/40

TURKEY.

I had talk this afternoon with expert on Turkey at Foreign Office. Only two recent developments, both satisfactory, are those reported in Dominions Office Telegram D. No. 470, paragraph 4 and Dominions Office Telegram D. No. 474 paragraph 2.

Turkish Ambassador at Moscow (my telegram No. 707) is returning to his post today.

STIRLING.

COPIES TO: P.M'S Dept. for War Cabinet
and Mr. Shadden. 27/9/40

F

Russia Turkey

I. 8062.

Via Imp. 189 7 268.

DECYPHER FROM

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.

DATED 18th September, 1940.
11.30 p.m.
RECEIVED 19th September, 1940

**MOST
SECRET**

Circular telegram D. 474.

MOST SECRET.

Following for the Prime Minister -

BALKANS.

1. French delegate who is on the International Commission of the Danube has been informed by the Secretary General (an Italian national) that the Commission has been dissolved by representatives of the German, Italian, Hungarian, Bulgarian Roumanian, Slovak and Yugo Slav Governments.

TURKEY.

2. His Majesty's Ambassador at Angora has made clear to the Minister for Foreign Affairs our desire for some solid statement of Turkey's attitude and represented our view that a display of firmness would be likely to discourage the U.S.S.R. from adopting a threatening attitude towards Turkey. The Minister for Foreign Affairs states that if the U.S.S.R. threatens Turkey it would offer war.

SYRIA.

3. The French High Commissioner has complained of the unfounded allegations by the British propaganda sources that the Italian Armistice Commission had demanded cession of French military aeroplanes and other material, and the use of aerodromes in Syria. He claims that the Commission have adhered strictly to the Armistice terms. Information of H.M. Consul General at Beirut suggests that they have confined themselves to making inventory of military material, dismantling aircraft, sealing aircraft aviation spirit and spares in hangars and compiling statistics regarding exportable surpluses of cereals and wool. H.M. Consul General receives the impression that they realise the difficulty of their position in the face of increasing pro British feeling and hostile French military.

J

INDO-CHINA.

4. According to His Majesty's Ambassador to China, the Chung King Government have reason to think, that the agreement reached at Tokyo between the French Ambassador and the Japanese Ambassador provides for Condominium in Indo-China.

5. United States Secretary of State has informed His Majesty's Ambassador that the United States Government are trying to collect aeroplanes to send to Indo-China to fortify resistance, but are embarrassed by the danger of aircraft falling into undesirable hands through possible Vichy - Berlin - Tokyo agreement. The Secretary of State had spoken most strongly to the new French Ambassador in the sense that if France valued American goodwill it must not become anti-British or connive at Japanese aggression.

WEST INDIES.

6. Having been told by His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington that we had some reason for thinking that there might be De Gaulle movement soon in Martinique and Guadeloupe, the United States Secretary of State indicated that in such an event the United States would have to act under the Havana Conference resolutions but that De Gaulle movement would not be unwelcome to him. The State Department are sending a destroyer to investigate the present situation.

Copy sent to -

War Cabinet
Defence Co-ord.
E.A.
19/9/40.

TELEPRINTED.

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

I. 7901,
CABLEGRAM.

DECYPHER FROM

SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,

LONDON.

Sent 13th September, 1940,
2.52 p.m.
Received 14th September, 1940.

Circular D. 466.

M O S T S E C R E T.

FOLLOWING FOR PRIME MINISTER -

**MOST
SECRET**

My Circular D. 415 (penultimate paragraph) --

There appears to be no immediate prospect of any negotiation between Russia and Turkey regarding the Montreux Convention. In view, however, of the possibility that this question might arise at some stage, our military advisers have been considering various modifications of the present limitations put on British and Soviet naval forces by the Convention, and have expressed the following views on the strategic considerations involved.

2. Possible curtailment of existing British rights:

(A) First situation: British Empire at Peace:

Cancellation of our right to send about 30,000 tons of cruisers, destroyers, sloops, etc., into the Black Sea, would deny us one method of upholding our prestige in Black Sea countries. Whilst this cancellation would not affect us in the present war, it is undesirable in principle and should only be accepted with a definite time limit.

(B) Second situation: British Empire at war, Turkey and Russia neutral:

We have the right to pass through Turkey (or Straits) without restriction to assist a State the victim of aggression, in accordance with a Treaty of Mutual Assistance concluded within the framework of the League of Nations and also binding Turkey. It does not seem that this right is being of any value to us.

(C) Third situation: British Empire and Turkey at war as Allies, Russia neutral:

Under Article 20 of the Montreux Convention we can send to the Black Sea any forces we like, provided Turkey agrees.

RS JD 30/9

CABLEGRAM.

We should not try to force Turkey to accept any curtailment of her right to enlist all available help from in such circumstances; though she might, unaided, successfully counter an attack from either Roumania or Bulgaria, she might well at the same time ask for help if Germany assisted either or both of the above countries by assembling submarines at Black Sea ports. Furthermore, Turkey might be unable to close Roumanian and Bulgarian ports to trade with Russia, whereas with our help the blockade of those ports would be greatly to our advantage, particularly in denying Russian aid to Germany. Although acceptance of the limitation of our rights to the despatch of naval forces from the Mediterranean to the Sea of Marmora (only) (a modification which has been suggested) would enable us to control this entrance to the Mediterranean and crossing from Europe to Asia, it would preclude us from assisting Turkey in the Black Sea. The possibility of assisting Turkey in this way must at present be remote, but the position might become more favourable in future, particularly if we had an opportunity of defeating the Italian Navy, or if the U.S.A. entered the war on our side. It is therefore undesirable to accept the limitation of our rights to send man of war forces to the assistance of Turkey in the Black Sea.

3. Possibility of any further extension of existing Russian rights:

(a) At present, the forces which Russia can pass through the Straits at any one time are limited to one capital ship (escorted by two destroyers) or 15,000 tons of cruisers or destroyers. Passage of Russian submarines except for repairs in dockyards outside the Black Sea is prohibited. While therefore the removal of the above mentioned restrictions would not materially affect Russia's existing rights to move the whole of her surface forces into the Mediterranean (provided such action were spread over a few weeks) it enables her to move her considerable fleet of submarines into that Sea.

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

I. 7901 - 3 -

CABLEGRAM.

(b) Unrestricted movement of Soviet submarines into the Mediterranean and beyond, whence, if the Soviet became hostile they could operate from Italian bases against our shipping not only in the Mediterranean but also in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, would seriously hamper our strategy by compelling us to keep in these areas anti-submarine forces which might otherwise be employed elsewhere.

(c) Any modification of the present restrictions imposed on the Soviet by the Montreux Convention would therefore be to our disadvantage.

.../ word apparently omitted.

Copy sent to War Cabinet.
Depts. Def. Co-ord.
Navy
E.A. TELEPRINTED.
14/9/40

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs.

Referred.

J. L. Murray
Secretary.

Turkey-Losia

**MOST
SECRET**

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

DECYPHER OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICER,
LONDON.

Date 28/8/40

Lodged 8.25 p.m.

No. 735

Recd. 3 p.m. 29/8/40

MOST SECRET

TURKEY.

Telegram 717.

U.K. Government have given the British Ambassador discretionary authority to urge the Turkish Government to send their Ambassador back to Moscow as soon as possible.

STIRLING.

Copy: War Cabinet
Mr. Shredder Inf.
P.M's Dept.
29/8/40.

Sedgwick
Bracegirdle

F.

Turkey, Moscow

**MOST
SECRET**

DECYPHER FROM -

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICER,
LONDON.

DATE SENT 24th August, 1940, 2.40 p.m.
DATE RECEIVED 25th August, 1940.

No. 717.

MOST SECRET.

Turkey. My telegram No. 706 paragraph 1. Turkish Ambassador at Moscow has expressed to British Ambassador at Ankara view that governing British relations with Soviet Government is mortal fear of Germany. He thought that if U.K. showed any sign of gaining upper hand over Germany the Soviet would in due course approach them with some proposals spontaneously. The British Ambassador suggested to Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs that next step in Turkish-Soviet relations should be a friendly message to Soviet Government by Turkish Ambassador when latter returns to Moscow. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that he had as yet taken no decision, and Ambassador may not return to his post for a month.

STIRLING.

Copy War Cabinet.
Mr. Shodden.
Ext. Affairs.
25.8.40.

Y

DECYPHER FROM

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER,
LONDON.

Sent 23rd August, 1940
9 p.m.
Received 24th August, 1940.

No. 714.
FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.
M O S T S E C R E T.

T U R K E Y.

External Affairs telegrams 706 and 708 --

The British Ambassador has now reported on his conversation with the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding Greece. The latter repeated his view that Mussolini would not attack Greece.

The Ambassador, however, asked if the Minister for Foreign Affairs could give some indication as to how he felt about Turkey's attitude under the Anglo-Turkish Treaty if the question of attack on Greece suddenly arose.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs was reserved and vague. He maintained that it would not do for Turkey to offend Russia and that relations with Russia had not in fact improved. To this the Ambassador pointed out that action in support of Greece could hardly be regarded as an offence to Russia.

The Ambassador formed the view that in the event of Italian attack, Turkey would make some excuse re fulfilling obligations under Article 3 and would avoid anything beyond "consultation". He considers, however, that their attitude might be different if British success against Italy became marked or in the event of conspicuous German failure in invasion scheme.

In subsequent communication the Ambassador analyses fully the advantages and disadvantages of Turkey becoming a belligerent arriving at the conclusion that in present circumstances her non-belligerency preferable.

BRUCE.

Copy sent to War Cabinet,
Dept. Def. Co-ord. 24/8/40

**MOST
SECRET**

DECYPHER OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICER, LONDON.

Dated: 28th August, 1940.

Lodged 7.10 p.m.

No. 708.

Recd. 10.00 a.m. - 25/8/40

**MOST
SECRET**

TURKEY. MOST SECRET.

(1) U.S.S.R. Turkish Ambassador at Moscow has now arrived at Ankara but no report in yet as to discussions.

(2) GERMANY. Papen's conversation with the President last week on return from Berlin does not appear to have changed anything in Turkish-German relations. The Germans are now pressing the Turks for extension of the recent \$20,000,000 agreement.

(3) United Kingdom. In view of the above, the United Kingdom Government are putting up to the Turks new scheme for commercial exchanges, to be carried out under United Kingdom Commercial Corporation.

No reply yet to United Kingdom Government's approach to Turks re Italian-Greek situation (Dominions Office telegram D.429).

STIRLING.

Copies to: War Cabinet
Mr. Strehen
Mr. Sheden 28/8/40.

Copies to: Capt. Bracegirdle
Mr. Sedgwick 28/8/40.

✓

Russia Turkey
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

DECYPHER OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM HIGH COMMISSIONER, LONDON.

MOST
SECRET

Dated 18th August, 1940.

No. 694.

Lodged 9.29 p.m.
Received 9.30 a.m.

19.8.40.

FOR THE PRIME MINISTER. MOST SECRET.

Turkish-Soviet relations. Halifax has now instructed Cripps that in all the circumstances we must now await consultations at Ankara between the Turkish Ambassador at Moscow and his Government before considering the question further.

BRUCE.

Turkey loss
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MOST SECRET

DECYPHER OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM HIGH COMMISSIONER, LONDON.

Dated: 16th August, 1940. Lodged 9.16 p.m. - 16/8/40.

No. 691. Recd. 3.00 p.m. - 17/8/40.

FOR PRIME MINISTER. MOST SECRET. U.S.S.R.

My telegram 682. Cripps has now replied to
Halifax expressing view that proposed general communication
"would be interpreted by Soviet Government either as a blank
cheque or more probably as an unsigned cheque."

BRUCE.

Secretary to the Minister
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

DECYPHER OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM HIGH COMMISSIONER, LONDON.

Dated 15th August, 1940.

Lodged 9. 55 p.m.

No. 682.

Recd. 10.30 a.m. - 16/8/40.

FOR PRIME MINISTER. MOST SECRET.

Turkish-Soviet relations.

My telegrams Nos. 587, 616 and 618.

Before finally settling instructions for approach to be made by Cripps to the Soviet Government regarding Turkish-Soviet relations the United Kingdom Government instructed the Ambassador at Ankara to obtain once again the views of the Turkish Government. The latter adhere to their earlier view that it would be unwise for Cripps to express any opinions or make any suggestions until Stalin's views were known and that therefore Cripps should simply make necessary soundings with Soviet Government in order to learn their point of view.

Halifax therefore suggested to Cripps a communication down the following lines:

"Stalin's remarks at interview with Cripps re Turkish-Soviet relations have been carefully considered by the United Kingdom Government who have in their turn consulted the Turkish Government. The United Kingdom Government however are naturally anxious to do all they can to see progress of improvement in relations of Soviet Russia and Turkey and would be quite ready to place their services at the disposal of the Soviet Government with this object in view. They would therefore be glad to learn the point of view of the Soviet Government in the matter."

Halifax is however inclined to share the view expressed by Cripps at an earlier stage that such a communication will be interpreted by the Soviet Government as a blank cheque. If Cripps still holds this view proposed written communication is to be dropped altogether.

At the moment it looks as if the whole question of approach is likely to fall to the ground.

BRUCE.

London - Tuesday
PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CABLEGRAM.

DECYPHER FROM -

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.

DATE 15th August, 1940
1.20 p.m.
RECEIVED 14th August

Circular telegram 1416

MOST SECRET.

Following for the Prime Minister.

BALKANS.

British prestige having suffered seriously from the German successes and collapse of France, is gradually recovering as the awaited German invasion of Britain is to occur. Germany and the U.S.S.R., however, at present predominate but the uncertainty of their immediate intention, together with the possibility of their individual interests leading ultimately to a clash, has produced hesitancy throughout the Balkans area. In these circumstances the Balkan States have shown a decided inclination to develop relations among themselves.

HUNGARY.

Complete subservience to Germany largely prevents the from pressing Transylvanian claim though Germany may well find difficulty in extracting Hungarian recognition of Bulgaria's claim for settlement of her Dobrudja claim. For the present the Hungarian Government are content to place full confidence in early German victory for Hungarian occupation of Slovakia and Transylvania.

GREECE.

The Greek Government in spite of their measures against the violation of Greek air and water by Italy, remains more anxious to avoid any action

which might provoke an Italian attack than to ensure respect of their own neutrality. While with a view to consolidating their neutrality, they have not been loathe to strike at the pro-German political elements, and in such circumstances have been compelled

**MOST
SECRET**

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CABLEGRAM.

compelled them to adopt a more belligerent attitude to Germany in the economic field.

YUGOSLAVIA.

Rumours of heavy Italian political demands in Yugoslavia have been denied but the threat of an unnecessary large Italian garrison in Albania, keeps Italy-Yugoslav relations delicate. Meanwhile the Yugoslav Government are under strong economic pressure from Germany, who is already taking steps to secure control of Yugoslav copper and when and whose evident intention is to isolate Yugoslavia from the rest of the Balkan States. Earlier inclinations to roll with U.S.S.R. against Axis domination appear to have yielded to a policy of temporary conciliation towards Germany. The Yugoslav Government thus hope to avoid doing anything which might prejudice their own integrity or Balkan peace.

BULGARIA.

The Bulgarian people probably remain at heart pro-Russian but the Soviet Government appear to be doing little overtly to increase prestige in Bulgaria, and Bulgarian Government, afraid of communalism impressed by German success and no doubt influenced by the large numbers of Germans in Bulgaria, have been looking to Germany for a settlement of Dobrudja claim. Any undue delay in securing a settlement no doubt cause serious repercussions.

So long as they consider it worth while to cultivate the Bulgarian Government may hesitate to draw closer to Yugoslavia (although Yugoslav Government would welcome such an approach) since they realise that Yugoslavia may be overrun by Germany and a Yugoslav - Bulgarian understanding drew attention to a common feeling for the U.S.S.R.

ROMANIA.

The Rumanian Government having resigned themselves

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CABLEGRAM.

inevitable territorial concessions and virtually surrendered the Roumanian oil industry to Germany, are certain to be faced with intensified Soviet propaganda and growing anti-revisionist movement supported by the Iron Guard.

There are indications that they are ready to satisfy the Bulgarian claim, which is a relatively simple and clear cut issue in order to strengthen their hands in dealings with the more far reaching Hungarian demands.

TURKEY.

The attention of the Turkish Government has been largely diverted from manipulation of the Balkan Entente to the adjusted position vis-a-vis Germany and the U.S.S.R. So long as we are unable to afford adequate support against Germany or the U.S.S.R., Turkey appears certain to remain non-belligerent. Franco-German relations remain limited to commercial bargaining. As regards the U.S.S.R. the Turkish Government have indicated willingness to improve relations but not at the expense of any concession in regard to the Straits which might threaten Turkish result of security.

CONCLUSION.

Indications are that Germany wishes to preserve peace in the Balkans area for her economic plan and the Balkan States are at the present ready to take their individual cues from Germany. Germany's acquiescence in the Soviet occupation of Roumanian territory suggests a movement by either great power would not necessarily provoke German-Soviet conflict. Moreover, both will no doubt be likely to avoid any step which would be likely to lead to an open clash. The present hesitancy, therefore, seems to foreshadow development of German influence with or without (1) territorial cessions or (2) Soviet connivance.

As received
Uninitiated

14.8.1940.

COPY TO - WAR CABINET
DEPT. DEFENCE CO.
R.A.

Russia-Turkey
FILE COPY

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

DECYPHER OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICER, LONDON.

Dated: 5th August, 1940.

Lodged 8.50 p.m.

No. 632.

Recd. 8.30 a.m. - 6/8/40.

U.S.S.R. MOST SECRET. My telegram No. 628.

Turkish Ambassador at Moscow told the British Ambassador on 1st August that although Molotov had seen the German Ambassador three times during last fortnight and the latter had just been presented with a fine villa by the Soviet he did not believe there had been any fundamental improvement in Soviet-German relations. Although Russians were evidently afraid at present to do anything likely to antagonize Germany he was convinced they wished to maintain relations with the United Kingdom. He thought the Germans were attempting to incite the Russians against Iran, possibly also against Turkey but for the moment they seemed to have failed. If Soviet attitude were to change he thought demands would first be made to Iran and would relate to areas in which Turkey was least interested, in order to avoid trouble with the latter.

STIRLING.

COPIES TO:

WAR CABINET
CAPT. BRACEGIRDLE
MR. SEDGWICK
MR. STRAHAN
MR. SHEDDEN.

6/8/40.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

DECYPHER OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM HIGH COMMISSIONER LONDON.

Dated 1st August, 1940 Lodged 9.18 p.m.

No. 618 Read. 10.30 a.m. 2/8/40

FOR THE PRIME MINISTER. MOST SECRET.

TURKISH-SOVIET RELATIONS.

My telegram 616 brings facts up to date.

Position complicated and difficult to understand. Following points may be of some assistance.

United Kingdom's interest is (1) to ensure that Turkey safeguarded from falling under German domination and freed from danger of attack by Soviet. (2) To get security from Russian naval threat in the Mediterranean. (3) Maintenance of Montreux Convention while Turkey non-belligerent and facilities through Straits if articles 20 or 21 apply either for the protection of Turkey, for better prosecution of the war, or possibly for a demarche to assist Russia against Germany.

(4) Adequate defence of the Straits, as anti-tank obstacles in case of landing attack by Germany. Turkey's interest is (1) "maintenance of sovereignty independence and integrity." (2) Certain that being able to control the Straits in her interests when any of these are threatened.

U.S.S.R. interest is (1) Security from attack by Black Sea by any Mediterranean power, that is including ourselves. It is possible that they want reassurance as to United Kingdom's intentions.

(2) Security from attack by Germany via Danube or Balkans: No. 4 of United Kingdom's desiderata is also an interest of U.S.S.R.

(3) Freedom for her warships to pass into the Mediterranean if she becomes a belligerent.

(4) As a permanent requirement an equal right with Turkey to decide all questions concerned with entry of warships of other powers into the Black Sea.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

**MOST
SECRET**

DECIPHER OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM HIGH COMMISSIONER
Dated 31st July, 1940 Lodged 8.30 a.m.
No. 616 Received 11.30 a.m. 1/8/40.

FOR THE PRIME MINISTER. **MOST SECRET.**
TURKEY-RUSSIA RELATIONS.

My telegrams 587 and 602. Dominions Office telegram No. 2195 summarises very thorough analysis by Hugessen of Turkish-Soviet and British desiderata, and of principles on which tripartite agreement might be based, and also instructions sent to Cripps regarding his approach to the Soviet Government.

Cripps' reactions were as follows:
Little chance of seeing Stalin again personally (and difficult even to see Molotov). He considers it dangerous for United Kingdom to act as middleman; line should be to let each party know that the other is willing to discuss the matter, indicate United Kingdom's attitude and leave initiative either to the Soviet or Turkey.

Replying in detail to Hugessen's analysis Cripps agrees that only possible form of agreement is ad hoc and that Montreux Convention must remain as permanent basis but he draws attention to article 29 under which Convention can be revised after November 1941. He stresses however that bipartite rather than tripartite negotiations should be envisaged as a start, with United Kingdom perhaps coming in at a later stage.

BRUCE

Copies to: Captain Bracegirdle
Mr. Sedgwick.

WHITEHALL 5422



6, RICHMOND TERRACE,
WHITEHALL,
LONDON, S. W. 1.

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

SECRET

H.729.

1st August, 1940.

MEMORANDUM TO :-

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

TURKISH-SOVIET RELATIONS.

I enclose copies of two memoranda prepared
for the High Commissioner, which may be of interest.

Alfred Stirling

10

Rp wrt

H.729.

1st August, 1940.

MEMORANDUM TO:-

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

TURKISH-SOVIET RELATIONS.

I enclose copies of two memoranda prepared
for the High Commissioner, which may be of interest.

SECRET

MR. BRUCE:

TURKISH-SOVIET RELATIONS

1. About the middle of June it was reported that Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs would shortly go to Moscow to resume talks broken off in October 1939. U.K. considered this would be not unwelcome but decided not to encourage Turks as it was felt they would make up their own mind in the matter irrespective of British advice.

2. At the beginning of July Cripps saw Stalin who indicated that he would welcome help of U.K. Government in bringing about improvement in Russo-Turkish relations. "Question of control of Straits ought to be dealt with".

3. Further developments affecting the situation were -

- (a) French collapse;
- (b) Russian occupation of Bessarabia and North Bukovina;
- (c) Roumanian renunciation of U.K. guarantee.

4. U.K. Government reviewed whole Balkan policy. Two general principles outstanding -

- (i) To exploit conditions likely to embroil Soviet and Germany;
- (ii) To guard against any development likely to embroil Soviet and Turkey.

5. Somewhat surprisingly, British Ambassador Ankara welcomed idea of Stalin's suggestion and expressed view that Turks would welcome it also. He admitted, however, that "if the general question of the Straits régime came up it would, of course, be more complicated". But at this stage made no further comment re the Straits.

A few days later (9th July) he reported that Numan seemed anxious that U.K. should encourage Turkish-Soviet rapprochement.

6. 13th July. Cripps sounded a warning that "actual basis for rapprochement should be carefully gone into". Care must be taken that his approach to Soviet should not be interpreted by latter as a "blank cheque". This would encourage Soviet to increase their demands and might well precipitate war in the Black Sea. He stressed that main point at issue was Straits régime and U.K. Government must be prepared to sponsor some modification of Montreux Convention in return for Soviet guarantee of Turkey.

Probably Cripps did not intend rather ominous word "guarantee" should be taken literally.

Ambassador Angora pointed out that what we should aim at was "mutual understanding on equal terms between Soviet and Turkey".

7. 15th July. Hugessen reiterated that he had twice made it clear to Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs that U.K. had no intention of pushing them into anything which would involve involuntary sacrifice of Turkish rights.

"At Moscow in October 1939 and even since the Turks have adhered strictly to the outlook of the Montreux Convention which I think represents their Magna Carta."

He had, however, told Minister for Foreign Affairs that it would be difficult to secure any result without touching the Straits question. He considered that both Minister for Foreign Affairs and Numan must be aware of this.

8. 16th July. Lord Halifax instructed Cripps that U.K.'s readiness to mediate was not that they were hopeful of achieving a new settlement as regards Straits, but because -

- (a) They did not wish to appear obstructive;
- (b) They felt it would be useful "to bring Stalin into the open";
- (c) They might ultimately by this means bring the two Governments to co-operate against the common danger of German penetration to Black Sea.

9. To this Cripps replied on 18th July. that we already knew what Stalin wanted from the discussions and it would be worse than useless to "bring him out into the open" if we merely brought him out on the wrong side. There were two courses open to the Soviet -

- (i) To try to frighten and weaken Turkey until she ceded them preponderant share in control of Straits;
- (ii) To gain some more modest share in control by friendly negotiations and co-operation with Turkey against an eventual German attack.

The Soviet would not be content with a mere "platonic reaffirmation of traditional Soviet-Turkish friendship" - in the face of rapid German expansion.

If Turks again refused positively to reconsider Straits régime Soviet would be encouraged to adopt course (a) and might indeed make some arrangement with Germany for joint intimidation of Turkey.

10. 19th July. After consultation by U.K. Turkish Government agreed to Cripps sounding Soviet with regard "to the development of Turco-Soviet and U.K.-Soviet relations". They stressed that Turkey would by no means be disposed to accept a compromise "which does not take fully into account her difficulties for the maintenance of sovereignty, independence and security".

Numan took the view that for the present Turkish Government must keep in the background and therefore would not send instruction to Turkish Ambassador Moscow.

11. 23rd July. Von Papen was summoned from Angora to Berlin. Numan considered Germans may have got wind of Cripps-Stalin talk and possible developments therefrom.

12. Meanwhile Hugessen forwarded analysis of situation and possible solution (Annex "A").

13. On receipt of this appreciation U.K. sent instructions (26th July) to Cripps to approach Stalin and say U.K., anxious to see improvement in Soviet-Turkish relations, were ready to place their services at Soviet disposal with this object in view. He was to point out difficulties in present circumstances of modifying Montreux Convention and suggest ad hoc agreement on basis of common interest in conjunction perhaps with U.K. Government, in protecting security of Straits against threat of German and/or Italian aggression. Cripps was not to make concrete suggestions in regard to Straits but try to elicit them from Stalin. Article 20 of Convention might provide a good point de départ.

Lord Halifax agreed with Cripps that there was some slight risk of bringing Stalin out in the open on the wrong side, but this was more than balanced by -

- (a) Chance of getting from Soviet statement of true nature of their aims re Straits - as possible resultant disillusionment of Turks would probably redound to U.K. advantage;
- (b) Failure to take up Stalin's invitation might be construed as a rebuff;
- (c) U.K. cannot afford to renounce any chance, however small, of helping to bring about improvement in Turco-Soviet relations.

14. Cripps has now replied that there is no chance of seeing Stalin personally; probably not even Molotov.

He also feels dangerous for U.K. to act as middle man. Our line should be to let each party know that the other is willing to discuss the matter, indicate our own attitude, and leave the initiative to them.

He has replied in detail to Hugessen's analysis of possible basis of tripartite agreement (Annex "A").

He agrees that only possible form of agreement is ad hoc and that Montreux must remain as permanent basis, but draws attention to Article 29 (revision after November 1941).

But he considers bipartite negotiations should be envisaged, as a start, with U.K. perhaps coming in later. He therefore proposes a communication to Soviet Government -

- (a) Reminding them that while Montreux must remain permanent basis there can be revision after November 1941;
- (b) Telling them we have reason to believe Turkey would be prepared, if Montreux remains basis, to consider ad hoc arrangement with Soviet;
- (c) Asking them whether such a basis offers possibility of useful negotiations - Turkey applying Articles 20 and 21;
- (d) Asking them whether they have any other suggestions as to ad hoc arrangement within the Montreux Convention.

31st July, 1940.

~~SECRET~~

ANNEX "A".

Ambassador, ANGORA.
(telegram No.849 of 24th July)

Ambassador, MOSCOW.
(Telegram No.529 of 28th July)

Examination of factors which might contribute to Turko-Soviet understanding.

Neither Germany nor U.S.S.R. wants to go to war with the other.

Nevertheless a conflict of interests is becoming clear - due to threat of growing German influence and possible military menace in Balkans.

This menace is of common concern to U.S.S.R., Turkey and United Kingdom.

Indeed, till a decision has been reached in Mediterranean it is the only clear factor on which agreement can be based.

Such an agreement can only be ad hoc. Even Stalin's demands of Turkey in October 1939 - though aimed at getting a privileged position in regard to control of Straits - were really aimed at covering the existing situation. In October U.S.S.R., fresh from its agreement with Germany, were concerned not with the activities of Germany but with United Kingdom and France, and were trying to prevent passage of their fleets into Black Sea to attack U.S.S.R. Stalin's demands were not really a definite attempt to upset Montreux.

None of the Straits régimes for last 150 years have been more than ad hoc, and they have been upset every time the international equilibrium has changed. Agreement now contemplated could hardly be expected to last more than duration of war.

Desiderata of Turkey:

- (a) Maintenance of her own sovereignty and integrity. " "
- (b) Certainty of control of Straits if any of her interests are threatened. " "

Desiderata of U.S.S.R.:

- (a) Security from attack by Black Sea by any power. " "
- (b) Security from attack by Germany via Danube or Balkans. " "
- (c) Freedom for her warships to pass through Straits into Mediterranean. " "

Ambassador, ANGORA.

Ambassador, MOSCOW.

Desiderata of United Kingdom:

- (a) Security from Russian naval threat in Mediterranean.
- (b) Freedom to send warships into Black Sea either (i) to protect Turkey or, (ii) for better prosecution of war or, (iii) for possible démarche to help U.S.S.R. against Germany.

Since October 1939 position has entirely changed and U.S.S.R. wants to guard herself not against United Kingdom but Germany.

Agreement might therefore be based on following 7 principles:

- (1) Turkey, U.S.S.R. and United Kingdom to agree not to attack each other.
- (2) United Kingdom and U.S.S.R. to agree not to ask Turkey for passage of warships through Straits for any purpose involving aggression on the other.
- (3) Turkey to allow such passage for mutual defensive purposes and in return get assurances to that effect.
- (4) Above engagements to lapse if U.S.S.R. or United Kingdom joined any Power or combination at war with the other.
- (5) Turkey to undertake not to let her territory or territorial waters be used by any power as a base for hostile operations against United Kingdom or U.S.S.R.
- (6) United Kingdom and U.S.S.R. to guarantee not to threaten or attack Turkey's independence or sovereignty, and to admit ultimate right of Turkey to control Straits if she considers these threatened. (Turkey would anyway assume this right if threatened).

Yes. Agrees strongly that only possible form of agreement is ad hoc.

Yes. Agrees that basis of these 7 principles is a possible one on which to proceed, provided it is possible and desirable to have a tripartite arrangement. He feels strongly however that bipartite negotiations (U.S.S.R.-Turkey) would be more hopeful, and that we might get Turkey to suggest United Kingdom coming in on them at a later stage in the negotiations.

He considers too that principles (2) and (3) depend on Turkey accepting view that it is only "if Turkey considers herself threatened with immediate danger of war" that she can invoke Article XX and that it is only in such circumstances that she can frame a new agreement which does not contravene Montreux. Unless this is so principles (2) and (3) would be outside the terms of Montreux.

Ambassador, ANGORA.

(7) All three to reaffirm validity of Montreux and declare nothing in proposed agreement could override or vitiate it. Aim should be to maintain Montreux as best permanent working arrangement in peace.

(8) Above suggestions do not take into account Stalin's (a) ambitions for permanent share in control of Straits in peace, or (b) his view that all Black Sea Powers should share in control.

(9) British Ambassador suggests (a): Stalin may possibly be persuaded that no permanent arrangement is possible now, (b) term "Black Sea Powers" is now very vague in view of virtual collapse of Roumania. Bulgaria is only Black Sea Power which would be left out.

(10) Lord Halifax (telegram 318) has made additional suggestion that Turkey's right under Article 20 of Montreux (i.e. when threatened with imminent danger of war, (a) to suspend main articles of the Convention (b) to have full discretion in the passage of warships) would be a good point de départ for a Turkish-Soviet agreement under which Soviet, if requested by Turkey, would lend aid in actual defence of Straits.

Ambassador, MOSCOW.

Yes. Agrees Montreux must remain as permanent basis. He points out however that any government can, under Article 29, raise question of revision in November 1941. (see also below).

No. Considers form of agreement - by which Soviet if requested by Turkey would lend aid in Straits - is impossible, as being exactly the kind of guarantee to which U.S.S.R. have persistently objected, i.e.: liability of some other country to decide when and how U.S.S.R. should be called in to assist. U.S.S.R. will want right to take full share in deciding whether and how protection to Straits is to be given.

He also reiterates that it is only "if Turkey considers herself threatened with immediate danger of war" that she can invoke Article XX, and he considers that it is only in such circumstances that she can frame a new agreement which does not contravene Montreux.

He considers it would be wrong to remind U.S.S.R. as Lord Halifax suggested, that any modification of Montreux Convention which would be of practical utility to U.S.S.R. is unlikely to be acceptable either to Turkey or U.S.S.R. Soviet would think this meant there would be no chance of revision of Montreux under Article 29 after November 1941 and would be deterred from coming to an ad hoc understanding. United Kingdom must be prepared to leave fluid position after the war.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

DECYPHER OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, LONDON.

Dated: 26th July, 1940. Lodged 10.35 p.m.

No. 602. Received 11 a.m. 27.7.40.

IMMEDIATE.

FOR THE PRIME MINISTER. PERSONAL FOR HIMSELF. MOST SECRET.

High Commissioners had a meeting with the Prime Minister this morning. Principal questions discussed:

- (1) Smuts and your cables re possible economic offensive by Hitler.
- (2) Japan, and
- (3) Possibility of United Kingdom acting as mediator in improving Turkish-Soviet relations.

With regard to (1) the Prime Minister expressed the view that the urgency of the question had been diminished by the omission from Hitler's recent speech of anything specific as to Germany's plan for European economic future. I urged that the matter might at any time again become urgent particularly if Hitler decided attempted invasion United Kingdom too risky - or having attempted was repelled. In any case we should be prepared with positive proposals to counter any move on his part, particularly as Europe faced with starvation and suffering under Gestapo while their countries are occupied might in the absence of any alternative despairingly acquiesce.

The Prime Minister expatiated at considerable length on the subject of Europe after the war and to my surprise visualised the necessity of League of Nations or some similar body having armed strength to enforce its decisions and internationalised troops. Although discussion was a lengthy one I do not anticipate that any action will be taken to translate the views that the Prime Minister expressed into any definite proposals for discussion and, when agreed to, for use should occasion arise. The only course is to continue to hammer at other members of the Government.

With regard to (2), I put the position strongly down the lines of your telegram of 25th July, and with regard to (3) I emphasise particularly the point raised in my telegram No. 587.

The discussions on (2) and (3) were in my view very useful.

4

The Prime Minister's mind is so pre-occupied with the immediate problem of the defence of the United Kingdom - possibly a good thing as this issue for the moment transcends all others - that I gather it is very difficult to get him to give his mind to other questions. I believe that your telegram was of real educational value and discussions both on Japan and Turkish-Soviet relations will make him take a greater personal interest in both questions.

BRUCE.

Russia-Turkey

FILE COPY
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
DECYPHER OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM HIGH COMMISSIONER, TURKEY
Date 22nd July 1940
No. 587

MOST SECRET
Received 11.30 a.m.
23/7/40.

FOR THE PRIME MINISTER MOST SECRET

Turkish-Soviet relations. See D.O. telegram D.366. Any discussion of the question of Straits will overshadow in Soviet view any other matter. In telegram just received Cripps emphasises this fact and expresses the view that if some modification of the Convention in favour of the Soviet could be brought about there is good chance of bringing about Turkish-Soviet rapprochement, thereby barring Germany's advance towards Asia Minor and at the same time weaning the Soviet Union from German influence. Fundamental to this, however, is that the United Kingdom should be prepared for some modification of the Convention and that Turkey should agree to modification contemplated. Moment I feel has not arrived for a decision as to what modification, if any, it would be prepared to accept and to promote Turkish-Soviet discussions until it has done so would be most unwise as a break down owing to failure to arrive at any arrangement about the Straits would create a dangerous situation and inevitably lead to a worsening of relations between the United Kingdom and the Soviet.

BRUCE.

7

Russia-Turkey
PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

VIA J.M.P. 479/40.

CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

DECYPhER FROM -

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.

DATED 21st July, 1940,
9.30 a.m.
RECEIVED 21st July, 1940.

Circular D. 366.

MOST SECRET.

Following for the Prime Minister.

FRANCE WEST AFRICA.

1. Agreement has been reacted with the West African
Merchants' Association for the resumption of trade with the
Cameroons.

TURKEY.

2. In reply to our enquiry regarding M. Stalin's
suggestion for improving Turko-Soviet relations, with special
reference to the Straits, the Turkish Government state that
they see nothing against our sounding the Soviet Government in
order to learn their point of view without committing the Turkish
Government or entering into fundamental discussion of the
question as Turkey will not accept a compromise which does not
take fully into account her difficulties for the maintenance
of her sovereignty, independence and security.

UNITED STATES.

His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington has been
informed of the following four proposals which the United
States Secretary of State will submit to the Havana Conference:

(1) Development of Inter-American Financial and Economic
Advisory Committee as the instrument of consultation especially
in regard to the effect of deranged foreign markets on the
American Republic.

(2) The creation of facilities (loans through the Export
Import Bank) for temporarily financing and stopping the accumulation

1. 6713
PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CABLEGRAM.

of surpluses of commodities essential to the economic life of the American Republics.

(3) Development of commodity agreements i.e. the regulation of coffee and other surplus markets, with a view to assuring equitable terms for producers and consumers.

(4) Public Health measures, Nutrition and organisation for relief - distribution of some part of surplus commodities.

COPY TO - WAR CABINET
DEPT. DEFENCE CO.
" E.A.
MR. MURPHY
MR. MOORE
MR. MCFARLAINE.

32.7.1940.

Russia-Turkey
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

DECYPHER OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICER, LONDON

Dated 19th July, 1940.

Lodged 8.30

No. 578

Recd. 10.4 a.m. - 20/7/40

TURKEY. Telegram 541 of 11th July. Recent German campaign against the Minister for Foreign Affairs seems to have failed at least for the present; Sarajoglu received ovation in Turkish Parliament July 12th.

On the other hand German attempts to embitter relations between Russia and Turkey may have had rather more success. A secret report has come in of a visit by Turkish Ambassador at Moscow to Molotoff. Though the Ambassador adopted very conciliatory attitude over White Paper Molotoff apparently replied with hints regarding possible "frontier adjustments" between Russia and Turkey in the Caucasus area.

Shortly afterwards, however, came Tass denial of rumoured Soviet ultimatum to Turkey and strong speech by Turkish Prime Minister in Parliament re-affirming Turkey's intention to fulfil all her obligations and at the same time stressing that Turkey had never meditated unfriendly action against Russia. As a result the tension somewhat relaxed.

No reply yet from the Turks to the British Ambassador's question regarding ^{approach?} (approval) to Stalin. The Ambassador has told the Minister for Foreign Affairs that in his opinion it will be difficult to secure any result without touching the Straits question and Conndi, Minister for Foreign Affairs must be perfectly alive to that fact. The Ambassador comments that "Montreux convention represents their view of Magna Carta."

Finalization of new Turkish-German trade agreement for 22 million Turkish pounds (my telegram No. 418) seems imminent. It appears to be down the lines communicated by the Turks to the United Kingdom (e.g. no supply of chrome)

BULGARIA. You will have noted changed British attitude towards the Dobrudja question (Dominions Office telegram D. 357) consequent on Rumania's entry into the orbit of Germany. There are many press reports of frontier incidents in the Dobrudja.

COPY to: BRACEGIRDLE &
SEDGWICK 22/7/40

STIRLING.

London
K. 28 Via Imp. 198/85.
PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

I. 5579

DECYPHER FROM:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.

Dated 17th July, 1940.
11.40 p.m.
Received 18th July, 1940

CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

Circular D.557. MOST SECRET. Following for the Prime Minister.

FRANCE:

M. Paul Morand has been appointed by the French Government agent for the liquidation of Economic and commercial affairs in the United Kingdom. We will similarly appoint a diplomatic agent to the French Government.

(1) We have informed M. Paul Morand that unless our Consuls in North Africa are permitted to resume their functions, we will be compelled to reconsider the position of French Consuls in British Territory, (who have so far been allowed to perform normal duties). M. Morand has agreed to endeavour to secure permission for the return of our Consuls particularly to Lyons and Marseilles.

ROUMANIA:

(3) While the Roumanians are relieved that the Munich conference between Germany, Italy and Hungary has not so far produced Transylvania crises, the majority are reported becoming reconciled to the inevitability of territorial changes. Following on the Hungarian demobilization measures, Roumania has largely demoralized.

BULGARIA:

(4) Subject to any comments from His Majesty's Ambassador at Angora, His Majesty's Minister at Sofia has been authorized to inform the King of the Bulgarians that in view of the changed situation in Roumania we are now prepared to sympathize with any Bulgarian desire to obtain present settlement of the Dobrudja claim.

TURKEY:

(5) The Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs has expressed scepticism as regards the practicability of our suggestion that the Turkish Government might approach the Soviet Government with a view to offering Bulgaria, joint Turkish Soviet support for her Dobrudja claim. The position would however be different if the Soviet Government approves Turkey.

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CABLEGRAM.

- 2 -

(6) The Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs interprets the recent German intrigues at Angora as designed to embroil Turkey with the Soviet Union with the ulterior object of weakening the Soviet Union and preventing the Soviet reapproachment with ourselves CHINA:

(7) The Chinese Government have protested against the proposed suspension for three months of transit of war material via Burma Road.

JAPAN:

(8) His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokyo reports that agreement respecting Hong Kong and Burma was signed on 17th July.

COPY - War Cabinet - TELEPRINTED TO SYDNEY.
Defence,
External Affairs.

18.7.40

Russia - Turkey

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

DECYPHER OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM HIGH COMMISSIONER, LONDON.

Dated 11th July 1940

Lodged 9.5. p.m.

No. 541

Recd. 10.30 a.m.
12/7/40.

FOR PRIME MINISTER. MOST SECRET. TURKEY.

There have been an exceptional number of reports, mostly conflicting, from various sources during the last few days, which leave the position extremely confused. The chief factor which emerges is German activity, mainly in two directions: (1) publication of White Paper with document showing Allied plan for attack on Caucasus etc. This is aimed at creating tension between United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. and getting rid of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sarajoglu, as being a leading supporter of Allies.

Endeavour to change relations between Russia and Turkey with a view to frightening the latter into dependence on Germany for "protection". Under this head come putting out of rumours that as soon as Russian Ambassador returns from Turkey to Moscow Soviet will make far-reaching demands on Turkey.

The British Ambassador reports that the Turkish Government do not appear apprehensive of any such demands by Russia (though other sources report they are in great anxiety), and that Sarajoglu's position seems to be un-weakened by German campaign against him.

Cabinet has considered the question United Kingdom approaching Turks with regard to Stalin's recent expressed wish for better relations with Turkey (my telegram No. 509). The British Ambassador has expressed the view that any approach on the part of the Soviet, either direct or through British, would be received sympathetically by the Turks, though he admits "if general question of the Straits régime came up it would of course be more complicated."

The British Ambassador has now been instructed to inform the Turkish Government of Stalin's remarks to Cripps and to ask Stalin for particulars of what he meant by an improvement in

in Russian-Turkish relations.

Great care will be taken in approach to Turkey to reassure the Turks that we would not be a party to Russia's advancement at the expense of Turkey.

It cannot of course be excluded that Germany and Russia may be in collusion over Turkey (e.g. the reported meeting in Istanbul between German and Russian Ambassadors to Turkey). Though it cannot be to Germany's interest to have Russia on the Straits, they may possibly have a plan for dividing up Balkans and/or the Near East (e.g. Germany taking Turkey and Russia Iran.)

BRUCE.

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CABLEGRAM.

DECYpher FROM

SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.

I. 5350.

Imperial GE 36/170.

Sent 12th July, 1940.

O140

Received 12th July, 1940.

Circular D. 337.

MOST SECRET.

FOLLOWING FOR PRIME MINISTER -

B A L K A N S.

1. Turkish-Soviet relations remain obscure, but there are indications that Turkey is apprehensive of Soviet intentions. The Germans are generally believed to be exploiting this situation with a view to -

- (1) getting rid of the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs;
- (2) making capital, at our expense, out of settling what may be artificially created Turkish-Soviet difficulties.

2. According to Turkish Secretary General, Germany has the upper hand of the U.S.S.R. in Bulgaria and is trying to settle the Dobrudja question, conversations having begun between Bulgaria and Roumania.

F R A N C E.

3. The French Government have suggested that a representative should provisionally remain in London with the task of settling outstanding commercial and economic matters. He would have certain diplomatic privileges and would maintain contact with us while the French Government examine our proposals for restoring diplomatic relations on normal basis.

TELEPRINTED to War Cabinet.
Depts. Defence, E.A.

12/7/40

7

CABLEGRAM.

Hand - W.W.
MAY 70.
M.S. SECRET

DECYPHER FROM -

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.

DATED 13th July, 1940,
11.32 p.m.
RECEIVED 13th July, 1940.

Circular D. 343.

MOST SECRET.

Following for the Prime Minister:-

BALKANS.

In view of the expressed willingness of Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs to consider in so far the Soviet aims in the Black Sea if approached by the Soviet Government, and M. Stalin's suggestion that we should help the Soviet Government in improving Russo-Soviet relations, special reference to the question of the Straits, His Majesty's Ambassador at Angora has been instructed, unless he sees objection, to acquaint the Turkish Government with M. Stalin's suggestion and enquire whether they would agree to our asking the Soviet Government to state more precisely what they have in mind.

In proposing this we have no intention of suggesting that the Turkish Government should renounce any of their rights under the Montreux Convention, nor that any special rights should be given to the U.S.S.R.

Signs of growing pro-axial inclination on the part of the Yugoslav Government appear to be due to (1) fear of Communist encroachments liable to incur Italian dissatisfaction and (2) realisation of the Soviet weakness via a via Germany.

His Majesty's Minister at Sofia anticipates possible danger of conflict of interests between Germany, U.S.S.R., and Turkey over the Dabrujia question. He feels satisfaction of Bulgarian situation may come soon from either Germany or the U.S.S.R.

COPY TO - WAR CABINET, DEFENCE AND INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Russia Turkey
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

**MOST
SECRET**

DECYPHER OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM THE HIGH COMMISSIONER,
LONDON.

Dated 12th July, 1940.

Lodged 10.59 p.m.

No. 541.

Received 9.15 a.m.
13.7.40.

FOR PRIME MINISTER. MOST SECRET.

TURKEY. Third para. from end should read as follows :

After words "British Ambassador has now been instructed" read
"to inform the Turkish Government of Stalin's remarks to
Cripps and to ask Turks whether they would like the United
Kingdom to ask Stalin for particulars of what he meant by an
improvement in Russian-Turkish relations."

BRUCE.

*Copy to P.M.C.
L.M. 12/7/40*

7

FILE COPY.

Russia - Turkey
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CYPHER OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM HIGH COMMISSIONER, LONDON.

Dated: 11th July, 1940.

Lodged 9.5 p.m.

No. 541.

Recd. 10.30 a.m. - 12/7/40.

FOR PRIME MINISTER. MOST SECRET. TURKEY.

There have been an exceptional number of reports, mostly conflicting, from various sources during the last few days, which leave the position extremely confused. The chief factor which emerges is German activity, mainly in two directions: (a) publication of White Paper with document showing Allied plan for attack on Caucasus etc. This is aimed at creating tension between United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. and getting rid of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sarsjoglu, as being a leading supporter of Allies.

Endeavour to change relations between Russia and Turkey with a view to frightening the latter into dependence on Germany for "protection". Under this head come putting out of rumours that as soon as Russian Ambassador returns from Turkey to Moscow Soviet will make far-reaching demands on Turkey.

The British Ambassador reports that the Turkish Government do not appear apprehensive of any such demands by Russia, (though other sources report they are in great anxiety), and that Sarsjoglu's position seems to be un-weakened by German campaign against him.

Cabinet has considered the question United Kingdom approaching Turks with regard to Stalin's recent expressed wish for better relations with Turkey (my telegram No.509). The British Ambassador has expressed the view that any approach on the part of the Soviet, either direct or through British, would be received sympathetically by the Turks, though he admits "if general question of the Straits regime came up it would of course be more complicated."

The British Ambassador has now been instructed to inform the Turkish Government of Stalin's remarks to Cripps and to ask Stalin for particulars of what he meant by an improvement in Russian-Turkish relations.

Great care will be taken in approach to Turkey to reassure the Turks that we would not be a party to Russia's advancement at the expense of Turkey.

F

- 8 -

It cannot of course be excluded that Germany and Russia may be in collusion over Turkey (e.g. the reported meeting in Istanbul between German and Russian Ambassadors to Turkey). Though it cannot be to Germany's interest to have Russia on the Straits, they may possibly have a plan for dividing up Balkans and/or the Near East (e.g. Germany taking Turkey and Russia Iran.)

BRUCE.

Copies to:

Capt. Bracegirdle
Mr. Sedgwick

12/7/40.

Anthony Eden
PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

I. 5159.

CABLEGRAM

via Imperial 253

DECYPHER FROM

SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,

Sent 7th July, 1940, 6.10

LONDON.

Received 8th July, 1940.

Circular D. 815.

M O S T S E C R E T.

FOLLOWING FOR PRIME MINISTER -

TURKEY - U. S. S. R.

**MOST
SECRET**

The following commentary on the Turkish attitude and the Turkish-Soviet relations may be useful to you in assessing pre-developments in South-eastern Europe.

1. In the long run, Turkey's foreign policy is governed by that of Russia - the hereditary enemy whose agelong ambition is to wrest the Straits from Turkey. Whatever country is opposed to Russia is ipso facto favoured by Turkey. Thus, in the last war, Turkey sided with Germany largely because Germany was Russia's enemy and Great Britain was Russia's ally. Last year, when we started our negotiations with Turkey which led in autumn to the Tripartite Treaty, the issue was somewhat confused by -

- (a) the belief, which lasted even after the Soviet Union's invasion of Poland, that the Soviet Government had no expansionist ambitions and did not, like the Tsarist regime, covet the Straits;
- (b) the fact that at that time Italy had in Turkey's eyes taken the place of Russia as Enemy No. 1, owing to her occupation of the Dodecanese;
- (c) Turkey's suspicion that Germany wished again to revive the *Dreng nach Osten* policy and her resolve not to lend herself again to this policy as she did in 1914.

2. It was in this atmosphere that our treaty was negotiated with Turkey last summer and autumn.

3. Since then Turkey has once more become aware and afraid of Soviet ambitions as regards the Straits, while her desire to take the offensive against Italy seems to have weakened.

7

MOST

CABLEGRAM.

I. 5159 -

4. At the same time, Turkey has come to the conclusion that she cannot expect from us the help that she had hoped for under the Treaty if she were attacked, especially now that France has collapsed. On Italy's coming into the war, she therefore found an excuse for not implementing her treaty obligations. The pretext for her abstention, however insincere it may be, was in effect based on the new facts of the situation. In other words, Turkey cannot risk coming into the war on our side unless she is sure that we can come to her defence if she is attacked

- (a) by Italy in the Aegean Sea;
- (b) by Germany through Bulgaria, and
- (c) by the Soviet Government either through Bulgaria, the Caucasus or by sea.

5. When Turkey signed her treaty with us she only had (a) and (b) in mind. But now that the danger of (c) has arisen and is rapidly over-shadowing both (a) and (b) in Turkey's eyes, Turkey is fast reverting to her old attitude, when her policy was dictated solely by her fear of Russia. This is so much the case that if this fear should at any moment turn to panic she might very well perform a complete volte face and enter as close relations with Germany as she entered with us last autumn. This might happen if she felt that either with our connivance or as a result of our impotence in the Mediterranean the Soviet Government were going to make a concerted effort to seize the Straits. In that event, it is possible that she would appeal to Germany to defend her against such an attack, and Germany would have every reason to respond to this appeal. In the first place, as long as the idea of Drang nach Osten persists in Germany's mind, Germany badly does not want to have Russia established across her path in the Bosphorus; and secondly, Germany would naturally be only too willing to

CABLEGRAM.

detach Turkey from her present connection with us and set her up once again as the protector of Turkey and the Near East against not merely Soviet but also British domination.

6. The seriousness, therefore, of a possible volte face on the part of Turkey should not be under-estimated, and it would be important to hold Turkey where she is, i.e. in position of a benevolent non-belligerent; and this not merely on account of her importance as a military and strategic factor in the Near East but because her example is bound to react on Egypt, Iraq and Iran.

7. It goes, of course, without saying that we should like to have Turkey in the war as a belligerent ally, but failing this we must strive:--

- (1) To reassure Turkey that the alliance with us, even if it does not give her all the security she requires, still represents the best policy for her to follow in the present circumstances.
- (2) To ensure that no efforts that we may make to collaborate with the Soviet Government should be such as to throw Turkey out of our orbit.
- (3) To prevent a breach or conflict between Turkey and the Soviet Government.

Copy sent to War Cabinet.
Depts. Defence. E.A. TELEPRINTED.

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CABLEGRAM.

I 5086.

for goods manufactured for them in Germany. They admit that some of the imported metals from British sources would also go to Germany in this way.

Copy to - War Cabinet.
Dept. Def. Co-Ordn. (TELEPRINTED)
Dept. E.A.
Customs.
Commerce.
S. & D.
5.7.40.
Treasury.

Turkey-Turkey
PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CABLEGRAM.

I. 5055.

DECYP ER FROM

D.W. 359/Via Imp. CE 39.
DATED 4th July, 1940.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.

6.45 p.m.
RECEIVED 5th July, 1940.

Circular D. 307.

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL.

Following for the Prime Minister -
BALKANS.

The general situation remains unsettled. The following points may however throw light on the attitude of the countries most nearly affected by the Soviet occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina.

GERMANY AND ITALY.

While the German Government were probably advised by the Soviet some time ago that the latter would, given suitable opportunity, advance their claim against Roumania, there seems little doubt that the Soviet move in fact surprised both the German and Italian Governments. In these circumstances the latter two appear to have advised the Roumanian Government to capitulate. The indications are that Germany, anxious to prevent (1) the Soviet Government threatening oil supplies, and (2) general conflict in the Balkans which might arise from prosecution of Bulgarian and Hungarian claims against Roumania, will endeavour to preserve the present territorial status of Roumania; or alternatively to lay down limits of the new Roumania to the profit of Hungary and possibly Bulgaria, thus, as she hopes, avoiding open conflict.

BULGARIA.

The Bulgarian Government at present restrained by German and Italian influence and desirous of avoiding war, do not appear likely to advance the Dobrudja claim unless Hungary moves. If Hungary moves the Bulgarian Government will probably be compelled by public opinion to move also, but would avoid if possible the use of force to secure the claim. The risk of a Bulgarian move against Turkey is negligible.

**MOST
SECRET**

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

- 2 -
I. 5055.

CABLEGRAM.

HUNGARY. There is reason to believe that the Hungarian Government have invited Roumanian Government to negotiate territory concessions through intermediary of Yugoslav Government and that the latter are urging moderation on the Hungarian Government and conciliation on Roumanian Government. The Italian Government are understood to be also exercising a restraining influence on the Hungarian Government.

TURKEY.

The Turkish Government while denying any Soviet move to secure the command of the Bosphorus have made it clear that any such move would mean war with the Soviet Government. While their relations with the latter remain more careful than cordial, they see little prospect of the Soviet Government concerting with themselves any policy which might arouse German resentment.

Copy to - War Cabinet.
Dept. Def. (TELEPRINTED)
Dept. E.A.
5.7.50.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

~~FAIRS~~ **MOST
SECRET**

Dated 3rd July, 1940.

Lodged 10.10 p.m.

No.509.

Received 10 a.m.
4.7.40.

IMMEDIATE.

FOR THE PRIME MINISTER. MOST SECRET.

U.S.S.R. My telegram No.457, paragraph 3.

Cripps has now seen Stalin, presented the Prime Minister's message (Dominions Office telegram D.292) and had talk lasting nearly three hours, described as friendly and severely frank.

The main points were:

(a) Germany has not the strength to dominate all Europe,
(b) Russia has no intention of going further into Rumania or the Balkans, (c) Russia would welcome the help of the United Kingdom Government in bringing about improvement in Russian-Turkish relations. "The question of control of the Straits ought to be dealt with." (d) The Soviet would not break their trade agreement with Germany, one of its terms being that they supply non-ferrous metals to Germany. There was no intention of Russia using her trade agreement with Germany against the United Kingdom.

Cripps has commented that as a result of talk trade negotiations may start shortly but I do not feel very optimistic especially in view of Stalin's insistence on the right to supply Germany with non-ferrous metals.

The question of Turkey and the Straits will need very careful handling. While it is clear that the U.S.S.R. would welcome our assistance in arriving at better understanding with Turkey and if we could do this "we should be in a fair way to harmonizing the real interests of the three countries and thus creating the best possible guarantee against German aggression in the Balkans," there is no doubt that the Turks are now very apprehensive of Russia.

BRINGER.

Turkey
PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

I. 4995.

CABLEGRAM.

DECYPHER FROM

X 84 Cable CE 345/45.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.

DATED 3rd July, 1940.
3 a.m.
RECEIVED 3rd July, 1940.

Circular D. 304.

MOST SECRET

Following for the Prime Minister -

SWEDEN.

1. While business circles are turning inevitably towards Germany and the press is cautioned not to provoke German resentment, in general the Swedes remain steadfastly opposed to Germany, friendly towards ourselves, and particularly sympathetic with the French.

TURKEY.

2. The Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs while denying any Soviet move towards securing command of the Bosphorus stated on 29th June that any such steps by the Soviet Government would mean war, in which case Turkey would ask for assistance, in particular the despatch of a naval force to the Black Sea.

SYRIA.

3. General Nuri has expressed satisfaction with the conversations at Angora. He has suggested a policy of "Syria for Syrians" which he believes the Turkish Government also favour. Supported by His Majesty's Ambassador at Angora, he is urging the Turkish Government to guard against passage through Turkey of German or Italian agents on subversive missions into Syria.

IRAN.

4. 1. United Kingdom. Cancellation of the credits agreement and Iranian congratulations to Turkey on remaining outside the European war makes it clear that our relations with Iran are not good.

2. U.S.S.R. Unconfirmed rumours mention a Soviet ultimatum regarding Northern Iranian provinces, railway from the North to the South and "expropriation" of the Anglo-Iranian Oil

CABLEGRAM.

Company. The Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs has however denied to His Majesty's Ambassador at Tehran reports that Iran is threatened by the Soviet Union.

3. Germany. German activities appear less marked; the Iranian authorities are taking precautions particularly as regards the oil areas. Indications are that while the Shah will not offend Germany so long as she is victorious, he will continue to observe a neutral attitude.

JAPAN-NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES.

5. Indications that Japan would welcome autonomy in the Netherlands East Indies (thus blocking any German claim to intervene) are strengthened by Japanese and Batavian press reports that the Japanese Government intend to appoint diplomatic representative at Batavia. His Majesty's Consul-General at Batavia has been informed officially that this would not be permitted although the Japanese Minister for External Affairs will probably visit the Netherlands East Indies to carry on discussions with the Governor-General.

INDO-CHINA.

6. Commander-in-Chief of French Naval forces in the Far East has issued an order stopping hostilities between French naval forces and enemy forces but declaring decision to defend Indo-China against all aggression.

Copy to - War Cabinet.
Dept. Def. Co-Ordn. (TELEPRINTED)
Dept. E.A.

Russia Turkey
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

DECYPHER OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICER LONDON.

Dated 21st June 1940

Lodged 9.10 p.m.

No. 453

Received 11 a.m., 22/6/40.

SECRET.

U.S.S.R. My telegram No. 438. Although there are new Governments in Lithuania and Estonia (and both are well on the way to become Russian provinces) Latvian Government still remains. Vyshinski Soviet Public Prosecutor has just arrived at Riga on a mission to President presumably dictate formation of new Government there.

While there is some evidence that U.S.S.R. had squared Germany before the latest moves in the Baltic States, on the other hand the British Minister at Kovno reports that Germans were taken by surprise. This is also the view of Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Whether Soviet action was prearranged or not, it seems immaterial as in any case the Germans have not reacted against it. Head of Northern Department to-day expressed the view that Russians were taking these moves really seriously but he does not consider that they will break with Germany or cease supplying her. These supplies have not decreased and according to a Ministry of Economic Warfare report oil supplies from Caucasus to Germany across Black Sea have increased recently. He does not consider Germany would react against any steps in Baltic States that Soviet may care to take, even Finland; only thing likely move them is whether there is intervention in Rumania in order to seize Bessarabia.

There are rumours as yet unconfirmed that Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs will shortly go to Moscow to resume talks broken off in October. It is thought here that this course is likely; consideration was given yesterday as to whether the United Kingdom should encourage development which would not be unwelcome, but felt that Turks will make up their own minds in this matter irrespective of British advice.

STIRLING.

Russia - Turkey
PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CABLEGRAM. 4246.

Via Imp. 190/45 X 6.

DECYPHER FROM

DATED 14th June, 1940.
1.10 a.m.
RECEIVED 14th June, 1940.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.

Circular D. 260.

MOST SECRET.

Following for the Prime Minister :-

TURKEY.

**MOST
SECRET**

(1) Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed His Majesty's Ambassador at Angora that the recent Turkish intimation to the Soviet Commissary for Foreign Affairs that Turkey would mobilize if Italy came in was not very well received. The Minister for Foreign Affairs considers Turco-Soviet relations not particularly cordial at present.

IRAQ.

(2) The French Government have instructed their representatives at Bagdad and Jeddah to move Iraqi and Saudi Arabian Governments to create trouble for Italy in Libya, Ethiopia and Somaliland.

Copy sent to -
War Cabinet (Teleprinted)
Defence
E.A.
14.6.40.

Turkey - Kuwait
PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

3373

DECIPHER FROM:

CABLEGRAM.

Secretary of State
for Dominion Affairs,
LONDON.

Dated: 18th May, 1940.
3.36am
Received: 18th May, 1940.

Circular D.193. SECRET.

Following for the Prime Minister:-

ITALY.

1. The Contraband Control Officer at Gibraltar has been instructed that Italian ships "Conte De Savoia" and "Wick", due at Gibraltar shortly, are not to be delayed for any form of control.

EGYPT.

2. Apart from Wafdist efforts to create anti-British feeling, the situation and public opinion in Egypt appears to be satisfactory. The Prime Minister is proving helpful in taking precautions against suspected mischief makers.

TURKEY.

3. The Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed His Majesty's Ambassador at Ankara that Turkish-Soviet relations have improved.

IRAN.

4. Our position in Iran is reported to be unsatisfactory compared with that of U.S.S.R. and Germany, which nevertheless do not appear to have gained ground lately. Commercial difficulties are largely responsible.

CHINA.

5. As regards our desiderata in the Tientsin Agreement, the Japanese Government have proposed a formula covering the removal of the barrier and the cessation of anti-British activities which subject to minor amendments seems satisfactory. Instructions sent to His Majesty's Ambassador will, it is hoped, now lead to early conclusion of the Agreement.

Copy sent to:-

War Cabinet, Defence Co-ord., External Affairs.
18/5/40.

Russia Turkey
EN CLAIR

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

TELEGRAM FROM EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICER, LONDON.

Dated. 22 APR 1940

No. B.61.

News Chronicle correspondent Shanghai reported 21st April that behind seizure and detention of 5 Japanese fishing boats after being machine-gunned by a Soviet patrol ship naval observers Shanghai saw confirmation that submarine bases are being built there and also at Whale Bay, Vladivostock. Times correspondent Istanbul reports Turkish press is abstaining from any unfriendly references to Soviet.

EXTERNAL.

Turkey Russia
PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CABLEGRAM.

1801.

SECRET

DECYPHER FROM

Imp. CE 1/14.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.

DATED 17th March, 1940.
8.40 p.m.
RECEIVED 18th March, 1940.

Circular B. 59.

SECRET

Following for the Prime Minister.

ROUMANIA.

1. The Roumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs states that in granting amnesty to the Iron Guard, the Roumanian Government are not surrendering to the Iron Guard but offering the individuals chance to re-affirm their loyalty.

TURKEY.

2. According to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs Turko-Soviet relations are "normal but cold".

FRANCE.

3. Unanimous resolution of confidence in the Government was passed at the Secret Session of the Senate on 15th March.

FINLAND.

4. The Soviet Treaty was signed at Moscow on the 12th March, instruments of ratification to be exchanged in Moscow within ten days.

SOUTH AMERICA.

5. My Circular B. 46. All of the American Republics have now approved the text of the protest to His Majesty's Government about the scuttling of the WAKAMA.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

6. According to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris Mr. Sumner Welles was most favourably impressed by the visit to London. At the same time Mr. Welles appears to admire Mussolini.

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CABLEGRAM.

- 2 -

7. My Circular B. 50. We have granted free passage to shipment of 250,000 dollars of American Red Cross supplies for Poland. American safeguards against German diversion remain somewhat inadequate.

THAILAND.

8. My Circular B. 46, paragraph 5. The Franco-Thai readjustment of the Mekong frontier now seems likely to be settled. This will expedite signature of the non-aggression pacts with France and the United Kingdom.

Copy War Cabinet.
Dept. Def. Co-Ordn.
Dept. E. A.
18.3.40.

**MOST
SECRET.**

TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, LONDON.

Dated 16th March, 1940. Lodged 3.10 p.m.

No. 187. Recd. 8.55 a.m.

MOST SECRET.

BALKANS AND MIDDLE EAST.

(1) Turkey-U.S.S.R. Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs on Thursday night told the British Ambassador that relations were "normal but cold", and no attempt on the Russian side to improve them.

(2) Turkey-Italy. There have been rumours of Italian approach to Turkey for some form of co-operation in the event of Russian move in the Balkans. Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that not true.

Turkish Ambassador in London has put forward as a personal suggestion the possibility of seeking solution of the Italian coal problem by means of triangular deal between the United Kingdom, Italy and Turkey. Under this Italy would supply Turkey with arms and war material (to which apparently Italy has no objection in principle). Proposal has been referred to the British Ambassador at Rome.

(3) Turkey-Germany. Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs states that von Papen has been cross-examining him closely regarding Anglo-French treaty and as to whether there are any additional secret engagements with the Allies. Von Papen said that Germany accepted the fact of the alliance but put forward as a personal suggestion that Turkey should make an agreement with Germany under which she would not take on any commitment with the Allies outside the treaty.

The British Ambassador considers this tentative approach shows German anxiety that the Allies might use Thrace, the Straits or Caucasus for an attack even though Turkey remained non-belligerent.

(b) Romania. "Telegraph" and evening press here giving great publicity to King Carol's sudden reversal of policy regarding the Iron Guard. Germans will undoubtedly add this to their claims of great diplomatic triumphs along with Finnish peace and coal agreement with Italy. No advice yet from Legation at Bucharest but thought here that move may be part of Carol's technique of maintaining balance.

STIRLING.

COPIES TO:

War Cabinet
Secretary, Prime Minister's Dept.
Secretary, Dept. of Defence Co-Ord.
Mr. Sedgwick
Capt. Bracegirdle.

Kosovo Turkey
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

**MOST
SECRET**

RECEIPT OF TELEGRAM FROM EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, LONDON

Dated 15th March, 1940.

Lodged 6.37 p.m.

161.

Read. 9.00 a.m. 16/3/40.

MOST SECRET. BALKANS.

(1) In all Balkan countries there has been increased interest plus some anxiety, in the activities of General Weygand's Army in the Near East. They have been assured that army is there for defence only and represents reasonable and legitimate precautionary measure.

Moscow's growing concern with Weygand's army is reflected in more friendly attitude which the Soviet is seeking to adopt towards Turkey and in precautionary measures taken in mining approaches to Adessa Sebastopol and Batum.

(2) French Military Attaché at Sofia recently reported that Bulgarians will call up large numbers of men in April. British Minister considers report exaggerated.

It had been proposed to commit to writing the conclusions of the recent Balkan Entente meeting and circulate these to Bulgaria. Romanian Minister for Foreign Affairs has now declined to do so. Bulgaria has settled amicably the two recent frontier incidents with Rumania and Turkey respectively.

Kirby, Ross
**MOST
SECRET**

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Decypher of Telegram from External Affairs Officer, London.

Dated 11th March, 1940.

Lodged 6.45 p.m.
Received 8.30 a.m.
12/3/40

177.

MOST SECRET.

TURKEY. My telegram 144.

(i) United Kingdom. You will have seen Turkish reply to questions regarding Straits (D73). Further clarification will be sought later in staff conversations, a series of which due to commence on 15th March. Press report that Wavell and Weygand are at Ankara is incorrect but Allied air chiefs are there.

(ii) Germany. "Telegraph" recently featured report that Germans were sending troops to Crimea with Baku as ultimate destination. This may well be true. Turkish-German trade talks have not reached finality.

(iii) U.S.S.R. Important broadcast by Turkish Prime Minister on 29th February was partly prompted by recent rumours of tension and stated that Turkey had no intention of attacking the U.S.S.R. Prime Minister seemed disappointed that this had not evoked some response. (See however paragraph (2) of my telegram No. 167.)

(iv) Bulgaria has complained to the United Kingdom of recent Turkish troop movements but has been told to address complaint direct to Turks.

Distribution - War Cabinet
Mr. Strahan
Mr. Sheddell
Mr. Sedgwick
Capt. Bracegirdle

Turkish Russia

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
DECRYPTED OF TELEGRAM FROM EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICE

**MOST
SECRET**

Dated 7th March, 1940.

Lodged 7.10 p.m.

167.

Recd. 8.30 a.m.

(1) PALESTINE. My telegram No.154. Debate resulted in defeat of censure motion with Government majority of 163 only three Government supporters voting against the Government. Colonial Secretary's speech described by "Times" as his best Parliamentary performance and by "Telegraph" as best in his career, evoked big ovation "of a character seldom given anyone except a Prime Minister." Stokes, Labour M.P. who has just returned from the Middle East, said "from Cairo to Bagdad all statesmen whether native Ministers, High Commissioners or Ambassadors would have heaved a sigh of relief that these (land) measures had been taken".

MOST SECRET

In a despatch of 2nd February Ambassador at Cairo had said: "Delays in making a start with implementation of White Paper and continuance of Jewish illegal immigration have accentuated Arab fears in regard to our intentions. This is more deplorable in view of possible extensions of the war to the East and of German efforts to undermine our position by propaganda." General Wavell, General Officer Commanding in Chief Middle East, wrote to Ambassador at Cairo on 30th January: "I can imagine nothing more damaging to British prestige and honour in this part of the world than that we should once again yield to Jewish pressure and go back even in the least degree on terms of White Paper".

(2) TURKEY. After conversations with Molotov on 2nd March, Turkish Ambassador in Moscow feels satisfied that Russian-Turkish relations are now better than they have been for some time past. He stated that Molotov was far calmer and more conciliatory than at other recent meetings although still extremely nervous about Allied activities in the Middle East.

Turkish Ambassador also states that Stalin was anxious to persuade Sumner Welles to extend tour to Moscow and had been mortified at his failure to do so.

F

Turkey-Russia
SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

TELEGRAM FROM EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICER, LONDON.

Dated: 27th February, 1940. Lodged 7.29 p.m.
Received 9.00 a.m.
144.

SECRET. TURKEY. My telegrams 115 and 142.

(1) Breakdown of supply information from Turkey at the week-end appears to have been due to storms rather than political tension. Now officially stated that there was no incident on the Caucasus frontier. Nor was "state of emergency" declared by the Supreme Defence Council which has however been in session. What occurred was that the Government decided to bring into force emergency economic laws passed a month ago and regulating mines, labour, transport, etc.

(2) Relations with the United Kingdom. No reply yet from Turks to inquiry addressed to them on 10th February (telegram No. 115 paragraph (a)).

(3) Relations with Italy. Turks held up conclusion of trade agreement while they asked the United Kingdom whether they had any objection to Turkey supplying Italy with a certain amount of chrome in return for sulphur. United Kingdom approved supply on this occasion.

(4) Turks asked the new Bulgarian Prime Minister if he would renew the assurances recently given Turks by M. Kiossewsoff (Dominions Office telegram B.35) and he has done so. There have been reports that Turks have put more troops near Thracian frontier; if so Bulgarians have not objected.

(5) Soviet wireless and press continue attacks on Turkey. There are also reports of the recall of Russian technicians from Turkey, of black-outs of Black Sea ports as well as Baku and of Russian fleet manoeuvres in the Black Sea, which may be true and in any case are part of German and Russian war of nerves.

telephones to minister

27/2/40

9/2

J

Turkey Russia

DRAFT CABLEGRAM TO EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICER,
LONDON.

No. 28

Date.

Your 142. Turkey. In view rumours
here of incidents between Turkey and Russia and general
interest created by arrival Australians this theatre glad
to receive immediate advice of any developments.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

TELEGRAM FROM EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICER, LONDON.

Dated 24th February, 1940.

142.

TURKEY - U.S.S.R.

Australian Press will probably have reported that the "Times" feature a prominent report from Balkan correspondent.

- (a) Turkish Defence Council has declared state of emergency;
- (b) Caucasus frontier incident involving Russian troops crossing Turkish territory.

No information yet from Ankara but both reports may be correct though (b) probably exaggerated. On probabilities, at present time Russia not likely to take action which might lead to war with Turkey as under treaty, this would bring the Allies in too. Furthermore German propaganda is spreading and encouraging reports such as these in order to unsettle the Balkans.

The "Times" correspondent at Istanbul recently reported a story was current there that Russia had suggested to the Turkish Government the resumption of conversations broken off last October. This may be based on no more than a recent visit of the Russian Ambassador to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs but as a secret report had been received here, vague but to the same effect, the British Ambassador has been asked to report.

STIRLING.



Russia - Turkey

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

1012.

CABLEGRAM.

DATE SENT 13th Feb. 1940.

7.30 p.m.

DATE RECEIVED 14th Feb. 1940.

9.45 a.m.

DECIPHER FROM -
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICER,
LONDON.

No. 115.

SECRET TURKEY.

My telegram No. 79 of 30th January.

(a) Relations with the United Kingdom. Trade and payments agreement has been concluded consolidating the 1936 and 1938 agreements and various exchanges of notes. Ministry of Economic Warfare are negotiating for further War Trade Agreements (see 73 (b)) and Turks have furnished long list of their needs, but talks have not yet progressed very far.

MOST SECRET. United Kingdom asked Turks on 10th February to define the position regarding letting British warships through the Straits if (1) Germany attacked Rumania or (2) Russia attacked Turkey. Though answers are not in doubt it is thought desirable to get Turks to give their consent in advance of any such eventualities in order to save delay should they arise.

(b) Relations with Germany. There does not seem to have been any formal trade agreement but Turks have released 6,000,000 pounds German goods from Customs. No report yet received here on dismissal of German technicians.

(c) Relations with U.S.S.R. No change here. Turks appear less afraid of Soviet since Finnish war and noticeable that Turkish press no longer prints articles saying that war between Turkey and the Soviet unthinkable.

(d) Relations with Italy. Advantage has been taken of recent commercial contacts to conclude new trade arrangement (revising that of 1938) under which expected that Italian-Turkish exchanges will be considerably increased.

(e) Relations with the Balkans. Further accounts of Entente

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CABLEGRAM.

meetings have now been received from various sources and confirm impression set out in my telegram No. 96 though the Yugoslavian Minister of Foreign Affairs was less optimistic, e.g., over prospective staff conversations, than others. Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs on his return to Ankara told the Authorities that he found the Bulgarian Prime Minister in "healthy frame of mind." While there is some evidence that Bulgarians are suiting their stories to their company, on the whole they now seem to be playing a role parallel to the other Balkan States.

First Secretary of the French Embassy here said yesterday that the French impression was that the fact that the Turks had got war material as a result of their policy towards the Allies had strengthened Turkey's position vis a vis the other Balkans.

Copy for War Cabinet -
Defense Co Ordination,
14.3.40.

Turkey - Russia

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

DECYPHER OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICER,
LONDON.

DATED: 30th January, 1940. Lodged 6.51 p.m.

No. 79. Recd. 9.00 a.m.

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET.

Near and Middle East. Your telegram No. 19.

(1) Turkey.

(a) Relations with United Kingdom. My telegram No. 43. Gold was delivered at Ankara last week end, "suspense" clause will accordingly be cancelled, and agreements regarding credits of gold and clearings will now formally be published (but not agreements regarding chrome and dried fruits).

(b) Relations with Germany. Negotiations for a new German-Turkish trade agreement are proceeding but nothing definite known of them. United Kingdom have reminded the Turks of promise to consider the possibility of further Anglo-Turkish war trade agreement. The Turks will probably agree, for a high consideration, to sell United Kingdom their valonea crop, one of their large exports, which it is desirable should not reach Germany.

(c) Relations with France. Reference visit to Ankara by British General Butler for contacts with Turkish General Staff, General Weygand is now on a similar mission. The decision of the Allied Military representatives at Paris in December in favour of a purely defensive policy in the Near East (i.e. in case of attack by Germany or U.S.S.R.) as opposed to an offensive policy, still holds good. French and in particular General Weygand were inclined to offensive policy but British stressed view that any action e.g. at Salonika or in Turkey would have to be backed with very considerable numbers of troops and subject to the most thorough preparations.

(d) Relations with U.S.S.R. Owing to resistance by Finns to Soviet, Turkish General Staff are slightly less apprehensive of attack by the U.S.S.R. whether on the Caucasus

frontier or through Iran.. They have, however, made the earthquake a pretext for declaring martial law in Eastern Turkey and for unobtrusively moving troops there, ostensibly to restore order. They have also asked the United Kingdom for guns for this region. The only indication of any improvement in the Russian attitude is that Stalin seems to have gone out of his way to send a courteous reply to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs' congratulations on his sixtieth birthday.

(e) Relations with Italy. No change. Commercial contacts still continuing. Not thought here that there is anything sinister in the visit of de Bono and Balbo to Rhodes.

(f) Relations with the Balkans. Since the recent détente between Turkey and Bulgaria, the British aim has been to improve, if possible, Bulgaria's relations with her neighbours. Greece and also, to some extent, Yugoslavia remain suspicious of Bulgaria. On the other hand the Bulgarian Prime Minister recently told Lord Lloyd that Bulgaria would not attack Roumania and would agree to shelve the question of the Dobrudja till after the war. A declaration of this kind would be of much greater value if made to Roumania direct, and it has been decided here that an attempt to bring this about should be left to Turkey. Consideration has also been given here as to whether the United Kingdom can take any helpful steps in connection with meeting of Balkan Entente at Belgrade later this week. Decided better not, lest suspicions of individual states be aroused. However, the United Kingdom Government have asked the Turks whether they have any suggestions to make in this connection. The Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs will again visit the Bulgarian Prime Minister on his way to Belgrade.

End of Part one. Part two follows in telegram No. 80.

STIRLING.

Russia-Turkey

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

DECYPHER OF TELEGRAM FROM EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICE, LONDON.

Dated: 15th January, 1940. Lodged 9.47 p.m.
45. Received 11.45 a.m.

SECRET. TURKEY.

(a) Relations with the United Kingdom and France.

Turkish Secretary-General's visit to London and Paris resulted in the signature of five agreements (1) (2) and (3) provide for detailed arrangements under September agreements, i.e. twenty-five million pound armaments credit, fifteen million pound gold loan and two million pound clearing. Under a fourth and very secret agreement Allies have secured that Turkish Chrome supplies will not go to Germany. In return for this they signed a fifth agreement providing for purchases of Turkish dried fruits and nuts. Furthermore agreement was reached that suspense clauses of the special agreement of September (by which treaty's entry into force was suspended pending delivery of Turkey's essential arms requirements) will be cancelled upon delivery of fifteen million gold. Delivery of arms began immediately after General Orbay's visit to England.

Unfortunately on his return to Ankara Numan has disclosed details of most of the above agreements which were to have been kept secret.

(b) BULGARIA. During Numan's visit to London it was arranged that he should consult in Sofia with Bulgarian Prime Minister and British Minister. Resulting communique is on the lines contemplated in the discussions here and is useful as registering detente established by recent withdrawals of frontier troops (due in fact to British influence). Though it does not touch the question of Bulgarian Roumanian rapprochement it is none the less a step forward.

(c) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Although the Turks maintain Soviet wish to improve relations the only signs / are

are Soviet gift to earthquake relief and report from Ankara that Soviet Ambassador is "less rude than he was".

(d) ITALY. Please see my telegrams 19 and 21.

(e) Internal Situation. No signs that Turkish morale has been shaken by recent disasters.

STIRLING.

COPIES TO:
WAR CABINET
SECRETARY, PRIME MINISTER'S DEPT.
SECRETARY, DEPT. OF DEFENCE,
CO-ORDINATION

Brooksby
PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

140.

DECYPHER FROM

CableCE 166/31.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.

DATED 8th January, 1940.
2.10 p.m.
RECEIVED 7th January, 1940.

Circular B. 5.

SECRET.

Following for Prime Minister.

FRANCE.

1. French Government have informed us of their intention to recognise entirely non-political Austrian office in Paris designed primarily to look after Austrians and organise relief of distress. We suggested to French Government to restrain Austrians from attaching undue importance to this peril and said we had not recognized any similar body in the United Kingdom. French Government propose to explain limited scope with every action to Italian and Yugo-Slav Governments.

TURKEY.

2. My telegram Circular B. 406 paragraph 6. Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs and Turkish Ambassador at Moscow consider that Soviet Government wish to improve their relations with Turkey.

Copy War Cabinet.
Dept. Def.
Dept. E.A.

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CABLEGRAM.

FROM SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS.

File 56/4 W 41
Date sent 31st December, 1940.
7.45 p.m.
Received 1st January, 1940.

**MOST
SECRET**

Circular D.132. MOST SECRET.

My Circular D.131.

ITALY.

Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs considers it would be a mistake for Allies to declare war on Soviet Union as this would consolidate latter's alliance with Germany.

Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs states that he recently advised special delegate of Roumanian Government that Roumania should resist any Russian attack in which case she "would not find herself alone."

Turkey.

According to Turkish Ambassador at Bucharest, Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs informed the Soviet Ambassador that Turkey would not be concerned by a Hungarian attack on Roumania, that in the event of an attack by either Germany or Bulgaria then she would fulfil the obligations she had undertaken and that a Russian attack on Roumania would be a matter of serious concern to Turkey and that Turkish Government would in that event be guided by consideration for their national interests.

Copy to - War Cabinet
Dept. Defence
" E.A.
1.1.40.

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CABLEGRAM.

566.

DECYPHER FROM

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.

**MOST
SECRET**
W. 143 Vlaamp. 143/39,
DATED 17th November, 1939,
12.59 a.m.
RECEIVED 17th November, 1939.

Circular D. 91.

MOST SECRET.

Following for Prime Minister -
HOLLAND.

1. The Military Attaché at the Hague has been informed by a member of the Dutch General Staff that the present precautions are considered adequate to halt any advance and give time for further inundations and that no immediate extension of major defensive measures is considered necessary. The Military Attaché has asked the general staff for full details of the defences and troop dispositions.

TURKEY.

2. His Majesty's Ambassador at Ankara considers that in the event of a Russian attack on Rumania, Turkey would only move if her interests were directly threatened or if Bulgaria moved against Rumania. Turkish Government are exceedingly anxious not to be involved against Russia and His Majesty's Ambassador thinks that Russia's seizure of Bessarabia would leave them fairly calm.

Copy War Cabinet,
Dept. Defence,
Dept. P.A.
17.11.39.

J

Russia - Bulgaria
PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CABLEGRAM.

**MOST
SECRET**

512
DECYPHER FROM Secretary of State
for Dominion Affairs,
LONDON.

Via Imp. CE 31 77/12
DATED 14th November, 1939.
9.45p.m.
RECEIVED 15th November, 1939.

Circular D. 89.

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL. Following for Prime Minister:-
BELGIUM.

1. Belgian Military Attaché has had second meeting with General Gemelin in Paris but only asked what forces the French were prepared to send to help Belgium, and showed no readiness to enter conversations for a concerted military plan. The French High Command are, however, satisfied with the plans made, independently of the Belgians, with the British Commander-in-Chief to meet all contingencies. The French view is that we can only wait and hope that if the blow falls, our assistance will not be invoked so late as to interfere seriously with the execution of our plans.

TURKEY.

2. The head of the Turkish Military Mission here has been informed by the First Lord of the Admiralty that in the event of Turkey being threatened by Russia, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would be disposed, on Turkey's invitation and in certain circumstances, to come to the aid of Turkey with Naval Forces superior to those of Russia in the Black Sea. It was explained that this did not imply any immediate military engagement and that Turkey should undertake certain preparatory arrangements at Naval bases.

Copy War Cabinet
E.A.
Def. 15/11/39.

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CABLEGRAM.

458
DECYPHER FROM Secretary of State
for Dominion Affairs,
LONDON.

W.39 via Imp. 30/5
DATED 12th November, 1939.
9.20p.m.
RECEIVED 13th November, 1939.

Circular telegram D.85.

MOST SECRET.

Following for Prime Minister.

His Majesty's Ambassador at Angora believes that the
Turkish Government are anxious to avoid for the present
the slightest act of provocation in the nature of staff talks
which might drive the Soviet Government completely into the
German camp.

ø mutilated group.

Copy War Cabinet
Mr. Sheden 13/11/39.

3
PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CABLEGRAM.

391
DECYPHER FROM Secretary of State 155 via imp. 157/41
for Dominion Affairs, DATED 10th November, 1939.
LONDON. 2.44a.m.
RECEIVED 10th November, 1939.

Circular B.376. SECRET. Following for Prime Minister.

ITALY.

1. Italian press continues to criticise the Comintern Manifesto and the general Soviet policy. Soviet effrontery may help to crystallize Italy's policy in the Balkans and incline her to assist more actively in the formation of a neutral bloc.

RUSSIA-TURKEY.

2. Since the exchange of cordial messages on the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs' departure for Moscow, Soviet references to Turkey have been consistently unfriendly and the impression that the Soviet Government appears to wish to give seems to be that the Turks have chosen their friends and that they must be prepared to take the consequences.

Copy War Cabinet
Defence
E.A. 10/11/39.

Liaison - London
PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

188, 190.

DECYPHER

FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS, DATED 1st November, 1939, 12.25 a.m.
LONDON. RECEIVED 1st November, 1939.

Circular B. 369.

SECRET

Following for Prime Minister -

PALESTINE.

1. Ibn Saud is being informed that careful consideration has been given to his recommendation for a general Palestinian amnesty and that announcement will be made drawing attention to the opportunities which are already at the disposal of those wishing to return to Palestine to make their peace with the administration. His Majesty's representatives at Baghdad and Cairo have been given discretion to deliver similar messages to Iraqi and Egyptian Prime Ministers.

TURKEY.

2. The Turkish Government have decided gradually to reduce their forces in Thrace to half the present strength. This will not apply to troops actually on the frontier which are at normal strength.

3. The Turkish Government repeatedly deny that any territorial claims were established by Russia during the recent Turko-Soviet negotiations.

SPAIN.

4. A move appears to be in progress towards the re-establishment of concordat between Spain and the Vatican in order to decrease clergy's opposition to the Government which is largely due to the latter's insistence on education on totalitarian lines.

GERMANY.

5. Germany has been trying to buy phosphates in Italy but has been refused on the grounds that total production is

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CABLEGRAM.

- 2 -

required for home consumption.

U.S.S.R.

6. United States Government believe that the Soviet and German Governments are acting in complete agreement in regard to Finland. United States Government are indignant with Soviet Government at the treatment of United States Embassy in Moscow over the "City of Flint".

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

7. Please substitute "90 days" for "92 tons" in penultimate sentence of paragraph 6 of my telegram Circular B. 568.

Copy War Cabinet.
Dept. E.A.
Dept. Def.
1.1.60.

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

140

CABLEGRAM.

DECYpher FROM SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.

WE LIMP W 36
DATED 29th October 1939.
8.32p.m.
RECEIVED 30th October 1939.

~~MOST~~
~~SECRET~~

Circular telegram D.58.

MOST SECRET. Following for Prime Minister.

FINLAND.

1. The Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs views the Russo-Finnish situation with anxiety on account of territorial demands made by Russia.

RUSSIA.

2. According to the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs the Finnish Government do not believe that the Soviet Government are prepared to take armed action. The Soviet Government have not hitherto raised the question of the Åland Islands but the main point on which the Finnish Government refuse to yield is the Russian request for a base on Rango. The Norwegian Government feel strongly about Russian demand for the Western portion of the Kibachi peninsula on Varanger fjord. The Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs believes that Russia will not insist on a mutual assistance treaty.

TURKEY.

3. Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs informed the Soviet Ambassador on October 29th that the Turkish Government will scrupulously carry out the provisions of the Montreux Convention. When asked for further information as regards attitude in the event of war between Russia and Roumania or of a Hungarian attack on Roumania, Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that it was impossible to answer as regards hypothetical cases.

CHINA.

4. British battalion at present stationed in North China will be withdrawn. Token forces will, however, be left at Tientsin and one platoon at Peking: these forces will amount to about 175 men and will be drawn from British battalions now stationed at Shanghai.

Russia Turkey
PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

Log.

DECYPhER OF CABLEGRAM RECEIVED FROM

W. 59 Cable CE 20.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.

Dated 28th October, 1939

9.40 p.m.

Received 29th October, 1939.

Circular D. 56.

MOST SECRET

**MOST
SECRET**

Following for Prime Minister -

TURKEY.

1. The Soviet Ambassador in Angora approached the Turkish Government on October 25th and asked several questions in regard to the Anglo-French-Turkish treaty to which he said that the Soviet Government could not give their blessing. In reply to a question on the attitude of Turkey in the event of war between Russia and Roumania and whether Turkey would allow passage of troops, ships, and war material through the Straits the Turkish Government propose merely to state that they will carry out the provisions of the Montreux Convention. In reply to another question Soviet Ambassador was informed that Turkish Government did not consider that the Turkey-Soviet negotiations had been broken off and that they were ready to receive suggestions.

ITALY.

2. My telegram Circular B. 367 paragraph 2. His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome would prefer to defer any approach to the Italian Government pending his forthcoming visit to London.

ROUMANIA.

3. It seems that Stalin definitely suggested to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs during the latter's visit to Moscow a settlement of the Roumanian question on the lines of Bessarabia for Russia, Southern Dobrudja for Bulgaria and for Roumania a guarantee against Hungary. It is possible that Bessarabia is due for "liberation" as soon as Finland has been dealt with and it may be that Soviet Union would like to resume negotiations with Turkey in preparation for that event.

Copy War Cabinet. Dept. Def. Dept. E.A.
29.10.39.

Turkey, Russia
TELEGRAM FROM EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICER, LONDON.

Dated: 26th October, 1939.

Sent 6.24 p.m.

Recd. 7.15 p.m.

587.

**MOST
SECRET**

TURKEY. MOST SECRET.

The Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs on his return from Moscow told the British Ambassador that his general impression was not so much that the Russians wanted to play the German game as that they were anxious about their own game so long as the Germans were not deeply committed on the western front. He thought that the Soviet had been surprised by his firmness and that he would hear from them again. He asked the British Ambassador whether the United Kingdom Government would still be willing to accede to the Soviet's two requests if these were put forward again. (To this the United Kingdom Government have replied that the tri-partite treaty having now been signed, the position is altered, though they would be prepared to consider requests on their merits). The Minister for Foreign Affairs also derived impression that after his decision to leave Moscow Soviet Government regretted having gone so far, and said on departure they loaded him with attention (which means little).

According to Secretary-General of the Turkish Foreign Office, reaction in Moscow to the signature of the tri-partite treaty has been very mild. His personal view is that there is no immediate danger from the Soviet as they will wait till everyone else is exhausted, and that what the Soviet most fear is a volte-face by Germany and a combination by the latter with the Allies against themselves.

He feels personally that now the treaty is signed the moment is favourable for a move to build up some real consolidation between all the Balkan States including Bulgaria. Also that Italy should be consulted regarding a general understanding on Balkan and Mediterranean questions.

As regards Bulgaria, Minister for Foreign Affairs is exercised at the apparent closeness of her relations with the U.S.S.R. Nevertheless he thinks recent Bulgarian mission to Moscow resulted in a set-back (which he connects with recent Bulgarian Government crisis) as the Bulgarians rejected certain Russian proposals for air communications.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs considers that Roumania is now prepared to delay Dobrudja question with Bulgaria. He formed the view in Moscow that the U.S.S.R. would not go to war with Roumania for Bessarabia but none the less would use it as a bargaining counter.

STIRLING.

Handwritten signature
**MOST
SECRET**

TELEGRAM FROM EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICER, LONDON.

Dated - 19th October 7.41 p.m. Recd. 20th October 6.45 a.m.

No. 573.

TURKEY. MOST SECRET. Reference D.O.

Telegram No. B.359. Russians raised two points for
Soviet-Turkish treaty which Turks found unacceptable:-

(1) In part of treaty providing for mutual
assistance covering Black Sea Russians wanted a "letting out"
clause providing that Russia would not have to go to war with
Germany;

(2) Alteration of Montreux Convention position
regarding the Straits and Black Sea (see last paragraph of
my telegram No. 561).

You will note that Anglo-Franco-Turkish
Treaty will be signed in original form in which it was initialled.

STIRLING.

J

**MOST
SECRET**

TELEGRAM FROM AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION R. LONDON.

Dated 19th October, 1939.

Sent 7.11 p.m.
Received 7.00 a.m.
20th October.

Clear the line - Most Immediate.

575. For Prime Minister. Most Secret.

Position on Western Front as previously reported with the addition that German mechanised divisions have been located near Basle and opposite the Dutch frontier, which suggests the possibility of a pincers movement. In view of the wholesale infringement of the neutrality involved, it is considered unlikely.

Breaking off of Soviet-Turkish negotiations. When an agreement appeared on the point of completion Soviet suddenly renewed demands which had been advanced earlier and rejected by the Turks with the apparent acquiescence of the Soviet. When the Turks again refused, Stalin personally insisted on their acceptance and the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs left Moscow. It is difficult to account for the change in the Soviet's attitude, but if due to German pressure, it is sinister, particularly if considered in conjunction with a report, confirmed from reliable sources, that fourteen submarines, not German, possibly Russian, passed through the Kiel Canal on October 12th.

Owing to the lack of a base in Southern Ireland for destroyers working the Atlantic patrol, necessitating return to an English base to refuel, the number of destroyers available for the purpose ~~to XXXXXXXX~~ has been found inadequate. De Valera is being approached to make Borehaven available but personally I am not optimistic of his acquiescing to any mere request.

BRUCE.

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

DECYPHER OF CABLEGRAM RECEIVED

1 CB 18 Via Imp.

FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.

Dated 18th October, 1939.

B. 12 p.m.

Received 19th October, 1939.

Circular B. 359.

SECRET

S E C R E T

Following for Prime Minister -
UNITED STATES.

1. His Majesty's Ambassador reports that interest in the neutrality debate is diminishing as the Senate is expected to repeal the embargo, although the attitude of the House of Representatives is uncertain. Feeling against Germany is almost equalled by the alarm ~~at~~ the increasing Soviet strength. The Prime Minister's rejection of Herr Hitler's proposals is generally approved. There is no support for the suggestion that the President should mediate.

PALESTINE.

2. Mufti is in Bagdad. Iraqi Prime Minister proposes to insist that he declare himself wholeheartedly on the side of Britain and undertakes to refrain from political activities or leave Iraq at once.

CHINA.

3. Japanese Forces appear to have suffered a setback in recent Kaingsi fighting.

TURKEY.

4. Soviet Government having raised additional points, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs refused to continue the Moscow discussions and is returning to Angora.

5. My telegram Circular B. 347 paragraph 1, Turkish Government are now anxious to sign the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Treaty as soon as possible in the form in which it was initiated.

Copy W. r Cabinet.
Dept. E.A.
Dept. Def.
19.10.39.

[Signature]

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

DECYPHER OF CABLEGRAM RECEIVED FROM Via Imp. 173 W. C_e 37.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE Dated 17th October, 1939.
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS, S. 28 p.m.
LONDON. Received 18th October, 1939.

Circular D. 45.

MOST SECRET.

TURKEY.

**MOST
SECRET**

1. In the Turko-Soviet treaty discussions on 16th October, M. Molotov seems to have demanded
 - (a) inclusion of a provision exempting Russia from hostilities with Germany;
 - (b) that Turkey should now under the Montreux Convention deny passage through the Straits to warships and transports belonging to non-Black Sea powers.
2. Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs refused to discuss these points or to remain pending reference to Turkish Government. He is leaving for Angora tonight where the Soviet-Turkey negotiations are to be continued.

Copy War Cabinet.
Dept. Def.
Dept. E.A.
18.10.39.

SECRET

TELEGRAM FROM EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICER, LONDON.

Dated: 17th October, 1939. Sent 6.50 p.m.
No. 561. Recd. 8.45 a.m.

SECRET. U.S.S.R. relations with Turkey.

There were two features in Anglo-Franco-Turkish treaty in which the Russians desired modification.

(a) That Article three (automatic assistance by Turkey in the event of the execution of the Allies' guarantees to Rumania and Greece) should be consultative only, not automatic. The United Kingdom and the French have agreed to this, the Turks assuring them that in practice the modification will not be important.

(b) The protocol. The United Kingdom have all along realised and had to accept the fact that Turkey would undertake no obligation which could result in her going to war with the U.S.S.R. The protocol was added to the treaty to cover this point. The Russians have insisted on strengthening the protocol so that the whole treaty may be suspended if the Soviet are involved in war with the United Kingdom and France. A compromise has been accepted by Molotov, but not yet approved by Stalin, providing for the protocol remaining unchanged, but there are to be additional exchanges of notes explaining what meaning is to be attached to it. Thus Turkey will explain to the Soviet that she will regard the treaty as being in suspense if Russia is involved in war with the Allies.

The view taken here is that in view of the long negotiations, nothing can outweigh the importance of publishing the Anglo-Turkish agreement as soon as possible. The actual form of the treaty is of little importance. What the United Kingdom is relying on is the good will of the Turks, based on their vital interests and their needs.

Copies to
Mr Farand
for transmission
S Melbourne
for Cabinet.

18. 11.30 a.m.

Copy sent to me in Moscow.
After obtaining British consent to the Russian demand for modification, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs resumed negotiation in Moscow. These have reached (8/10/39).

an advanced stage but no details yet, though in so far as they are known, the terms seem to be regarded as not too bad from the British point of view.

The intention apparently is that the Turkish-Soviet agreement should be in two parts:-

(1) Provision for consultation in the event of war in the Balkans.

(2) Provision for mutual assistance covering the Black Sea (including the Straits) and European Turkey.

The latest advice is that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs has now sent the final text to Ankara and the United Kingdom are asking for it.

The United Kingdom only agreed to the Russian modifications on condition they should see the text before the treaty was signed, and there are indications that the Turks, in their haste for signature, may wish to evade this stipulation. There has been no information from neutral missions. The Ambassador at Moscow reported that he thought the Turks were being pressed hard. The Soviet have tried to get a stricter definition of the provision of the Montreux Convention re exemption, i.e., to Russia's advantage. Stalin personally raised this a fortnight ago but dropped it. Molotov has raised it within the last few days and referred it back to Stalin.

STIRLING.

235 via Imperial 15/4

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

DECYPHER OF CABLEGRAM
FROM SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.

Sent 15th October, 1939
9.15 p.m.
Received 16th October, 1939.

Circular telegram D.43.

M O S T S E C R E T.

Following for Prime Minister

TURKEY:

(1) No real progress was made in discussions between Turkish and Russian Ministers for Foreign Affairs on 14th October.

BELGIUM.

(2) According to the Belgian Ambassador in Rome and the French Ambassador at Brussels, the Belgian Government will not go to war unless Belgium is invaded and will not move in the event of an invasion of Holland.

ITALY.

(3) The Italian Government have received no invitation to participate in a conference at Berlin with Germany and Russia to discuss the best means of terminating the war. Count Ciano would not feel encouraged to participate in such a meeting in view of Italy's relations with Russia.

FINLAND.

(4) The Finnish Minister in Moscow states that certain of the Soviet proposals are unacceptable. He does not consider that there is any danger of a Russian attack during the week in which the Finnish Government will be considering Russian proposals.

(5) The King of Norway considers the forthcoming meeting of Scandinavian monarchies and the Finnish President to be little more than a gesture.

Copy sent to the War Cabinet.
Depts. Defence and E.A.

16/10/39

(TELEPHONED TO MELBOURNE)

7

Indirect Broadcast
PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

DECYPHER OF CABLEGRAM RECEIVED FROM

67/14 Cable W. 51.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.

Dated 14th October, 1939.
8. 53 p.m.

Received 15th October, 1939.

MOST

SECRET

Circular D. 42.

MOST SECRET

Following for Prime Minister from my Prime Minister -

TURKEY.

1. The Soviet Naval Attaché at Istanbul is reported to have stated that as freedom to use the Straits is vital to Russia, Russians prefer a strong and independent Turkey, but she must be really independent; that this point is being put to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs in Moscow now; and that strong pressure would be applied if the Turks do not come to heel.

RUSSIA.

2. His Majesty's Ambassador estimates the chances are even that Russia may come into the war against us in the immediate future. Attitude of Soviet Press is hostile to "imperialist Western Powers" and Germany would clearly offer every temptation to obtain background of a Russian military alliance which might lure Italy on to Germany's side thanks to Turkey having been neutralized. On the other hand Russia can get all she wants without war, and the Germans may overestimate the value of consultation with her. His Majesty's Ambassador concludes that every week's delay works in favour of the German-Soviet dissension.

FRANCE.

3. Monsieur Sarrouet informed His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris that the Minister of Public Works was a defeatist and he expressed his intention of dealing severely with defeatism whether on the left or right. Sir E. Phipps was later able to confirm this account in conversation with the Minister for Public Works. The latter stated that France is calm and courageous but that the war must be short if this is to continue; that Italy's neutrality must be preserved at all costs; that Germany and Russia are completely hand in glove and that the former would work wonders with Russian output and transport.

- 2 -

De Menzie claimed that Bonnet and the Air Minister held similar views, but admitted that other Governments were firm.

Copy War Cabinet.
Mr. Shadden.
Col. Hodgson.
15.10.39.

(TELEGRAMMED TO MELBOURNE)

Turkey liaison
2 copies sent

TELEGRAM FROM HIGH COMMISSIONER, LONDON.

DATED - 10th October, 1939.

Sent 8.3 p.m.

Recd. 8 a.m.

No. 546.

**MOST
SECRET**

For Prime Minister. MOST SECRET.

Turkish-Soviet negotiations still dragging on.

Latest suggestion by the Turks is that the confidential protocol in the Anglo-Franco-Turkish treaty (exempting Turkey from hostilities with the U.S.S.R.) which Russia wanted modified (see Dominions Office telegram No. D.26, paragraph 5) should remain as it is. The Turks then to give separate explanations to the Soviet as to the exact implications of the protocol, and to the United Kingdom and France as to the exact implications of their engagement with the Soviet. The United Kingdom are prepared to accept this.

Meanwhile, the situation of the U.S.S.R. vis-à-vis the United Kingdom shows no improvement. When instructed to protest to the Soviet about unfriendly article in Izvestiya, the British Ambassador at Moscow expressed the view that a critical moment like the present, when the Soviet might at any time come into the war against us, was not one for action of this kind. Military appreciation not available today - promised for tomorrow.

BRUCE.

Copies to Mr Ferrand for transmission
by secret-phone to Melbourne. 9.10 a.m.
for War Cabinet.

Copies Capt. Graceville
Mr Adenich. R. 10/10/39.

D

Austria-Turkey

TELEGRAM FROM HIGH COMMISSIONER, LONDON.

Dated 10th October, 1939.

Sent 8.3 p.m.
Recd 8 a.m.

No. 546.

**MOST
SECRET**

For Prime Minister. **MOST SECRET.**

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BRUCE.

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

DECYPHER OF CABLEGRAM RECEIVED FROM

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.

Via Imp. 118/31.

Dated 10th October, 1939.
11.46 p.m.
Received 11th October, 1939.

SECRET

Circular D. 37.

MOST SECRET.

Following for Prime Minister from my Prime Minister -
ITALY.

1. Unofficial war trade discussions are proceeding satisfactorily and Italy may agree to some form of rationing of their imports. A favourable factor is large German indebtedness to Italy.
TURKEY.

2. His Majesty's Ambassador and French Ambassador at Moscow have been instructed to suggest to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs a compromise modification but in the last resort to agree to modifications proposed by the Soviet Government (my telegram Circular D. 26 paragraph 5). Our final decision would remain conditional on our being satisfied as to the terms proposed by the Turco-Russian Pact.

Copy Min. and Dept. E.A.
Min. and Dept. Def.
11.10.39.

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CRYPTIC OF CABLEGRAM
FROM SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.

Sent 9th October, 1939
2140.
Received 10th October, 1939.

MOST
SECRET

Circular D.31

~~MOST SECRET~~

Following for Prime Minister --

Roumania-Hungary.

1. My telegram No. Circular B.347, paragraph 2; Hungarian and Roumanian troops have been withdrawn from the frontier.

Japan.

2. Position of the Japanese Government is insecure.

Turkey.

3. The Turkish Government have decided to instruct the Minister for Foreign Affairs on October 10th to leave Moscow immediately, if we refuse the suggested modification (see paragraph 5 of my telegram Circular D.26) or return no reply, or should the Soviet Government raise any new point. Minister for Foreign Affairs urges that we should give oral agreement to enable Turkish-Soviet text to be drawn up. Turkish draft of the letter provides assistance in the case of aggression in the Black Sea Straits or European Turkey; consultation in the event of aggression in the Balkans, and suspension of treaty in the event of Russia being at war with Great Britain and France. In the latter event both treaties would thus lapse and the Turkish President emphasises that Turkey would then act in her own interests, e.g. in case of an attack by Italy.

4. Matter is under consideration between the United Kingdom and French Governments. We feel that insistence on Turks signing treaty with Great Britain in its present form would not add to the prospects of Turkish co-operation since, in cases affecting Turkey's vital interests, she is likely to give this in any case and we might prejudice both our good relations with her and possibility of Turkey acting later as a useful link with Russia.

Copy sent to Minr. and Dept. Defence.
" E.A. 10/10/39

Anglo-Turkish
MOSI
SECRET

TELEGRAM FROM HIGH COMMISSIONER, LONDON.

DATED 7th October, 1939.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Sent 6. 55 p.m.
Received 5.15. a.m.

535.

For Prime Minister.

MOST SECRET.

Soviet-Turkish negotiations. War Cabinet decided to agree to Stalin's modifications to the Anglo-Turkish treaty subject to full disclosure of the terms of the Soviet-Turkish agreement.

^a As ~~in~~ result of the Soviet agreements, Estonia is now considered almost certain to go communist and possibly Latvia also, and both will become puppet states of the Soviet. Lithuania's terms on the surface not so harsh but probably the same result more delayed.

Considerable anxiety in Iran as to the possibility of Soviet action against them with consequent dangers to India.

BRUCE.

Copy given to me

Copy taken without my knowledge

9/10/39
W

to me given to me
in confidence
Copy Capt Brancowitz
18 9/10/39

O

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

SECRET

DECYPER OF CABLEGRAM RECEIVED FROM

Via Imp. 60/16.

SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.

Dated 6th October, 1939
9.5 p.m.
Received 7th October, 1939.

SECRET.

Circular B.355.

GERMANY.

1. According to a neutral source German morale is now high as a result of the Polish triumph and unlikely to change until appreciable military reverses are encountered. Effort to drive a wedge between Hitler and the nation ineffective, but statement of concrete peace terms might carry conviction. Feeling against England very strong.

ITALY.

2. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs is said to have been extremely impressed by the German war machine, but the Ministry of War appears to believe that ultimate Allied victory probable.

ROUMANIA.

3. Russian and Romanian troops have been withdrawn from the Bessarabian frontier.

TURKEY.

4. Turkish Government are said to have informed the Romanian Minister that agreement had been reached with the Soviet Government for mutual assistance accompanied by consultation in the event of aggression in the Balkans and no separate peace.

IRAN.

5. The Iran Government are very nervous of Soviet policy. Minister for Foreign Affairs fears in the case of British-Russian hostilities India would attack Iran.

Iran Government hope that we can take Germany's place in imports and exports.

JAPAN.

7. His Majesty's Ambassador is increasingly doubtful whether Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs is prepared to meet our point of view in regard to silver question.

8. Recent Manchurian fighting has impressed Japanese with the necessity for increased mechanisation. According to the Japanese reports the quality of the Soviet troops has improved and their weapons are good.

Copy Min. and Dept. Def.
Min. and Dept. E.A.
7.10.39.

Turkey-Bosnia

LT. COL. HODGSON.

Prime Minister's Department.

DECIPHER OF CABLEGRAM.

Cable PO 67/17.

Dated 5th October, 1939
7.40 p.m.
Received 6th October, 1939.

From -

The SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.

Circular D. 27.

MOST SECRET.

PERSONAL.

Following for Prime Minister from Prime Minister -

ITALY.

1. No change in Italian-German relations has resulted from Count Ciano's visit to Berlin. Whilst nominally adhering to the axis, Italy maintains neutrality in practice.

2. Count Ciano was not informed of the contents of Hitler's forthcoming Reichstag speech and Italy will neither make peace proposals nor act as intermediary.

TURKEY.

3. The Turkish Government think that if they can come to terms with the Soviet Government it would help towards the isolation of Germany. The allied Ambassadors at Angora agree that the disadvantages of accepting the Soviet proposals seem less than those of rejecting them.

Copy Min. and Dept. Def.
Min. and Dept. E.A.
6.10.39.

Priority - Top Secret
**MOST
SECRET**

TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM THE AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION

Dated 5th October, 1939. Sent 6.30 p.m.

IMMEDIATE.

No. 526.

For Prime Minister. **MOST SECRET.**

Some further evidence supporting von Papen (my telegram No. 520). Information shows increasing anxiety in Riga circles at Soviet alliance. Von Weizsäcker alleged to have stated that Germany will hold out until the beginning of next year when Communists will gain the upper hand and that communistic propaganda is everywhere being carried openly in factories as well as in towns and the army will soon be infected.

A Swede, friend of Goering, who twice flew from Berlin to London as an intermediary, just before the outbreak of war, is again showing signs of activity. This interpreted as indicating dissension and anxiety.

Turks are urging that the Soviet's suggested amendments to the United Kingdom and French agreements do not materially alter the terms and should be accepted particularly in view of the rapidly changing situation and the fact that a Soviet-Turkish agreement would be unpalatable to Germany. The United Kingdom and French Ambassadors at Ankara consider it advisable to agree to modifications.

BRUCE.

(5)

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

DECYPhER OF CABLEGRAM.

WE Imp. W.162 166/37

FROM Secretary of State,
for Dominion Affairs,
LONDON.

SENT 5th October, 1939.
1.20p.m.
RECEIVED 5th October, 1939.

MOST SECRET.

Circular D. 26.

China.

1. Chiang-Kai-Shek is dissatisfied with Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs and important Government changes are probable.

France.

2. His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris considers general morale of the French to be sound. Sections of Labour, including Communists, are carrying on peace propaganda.

Italy.

3. Conversations of Count Ciano in Berlin do not seem to have been satisfactory either to the Germans or the Italians.

Turkey.

4. Turkish Government are anxious to find means of meeting Soviet Government's wishes respecting Anglo-Franco-Turkish Treaty.

5. Under Article 3 Turkey undertakes to support Great Britain and France in execution of their guarantees to Roumania and Greece; Soviet Government wish co-operation to be for consultation only. If Russia is at war with Great Britain and France Soviet Government wish the entire treaty to be suspended.

6. His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow has been instructed to enquire as to the exact circumstances in which it is suggested that Turkey should remain neutral because Russia was a belligerent. If Turkey's undertakings are to be further limited His Majesty's Government will consider whether they can continue the pledge of unconditional assistance to Turkey without adequate return.

Copy Min. & Dept. E.A.
Min. & Dept. Ref.
5/10/39.

London Turkey
TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICER, LONDON

Dated 4th October, 1939.

Sent 4.46 p.m.

No. 522.

Recd. 4.35 a.m.

MOST SECRET.

**MOST
SECRET**

Your telegram No.70 and my telegram No.521. Foreign Office advise that while on the military side appreciation is being prepared by the Chiefs of Staff no conclusive appreciation on the political side possible at the moment as the situation is changing daily and almost hourly and reports received are contradictory. They point out that Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs is still in Moscow, Latvian went there on Monday and Lithuanian yesterday.

While account given by Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to the British Ambassador at Moscow (reported in my telegram No.521) is not unsatisfactory and should be reliable as far as Turkey is concerned I understand that report just arrived through Turkish Secretary-General Ankara is less reassuring.

From long talk with head of Russian Department this morning following points emerge:

- (1) As far as can be judged Russia has no military agreement with Germany.
- (2) On the economic side Russia is clearly all out to increase her trade with the Germans and to help them to counteract our blockade.
On the other hand she has given indications recently that she wishes to trade with the United Kingdom. Offer re timber (my telegram No.518) was submitted by Minister of Supply to Soviet Trade Representative at London at week-end. The latter received it not unfavourably and referred it to Moscow; reply now being awaited.
- (3) Soviet press and wireless have been very anti-British. Protest was under consideration but has been dropped.
- (4) Soviet moves regarding the Baltic States not welcome here but must be equally displeasing to Germans.

2.

(5) Regarding Russia and the Balkans there is no further information on Russian troop movements near Rumanian frontier reported last week. There is a report though not yet definite that Bulgarian Minister of Finance is to go to Moscow shortly ostensibly for commercial agreement - but possibly also to discuss the occupation of the Southern Dobrudja by Bulgaria if the Russians occupy Bessarabia.

STIRLING.

London Turkey
TELEGRAM FROM INTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICER, LONDON.

CLEAR THE LINE. MOST IMMEDIATE.

Lodged 4 p.m.
Received 4.30 p.m.

Dated - 4th October, 1939.

521.

~~TOP SECRET~~

**MOST
SECRET**

Your telegram No. 70 (a) Appreciation will follow shortly.

(b) Following information from Ambassador at Moscow. Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs had five hours interview with Stalin Sunday night. According to the Minister for Foreign Affairs Stalin showed considerable reserve at first and did not mention either pact or mutual assistance. Later however Stalin's attitude changed and the Minister for Foreign Affairs felt much more optimistic. Proposed Turkish-Soviet Pact was thoroughly discussed. Minister for Foreign Affairs communicated the substance but not the texts of British treaties with Turkey to Stalin who raised no objection except to "Protocol of Signature" which the Russians wanted to be more definitely worded to the effect that "Turkey will remain neutral" in the event of war between the United Kingdom and the Soviet. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he would refer the suggestion to Ankara but pointed out that the text of the Protocol had been agreed to between the Turks, British and French and could not be altered without consent of the two latter.

Stalin told the Minister for Foreign Affairs clearly that nothing had been concluded between Soviet and Germany beyond what had been published. Such references as he made to Great Britain and France were free from any hostility.

While his general impression was that the Soviet would not come into the war on the side of Germany unless the United Kingdom overtly threatened recent Russian territorial gains, the Minister for Foreign Affairs admitted that it was only an impression and that the Soviet would obviously not disclose attitude on the larger question until the negotiations with the Turks had progressed further.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that the German Minister for Foreign Affairs' visit and his had been accidentally and were unconnected. This is confirmed by the statement by member of German (x) to neutral colleagues.

Regarding the Baltic States, Estonian Minister at Moscow has told the Ambassador that Estonia had been given the choice of agreeing to the Soviet demands which were in the circumstances moderate (and definitely excluded any idea of imposing Bolshevism on Estonia) or of submitting to a more drastic solution. In view of this the Ambassador thought it likely that Latvia and Finland would in due course be similarly approached. Latvian and Lithuanian Ministers for Foreign Affairs have both now arrived at Moscow.

STIRLING.

* word omitted.

London - Turkey

TELEGRAM FROM HIGH COMMISSIONER, LONDON.

Dated 28th September. Sent 8.30 p.m.
 Recd. 29th Sept.

No. 805.

For Prime Minister. MOST SECRET.

With reference to my immediately preceding telegram, Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs has assured United Kingdom Ambassador in Moscow that he does not intend to be bullied by Russians and would rather leave Moscow without any arrangement than agree to anything that would cut across agreements with France and United Kingdom.

In view of possible peace offensive probably with Mussolini as intermediary in my view imperative nature and form of reply should be fully considered before move takes place. Have obtained agreement to meeting with sub-committee Prime Minister, Halifax, Chatfield, Hankey, Eden this evening to discuss matter.

BRUCE.

SECRET

DECYPhER OF CABLEGRAM RECEIVED FROM

Imp. 144/25.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.Dated 25th September, 1939.
10.12 p.m.
Received 26th September, 1939.

Circular B. 345.

S E C R E T.

Following for Prime Minister -

R U S S I A.

1. Communique published by Soviet Press states that German and Soviet Governments have established demarkation line between the two armies following the River Pissa, Czerby, Uz, Vistula and San.

G R E E C E - I T A L Y.

2. Greek and Italian communique state that in view of the sincere friendliness of mutual relations, Greek and Italian troops are being withdrawn from the Albanian frontier.

U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A.

3. President's message was well received by press generally.
Receipt ~~xxxxxx~~ of blue book publication ~~xxxxxx~~ satisfactory.

L A T V I A.

4. His Majesty's Government are pressing Latvian Government to withdraw alleged notification to Polish Legation at Riga that it can no longer be recognised.

T U R K E Y.

5. In view of indications that Turkish Government are playing for time pending developments of Turco-Russian negotiations and as prospect of our requiring Turkish aid seems less imminent, His Majesty's Ambassador has been instructed to offer no further concessions at this stage.

F R A N C E.

6. Hitler's Danzig speech reported to have hardened French determination.

R U S S I A.

7. Russian Government stated to have informed Chinese Ambassador at Moscow that there are no negotiations for a Russo-

Japanese non-aggression pact, that Mongolian truce is merely the liquidation of border incidents, that the Russians intend to continue to support China, and that intervention in Poland does not imply Russia's intention to participate in European War.

CHINA.

8. Sino-Soviet commercial treaty signed in June said to provide for a large Russian supply of munitions to China.

9. Russian Ambassador has had several interviews with Chiang K'ai-shek - and there are rumours of a possible Russian mediation between China and Japan.

JAPAN.

10. H.E. Ambassador has been instructed to endeavour to renew the Tientsin negotiations on basis of neutralization of silver or its use for flood relief.

Copies have been sent to:-

Min. & Dept. Defence
" " External Affairs
26/9/39.

Business Section

TELEGRAM FROM EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICER, LONDON.

DATED - 24th September, 1939.

No. B.19.

RUSSIA. British United Press states that Soviet Authorities on Saturday ordered men mobilised since 7th September to remain with the colours owing external conditions.

U.S.A. Reuter correspondent at Washington states that latest indications are that 35 Senators oppose embargo repeal 10 to 15 undeclared, remainder favour repeal.

GERMANY. German official newagency, answering reports that Russo-German demarcation line gave much more than Germany expected to pay, stated Saturday that line should not be taken as definite delimitation of frontier.

TURKEY. Exchange message quotes Bucharest report that Soviet has given guarantee to Turkey that she will not allow Germans reach Black Sea.

JAPAN. Reuter reports that Tani succeeds Sawada; "Nichi" states that Amau will be new Ambassador at Rome. Asahi predicts a change in Ambassador at Washington.

Turkey Russia
TELEGRAM FROM HIGH COMMISSIONER, LONDON.

MOST

SECRET

Dated 21st September, 1939.

Lodged 7.4 p.m.

Received 6.25 a.m.

Immediate.

485. For Prime Minister. Most Secret.

Following views with reference to Russia's attitude taken by United Kingdom Ambassador at Rome from Turkish colleague I regard as important. Russian German Pact, at any rate from Soviet's point of view, is negative not positive, i.e. as Anglo-French-Russian negotiations had failed Soviet decided to avoid conflict with Germany, but they do not intend to co-operate with Germany.

Russian occupation of Polish frontier regions was to prevent their being occupied by Germany. As a warning to Germany "Hands off the Baltic States".

Establishment of cordon of Soviet troops along the Polish-Roumanian communications is a further warning "Hands off Roumania". Russia would not defend Roumania if Germany attacked her, but in that event would herself occupy not only Bessarabia but also the whole of the coastal region of Roumania in order to prevent Germany reaching the Black Sea.

Turkey's friendship with Russia remains unshaken and a factor on which Turkey and her friends can rely. In view of Russian attitude as regards the Black Sea and the Baltic there is by no means negligible possibility of Anglo-French-Russian co-operation in those areas through Turkish link.

BRUCE.

Prussia-Turkey
PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

SECRET

DECYPHER OF CABLEGR M RECEIVED FROM

X 1 Via Imp. 102/21.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.

Dated 21st September, 1939.
7.38 p.m.
Received 22nd September, 1939.

Circular B. 343.

S E C R E T.

TURKEY.

1. There is complete agreement as to text of our treaty and as to military convention, but the Minister for External Affairs requires certain necessary war material before Turkey can sign.

2. Turkish Ambassador at Rome interpreting Russian action as a warning to Germany "hands off Baltic States and Roumania", believes Turkish Government act ^{as} ~~as~~ intermediary between allies and Russia.

FRANCE.

3. Russian move has dealt French Communists fresh blow.

JAPAN.

4. According to senior Japanese officials it is ridiculous to suppose that the Soviet-Japanese truce will lead to a Non-Aggression Pact.

5. Japanese Press is pessimistic as regards His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom-Japanese relations.

6. Various Japanese authorities have hinted that Tientsin negotiations should be resumed.

CHINA.

7. Japanese Military authorities at Tientsin appear disposed to improve local situation.

8. In reply to the proposal for co-operation between the United Kingdom and China against Japan, Chinese Ambassador in London was informed that so long as Japan remained neutral Chinese neutrality was the best contribution to common aim of victory over Germany.

AMM
AD
PS
Copy Min. and Dept. Def.
Min. and Dept. E.A/
22.9.39.

J

~~SECRET~~

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

DECYPER OF CABLEGRAM.

Cable X51 116/27

FROM SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.

SENT 20th September, 1939.
9.22p.m.
RECEIVED 21st September, 1939.

Circular B.342.

~~SECRET~~ Following for Prime Minister.

HUNGARY.

1. Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs re-affirms the determination to resist any German attempt to violate the neutrality, but states that such resistance could only last a few days. He considers that Great Britain and France will lose respect and influence in South Eastern Europe if they do not declare war on Russia.

POLAND.

2. Monsieur Beck states that the French Government agree to the Polish Government operating on French soil. He hopes to create a Polish foreign legion.

GERMANY.

3. German Government have sent a note to the French Government stating that the United Kingdom Government, by blockading women and children, and the Polish Government have broken the rules of humane warfare and that the German Government reserves the right to retaliate.

Russia.

4. His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow considers that the Soviet mobilization and precipitate invasion of Poland came as a surprise to the Germans and that war between us and the Soviet Union would be playing the German game. We should therefore act gently as regards any protest, and in contra-discussions.

FRANCE.

5. Preliminary arrangements reached at San Remo for a Franco-Italian commercial agent specifying that Italy shall:

- (a) prevent imports from France reaching Germany;
- (b) Consider providing France with 300,000 to 500,000 tons of shipping;

S.

(c) Supply contraband goods to France;

(d) envisaged purchase for allied use

German ships held up in Italian ports.

CHINA.

6. Anti-British campaign by Japanese at Peking appears unrelaxed.

TURKEY.

7. My telegram, Circular B.341, paragraph 4: We have informed Turkish Government that Russian action reinforces our view that signature of treaty with Great Britain should precede Minister of External Affairs' Moscow recognition. We have added that we share Turkish Government's views that it is undesirable to regard Russian action as a *casus belli* and that we and the Turks should wait and see how things develop; this is another reason delaying Moscow visit.

Copy Min. & Dept. B.A.
" " Def.
21/9/39.

America - Tuesday

TELEGRAM FROM EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICER, LONDON.

Dated 20th September, 1939.

Sent 7.55 p.m.

B.11.

UNITED KINGDOM. Prime Minister stated in Commons Wednesday that war aims of United Kingdom Government had always included formation of stable international system having as object prevention of war and just settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

GERMANY. B.U.P. message states that delegation of German Army and Air Force officers have arrived Moscow from Hitler's headquarters in Poland to consult Soviet authorities on matters of mutual interest.

POLAND. "Evening News" quotes communique issued Moscow Wednesday claiming that Soviet Cavalry and tank units had entered Lwow. Exchange reports states that Soviet army instructed rigorously to observe Roumanian frontiers.

LATVIA. In reply to Soviet allegation published by Tass Agency that Polish and other submarines were being sheltered in ports belonging to certain Baltic States see B10 Estonia. Reuter quotes denied by Latvia that any foreign submarine has been in her ports or territorial waters since commencement war.

TURKEY. "Star" quotes report from Ankara that Foreign Minister leaving for Moscow Thursday to examine certain questions interesting both countries. Also stated that satisfactory progress made in talks for conclusion of definite Facts of mutual assistance with Britain and France.

ITALY. B.U.P. quotes official radio announcement Rome Wednesday that Italy withdrawing all troops along Albanian Greek frontier. Reason given was peaceful relations between Italy and Greece. Also stated that Greece withdrawing troops on their side frontier.

JAPAN. Foreign Office spokesman stated Wednesday that Japan wanted peace in East Asia and did not want to become involved in European war. He added certainly the United States is anxious that the European war shall not be extended to the Pacific area. If any power disturbs peace and order in this part of the world that power must be responsible for the consequences.

EXTERNAL.

DECYpher OF CABLEGRAM

FROM SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.~~SECRET~~Sent 19th September, 1939
10.30 p.m.
Received 20th September, 1939.

Circular D.16.

~~SECRET~~

Following for Prime Minister --

Russia.

1. His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris found Monsieur Blum gloomy over the Russian situation. Though he believes that Stalin will eventually betray Hitler as he betrayed us, he fears that German engineers may increase Russian supplies of petrol to the German and Soviet Air Forces, which would be of great assistance to the latter.

2. Conflicting and as yet unsubstantiated reports from a Japanese source at Moscow and a Russian source in Paris, maintain that (a) on Russian demand, to which Germany was in agreement, Turkey has agreed to remain neutral in the event of a war between Russia and Great Britain on the assumption that the Balkan States be not attacked; (b) Germany has agreed with Russia not to invade Roumania. (c) Plans for visit of Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to Moscow is in connection with Russian threat to close exit from Straits into Black Sea unless Turkey agreed not to allow naval forces exceeding 50 per cent of the Soviet forces to enter into the Black Sea.

Our view, in so far as events can be judged at present, is as follows --

- (a) Russia is seeking to prolong the war and so prepare ground for subsequent dissemination of Bolshevik propaganda;
- (b) In entering Polish Ukraine, Russia is forestalling Germany for bargaining purposes;
- (c) Russian advance for similar reasons into Bessarabia seems possible in the event of active invasion of Roumania whose territory is not yet known to be violated
- (d) Roumanians have all along maintained that they would resist if attacked. Their Balkan Entente partners are under no treaty

obligations to assist them except on internal frontier, e.g. attack by Bulgaria; but Anglo-Franco-Turkish treaty now under negotiation would involve Turkey in obligation to assist us when we implement our guarantee to Roumania.

4. In view especially of resultant difficulties to Turkey we do not intend to break off relations with Russia because of the latter's invasion of Poland; a secret protocol in the Polish-British treaty provides that our obligations apply only in the case of German aggression. At present there are no indications that the Soviet Government want to go to war with us and France.

Copy sent to Minr. and Dept. External Affairs.
Defence.

20/9/39

Prime Minister
SECRET

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

DECYPhER OF CABLEGRAM.

Imp. 156 Y 1 CE 34

FROM Secretary of State
for Cominon Affairs,
LONDON.

DATED 18th September, 1939.
11.40p.m.
RECEIVED 19th September, 1939.

SECRET.

Circular B.369. Following for Prime Minister.

Bulgaria.

(1) Semi-official paper states that Bulgarian Ministers abroad have been instructed to affirm the continuance of Bulgarian neutrality.

Hungary.

(2) My circular telegram B.338 paragraph 1 : Hungarian Ministry of War have informed the Military Attaché that the Kasse line is in order and traffic is normal.

Turkey.

(3) Turkish Government agree that in view of Russian developments tripartite treaty with Great Britain and France should be signed soon. Economic issues are still under consideration.

Russia.

(4) His Majesty's Ambassador recommends that, unless we should decide to declare war on Russia as a result of the Soviet invasion of Poland, full diplomatic relations should be maintained with the result of having direct access to Monsieur Molotov when the Soviet-German friendship begins to wear thin. He points out that the necessity of keeping a large army on war footing outside Russia must reduce German military or food supplies.

(5) Turkish Government regards Russian action as a warning to Germany not to threaten Rumania. They are anxious that we should not regard Russian action as a *cassus belli*. Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs has accepted invitation to go to Moscow to discuss a Turkish-Soviet non-aggression Pact and the Turkish Government consider that invitation indicates the absence of any Russian-German understanding for an attack on the Balkans.

Latvia.

(6) Soviet Government has assured Latvian Government that they intend to "Practice a policy of neutrality" towards Latvia.

France.

(7) There is some dissatisfaction at Cabinet re-shuffle. Formation of a War Cabinet is being advocated.

Yugoslavia.

(8) Yugoslavia is trying to bring an understanding between Roumania and Hungary.

Lithuania.

(9) Lithuanian Government have rejected unofficial German proposal to seize Vilna. Lithuanian Government anticipate that Russia may occupy the town and offer it to them.

Japan.

(10) His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington has been instructed, if French Ambassador receives similar instructions, to inform United States Government that United Kingdom and French Governments have not at present sufficient resources effectively to resist persistent Japanese pressure and that unless definite assurances of United States support are forthcoming they may have to consider withdrawing their garrisons from North China.

Greece.

(11) My Circular telegram B.358 paragraph 3 Greek Government are anxious to return early reply to the Italian offer of the withdrawal of troops from Albanian border if Greek Government would repeat substance Greek-Italian pact supplementing it with non-aggression undertakings subject to each party's existing obligations.

Copy -

Min. & Dept. E.A.
Min. & Dept. Def. 19/9/39.

Turkey Russia
TELEGRAM FROM EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICER, LONDON.

Dated - 18th September, 1939.

Sent 8.45 p.m.
Recd. 9.45 a.m.

No. 8.7.

JAPAN.

Reuter reports that Japan and Soviet taking swift steps to conclude frontier quarrel. Two preliminary meetings to discuss enforcement of truce already held and formal meeting being held 18th. Japanese Foreign Office spokesman has stated that question of truce raised during recent talks on various pending questions between Togo and Molotoff. R.U.P. message states that General Terauchi of Japanese Military Mission which has been in Italy was met on arrival Berlin by Ribbentrop who returned from front for occasion.

Russia.

Reuter and R.U.P. report that Soviet Military Attaché in Berlin has arrived in Moscow to have conversations with Stalin Molotoff and Voroshiloff.

Soviet Ambassador Berlin has notified Slovak Minister there that Russia recognises Slovakia De Facto and De Jure and intends entering into diplomatic relations with her.

U.S.A.

State Department Washington has issued list of 28 Americans in Athens still unaccounted for.

POLAND.

Ministry of Information announcement that British Ambassador Warsaw crossed to Romania Sunday and understood that Polish Government are themselves either in Romania or about to move there.

Exchange states that Squadron Polish planes landed in Latvia Monday. They were confiscated and pilots interned. R.U.P. quotes Riga report that some detachments of Polish troops had crossed frontier into Latvia and were interned.

/ TURKEY.

TURKEY.

Evening Standard reports that political observers in Ankara inclined to believe that by possible Soviet-Turkish Pact Russian leaders intend to cast other foreign powers from any influence in Black Sea while Turkey would remain sole guardian of Dardanelles.

RUMANIA.

Exchange report states that Rumanian Minister Moscow has received assurances from Soviet Authorities that Rumanian neutrality will be respected by Russia.

DENMARK.

Star reports that the Premiers and Foreign Ministers of four northern countries began deliberations in Copenhagen Monday.

GERMANY.

Reuter reports official statement issued Berlin Monday as follows: task of German and Soviet troops in Poland comprises re-establishment of order and peace in Poland which were destroyed by disintegration of Polish State.

EXTERNAL.

Russia Turkey
TELEGRAM FROM HIGH COMMISSIONER, LONDON.

**MOST
SECRET**

Dated: 18th September, 1939. 8.15 p.m.
Received: 19th September, 1939. 7.20 a.m.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

No.473.

For Prime Minister. MOST SECRET.

U.S.S.R. action. Position still most confused.

I gather that war cabinet this morning decided no useful action could be taken.

Following views are of interest: U.S.S.R. British Ambassador Moscow urges strongly that United Kingdom should not declare war on U.S.S.R. in which he sees no advantage. He feels rupture of relations without going to war even more undesirable. His advice is to retain British and French Ambassadors at Moscow with possibility direct access Molotov when Soviet German friendship begins to wear thin.

He points out that Soviet invasion of Poland will entail their keeping large army on a war footing outside Russia consuming food and petrol and thus reducing German hopes military or food supplies.

TURKEY. Minister for Foreign Affairs and Secretary General have expressed to British Ambassador satisfaction at turn of events. In their view Russians had evidently taken fright by rapid German advance and their action was to be regarded as a warning to Germany not to threaten Rumania. They hoped United Kingdom and France would not treat it as a *casus belli*. Proposals for Soviet Turkish non-aggression pact were evidence that there could be no Russian German understanding regarding attack on Balkans and Minister for Foreign Affairs expected good results from his visit to Moscow probably within a week. Secretary General told the French Ambassador that they would sign nothing with Moscow without having signed previously or simultaneously with us.

British Ambassador is also satisfied that Turks remained genuine in their desire to conclude a treaty with United Kingdom and have not changed their policy in this respect.

BRUCE.

Turkey, Russia
**MOST
SECRET**

TELEGRAM FROM HIGH COMMISSIONER, LONDON.

Dated 18th September, 1939.

Sent 12.45 p.m.
Recd. 11.9 p.m.

No. 472.

For Prime Minister. Secret. Reports of Russian advance into Poland now confirmed from several posts including the British Embassy in Poland, which has been moved to Krmonetz, near the Soviet frontier and is likely to leave for Rumania. The press reports resistance by the Poles.

It seems clear that action was undertaken in agreement with Germany and is the quid pro quo for the recent pact, the details having probably been worked out by the Russian Military Mission to Berlin (telegram No. 280). One view is that partition will be on the basis of the Curzon Line of the Versailles Conference, which would have limited the Polish State to nationals of Polish race, excluding White Russians and Ukrainians, the latter taken by Poland from the Soviet. It would therefore be merely wishful thinking to imagine that there will be a clash between the Russians and Germans, though later on difficulties between them may well arise, e.g. the Germans have already occupied the part of the Polish Ukraine around Lemberg, which contains oil wells.

The United Kingdom has no treaty obligation to Poland arising from attack by Russia (by reason of the secret protocol to the recent Anglo-Polish agreement); and the United Kingdom can no more help Poland against Russia than against Germany. Skeleton War Cabinet sat yesterday and full meeting today. On the whole, it is unlikely that the decision will be to declare war on Russia, though it is possible that diplomatic relations might be broken off. The Soviet has a large number of submarines at Murmansk and Vladivostok. The Soviet Government have given assurances to all countries with whom Russia has diplomatic relations that she will pursue a policy of neutrality. Russia desires to see Germany and the Western Powers fight it out. The

Soviet Embassy at London "knows nothing", though according to information received by the Foreign Office Maisky has been making preparations for departure.

One most important aspect of this new development is the effect on Turkey which it is impossible to estimate at the moment. The Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs has accepted the Soviet's invitation to Moscow, extended some time ago and now urgently repeated.

Financial negotiations between the United Kingdom and Turkey are proving very difficult and the Turks have put up demands which, at first sight suggest a desire to confront the United Kingdom with an insuperable obstacle. The Ambassador at Ankara, however, does not believe such is their intention, attributing it to muddle by Turkish departments and inability to realise that British supply is limited.

BRUCE.

Turkey-Russia
SECRETDECYPHER.

Imp. 77 W. 37.

Cablegram received from

Dated 1st June, 1939.
10. 18 p.m.THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS,
LONDON.

Received 2nd June, 1939.

Circular B. 210.

SECRET.

Following for Prime Minister :-

POLAND.

1. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom recently suggested, with a view to preventing war resulting from precipitate Polish reaction in the event of a sudden coup at Danzig, that the Polish Government might in such circumstances hold their hand until this country had delivered a warning to Germany accompanied by preparatory military measures on our part.

2. M. Beck while in general agreement has asked for details of military measures envisaged and has suggested that Polish public opinion should be reassured that our diplomatic intervention in such circumstances would not end in the proposal of a compromise unacceptable to Poland.

3. He further reserved his opinion as to Russian co-operation in such representations to Germany on the ground of the probability of German reaction.

BALTIC.

4. Scandinavian countries continue to express concern at the Russian attitude over the Aaland Islands (see my telegram Circular B. 208 paragraph 8). Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs feels that the matter need not be submitted again to the League and hopes for Soviet agreement.

TURKEY.

5. No immediate visit to Moscow is contemplated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

6. The Minister for Foreign Affairs states that the Greek reply to the Roumanian approach (see my telegram Circular B. 208 paragraph 13) was approval and support of the Turkish policy.

YUGOSLAVIA -- ROUMANIA.

7. Yugoslav reply to Turkish enquiries characterised as inaccurate M. Gafencu's description of the attitude of the Yugoslav Minister for Foreign Affairs (see my telegram Circular B. 208 paragraph 11).

Copy for Mr. Hughes.
Mr. Casey.
Min. and Dept. Def.
Min. and Dept. E.A.
Sen. McLeay.
Mr. Fairbairn.
2.6.59.



6, RICHMOND TERRACE,
WHITEHALL,
LONDON, S.W.1.

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CONFIDENTIAL.

S.7010.

Air Mail 16.8.39.
Due to arrive 26.8.39.

MEMORANDUM TO:-

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

copying
TURKEY.

Relations with the U.S.S.R.

Our informant at Angora reported on 7th August a conversation he had had with the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs. M. Saracoglu had been informed a few days previously by the Soviet Ambassador that the Soviet Government were now prepared to enter into a private and secret agreement with Turkey.

2. M. Saracoglu had informed the Soviet Ambassador unofficially that in principle the Turkish Government agreed, and that he would be ready to proceed to Moscow. M. Saracoglu added that he held the view that, though reluctant to say so openly, the Soviet Government were anxious for his presence at Moscow in the hope that he might prove helpful as an intermediary between the United Kingdom and the Soviet. He did not regard this as certain but seemed to think it not unlikely.

3. The Turkish Foreign Minister has now informed the Soviet Government officially that the Turkish Government are willing to study a preliminary draft of a bilateral agreement between the two countries.

Alfred Shiring

Russia Turkey

CONFIDENTIAL



6, RICHMOND TERRACE,
WHITEHALL,
LONDON, S.W.1.

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

S.6145.

Air Mail - 21.12.38.
Due to Arrive - 31.12.38.

MEMORANDUM TO:-

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

U.S.S.R.

Relations with Turkey.

On 23rd November the Soviet Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs, M. Potyomkin, and the Soviet Ambassador in Turkey, M. Terentyev, were received by M. Ismet Inönü in the presence of the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, the conversation lasting for one hour and a half. Before the conversation with the President of the Republic, M.M. Potyomkin and Terentyev visited the Minister for Foreign Affairs with whom they had a prolonged conversation and also called on the President of the Grand National Assembly. Considerable publicity has been given in the press of Moscow to the presence of the Soviet Delegation at the funeral of Ataturk.

Alfred Stirling.

Abell

J

J

Russia - Turkey

CONFIDENTIAL

2, WHITEHALL GARDENS,
LONDON, S. W. 1.
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA,
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

S.5123

Air mail - 26.2.38.
Due to arrive - 12.3.38.

MEMORANDUM TO:-

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

TURKEY
Relations with U.S.S.R.

With reference to S.4222, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs told Sir P. Loraine on 16th February that Stalin had decided not to assume the titular headship of the Soviet State as it might be thought that the recent drastic purge had merely been undertaken for his personal advancement to that high position; that a new Soviet Ambassador to Turkey would shortly be appointed to represent M. Kalinin, who under the new Russian constitution had become legally and effectively the head of the State; and that the matter had been explained to the Ataturk, who was satisfied and had consented to receive the new Soviet Ambassador. The Minister added that complete cordiality and harmony now reigned again in Soviet-Turkish friendship. Turkey had stood her ground and it was Russia that had come round. Thus the basis of that friendship was unshaken and even consolidated and Turkey's conception of the limitations of reciprocal engagements had prevailed.

Alfred Stirling.

W.R.B.

F.N.D.

CONFIDENTIAL



2, WHITEHALL GARDENS,
LONDON, S.W.1.

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

S.4222.

Air mail - 4th August, 1937.
Due - 18th August, 1937.

MEMORANDUM TO:-

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

TURKEY

See S.4206.

Visit of Dr. Aras to U.S.S.R.

The British Ambassador to Turkey reports that the visit to Moscow had, according to Dr. Aras, been entirely successful in its avowed and ostensible object, which was to reaffirm and publicly manifest Turco-Russian friendship as a real and durable factor. Besides that, the simultaneous presence in Moscow of the Turkish Minister of the Interior had served to convince the Soviet Government that Dr. Aras has throughout been carrying out faithfully the policy of the whole Turkish Government and has not merited the presumably inspired accusations of the Moscow press to the effect that he has been conducting a personal policy of tending to weaken Turco-Russian friendship.

In his exchanges with the Russians, Dr. Aras went on, he had been entirely and exactly honest: he had made it clear that Turkish friendship for Russia was intact; that Turkey would fulfil scrupulously the obligations towards Russia that she had accepted and which were public knowledge, and that there would never be any initiative from the side of Turkey to undermine or weaken the friendship; but that Turkey was not prepared to subscribe to an extension of those obligations, implied or explicit.

Markings: R, J, J
Dr. Aras reported furthermore to the Ambassador that although a great deal of good had resulted from the direct exchange in the way of clearing up misunderstandings and probable suspicions in the minds of Russians of certain aspects of Turkish policy, and although the substance as well as the appearance of Russo-Turkish friendship had been genuinely reaffirmed, nevertheless a slight but "insidious" rift had been left. When asked whether he meant by this that the Soviets wished to have Turkish policy in tow and that the Turkish Government were unwilling to accept the tow, he replied it was exactly that. During the Moscow conversations the Russians had been trying in various ways to stretch the interpretation of Turkish obligations and he had steadfastly resisted all suggestions having that tendency. His feeling of the "rift" had been enhanced by the fact that M. Stalin had evinced no desire to receive himself and his colleagues.

Alfred Stirling
AS

Lastly, Dr. Aras said that the recent executions, imprisonments, etc., in Russia would have the effect of strengthening M. Stalin and his régime and he cautioned the Ambassador against giving credence to reports in a contrary sense.

pw

CONFIDENTIAL



2, WHITEHALL GARDENS,
LONDON, S.W. 1.

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

S.4148

Air Mail - 21.7.37.
Due to Arrive - 4.8.37.

MEMORANDUM TO:-

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

TURKEY

With reference to paragraph 1 of S.4033, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of the Interior left Moscow on 16th July for Turkey via Odessa on the termination of their three days' official visit. The British Ambassador at Moscow reports that the official communiqué regarding the visit as also a brief conversation he had with M. Aras left him with the impression that the main object of the visit was to dispel rumours of the cooling-off in Soviet-Turkish relations and that, apart from the signing of a convention for the regulation of frontier incidents, nothing positive was achieved.

Am
HD
Kew
JUL

Alfred Stirling

7
Kew

~~SECRET~~

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS.

L. L. O. Note - dated 12.5.32.

Relations with Turkey.

Following upon General Ismet Pasha's visit to Moscow, the Soviet Government have opened a credit equivalent to 8 million dollars to enable the Turkish Government to purchase immediately the latest types of Soviet industrial machinery. The credit will bear no interest and will be liquidated over a period of twenty years by consignments of Turkish produce to the U.S.S.R. It is also reported that the Soviet Government have presented the Turkish Government with ten tractors and five tanks.

16
30 JUNE 1932

SECRET

TURKEY.

L.L.O. Note - 13.11.31.

Turco-Soviet Relations.

His Majesty's Ambassador in Turkey reports that during the visit of M. Litvinov to Ankara, a protocol was signed on the 30th October extending for five years the duration of (a) the Russo-Turkish Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality of the 17th December, 1925, (b) the Protocol of the 17th December, 1929, relating to that treaty, and (c) the Naval Protocol of the 7th March, 1931.

Sir G. Clerk obtained the impression that, while there has not been as yet any serious weakening of the friendship between Russia and Turkey, M. Litvinov left Ankara disappointed with the results of his visit. M. Litvinov is reported to have expressed disapproval of Turkey's advances towards the League of Nations, but to have received a discouraging reply. It is further stated on what Sir G. Clerk regards as good authority, that M. Litvinov made a direct proposal that Turkey should agree to close the Straits if Russia were at war, but that this proposal was definitely refused.

It is announced that Ismet Pasha, the Turkish Prime Minister, has accepted an official invitation to visit Moscow. The date of the visit has not yet been fixed.

V.O.

9.11.1931

SECRET

TURKEY.

F.O. Note - 27.3.31.

Russo-Turkish Relations.

His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow reports that a new Turco-Soviet commercial treaty, which has been the subject of protracted negotiations, was signed at Moscow on the 16th March. According to a communique issued by the Soviet Government, the treaty is based on the principle of reciprocal most-favoured-nation treatment.

Key
8 MAY 1981

4
TURKEY.

F.O. Note - 13.3.31.

Russo-Turkish Relations.

His Majesty's Charge d'Affaires in Turkey reports the signature at Angora on the 2nd March of a Russo-Turkish protocol, under which the two Governments mutually agree not to increase their existing naval forces in the Black Sea or adjacent waters, nor to order or begin the construction of units intended to increase those forces, without giving six months' notice to the other.

Mr. Morgan states that this protocol is complementary to article 2 of the Russo-Turkish protocol of the 17th December, 1929.

Graeco-Turkish Relations.

On the 12th February the Turkish Assembly approved, by a unanimous vote, the Graeco-Turkish Treaty of Friendship, Neutrality, Conciliation and Arbitration, and the protocol concerning the limitation of naval armaments, which were signed at Angora on the 30th October, 1930.

Ko

22 APR 1931

Turkey -
Russia

COMMONWEALTH EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DEPT.

Cutting from the TIMES of 10/3/31

A BLACK SEA NAVAL
ARRANGEMENT

TURKISH-SOVIET PROTOCOL
FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT
CONSTANTINOPLE, MARCH 9

A protocol has been signed in Ankara between the Soviet Ambassador, M. Suritch, and the Turkish Foreign Minister, Tewfik Rashed Bey, relative to the Soviet and Turkish naval strength in the Black Sea and adjacent seas. This protocol, it is stated, is the sequel to the Soviet-Turkish Treaty of 1925 and additional to the protocol of December, 1929.

The two countries bind themselves not to construct any kind of warship destined to reinforce their respective fleets in the Black Sea or the adjacent seas; also not to order such a unit abroad, and, in general, engage themselves not to take any measure which will have the effect of reinforcing their respective fleets in the above-mentioned waters without informing each other six months beforehand.

This protocol resembles the Greco-Turkish Naval Protocol which was signed last November, but it is at present not clear what are the "adjacent seas" to the Black Sea. They may be the Sea of Marmora and the Aegean Sea, or only the Sea of Azof. In any case, Turkey does not keep any part of her fleet in the Black Sea, nor does she possess any naval bases there. Russia, on the other hand, has several naval bases in the Black Sea and many old warships of various sizes, including the battleship Pariskaya Komuna and the cruiser Profintern, which entered the Black Sea from the Baltic over a year ago. The protocol is another manifestation of Turkish-Soviet friendship and should prove especially useful to Turkey, who is obliged to watch carefully Soviet naval movements in the Black Sea.

Russo-Turkish
Naval arrangement

14 APR 1931

COLONIAL EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DEPT.
Cutting from the TIMES of
19. 12. 1929

Russia

Rel. with Turkey

TURKEY AND THE SOVIET

CLOSER LINKS

(FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT)

CONSTANTINOPLE, DEC. 18
The importance of the protocol attached to the Turkish-Russian Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality signed at Ankara yesterday by M. Karakhan and Tewfik Rashedi Bey may be judged from the second article of the protocol as published by the official Anatolian News Agency.

The two contracting parties mutually agree that they have not concluded agreements, other than those concluded with States contiguous by land or sea to the other contracting party. The two parties further undertake not to enter into any negotiations for the conclusion of political agreements with States contiguous by land or sea to the other party without notifying the latter, nor shall they conclude any such agreements without the consent of the other party. It is, however, understood that instruments aiming at the establishment or maintenance of normal relations with such contiguous States, and which are made public, are not subject to the above stipulation.

The duration of the treaty shall be two years, and, unless denounced by either party six months before its expiration, it will automatically remain in force another year.

The signature of such a protocol denotes a decided tightening-up in the relations between Ankara and Moscow, and I have reason to know that its conclusion came as a great surprise to the majority of interested countries. At present it is not clear why such a close relationship should be entered into by Turkey and the Soviet. A local view is that M. Karakhan was instructed to do his utmost to bring the two countries closer together, as the visit of the British Mediterranean Fleet to Constantinople last October had alarmed Moscow, which feared Turkey might drift outside its political orbit.

Vo
24.1.30

NEW TURCO-SOVIET
TREATY.

SIGNED AT ANGORA.

CONSTANTINOPLE, Tuesday.

According to an official communiqué issued in Angora, the representatives of Soviet Russia and Turkey, having decided to renew the Russo-Turkish Pact of Friendship, non-aggressor, and non-participation in hostile groups, which was concluded in Paris in 1925, a protocol to this effect was signed to-day. The Pact was first concluded in Paris in 1925 between Dr. Tewlik Rusidli and Chicherin at the moment that the fate of Mosul was being decided at the Conference of Lausanne. It was for a period of five years, and would expire in February next.

The following are some of the provisions of the Pact and its three protocols:

(1.) Neutrality in the event of military action against the other party to the agreement.

(2.) Non-participation in any political, military, naval, or economic coalition against the other party to the agreement.

(3.) Complete freedom of action in neutral relations with other Powers, in so far as they do not conflict with specified undertakings.

Karakhan is leaving Angora this evening, and will spend two days in Constantinople before returning to Moscow on Thursday.—
Reuter.

TURKEY.

RELATIONS WITH U.S.S.R.

Despatch from Constantinople 25/1/28,
advising the conclusion of the Communist ~~treaty~~. The
sentences were light and not calculated to clear up
every Communist cell in Turkey", but it is remarkable
that the Turkish Government has gone as far as it has
in an anti-Communist direction, and ^{shows} that it has
sufficient confidence in its stability not to hesitate
to take action which may displease U.S.S.R. There is
a certain amount of friction over the restrictions and
vexations Turkish exports to U.S.S.R. encounter, and
the propaganda the U.S.S.R. is conducting across their
common frontier.

19th March, 1928.

TURKEY.

Relations with U.S.S.R.

Despatch from Constantinople 22/9/27 -

"Turko-Russian relations are as good as ever, but
"Turkey will not tolerate communist cells".

KW 16.1.28

16.1.28

Testimony
PERSIA.

CONFIDENTIAL.



August 12, 1941.

SECTION 1.

[E 4650/3444/34]

Copy No. 070

Mr. Eden to Sir S. Cripps (Moscow).

(No. 185.)

Foreign Office, August 12, 1941.

Sir,
I ASKED the Soviet Ambassador to come to see me this morning, when I told him that I was gratified to learn that the assurances of His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government to Turkey had now been presented at Angora and had had a good effect. M. Maisky was much pleased to learn this and I thanked his Excellency for his help in pressing matters forward thus speedily. I continued that it was important that we should follow up this hopeful development and, in particular, I was anxious that we should give the Turks information of the presentation of our memorandum to Iran and assurances in respect of our intentions in that country on the same day as we delivered the memorandum in Tehran. M. Maisky agreed and I gave him a copy of the attached note, setting out the instructions which we proposed to send to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen. M. Maisky undertook to telegraph to his Government and seemed hopeful that they would co-operate with us in this action.

I am, &c.
ANTHONY EDEN.

Enclosure.

NOTE.

IT is suggested that the Soviet and British Ambassadors in Angora should be authorised to inform the Turkish Government on the 14th August of the substance of the memorandum which is to be communicated to the Persian Government on that date respecting the reduction of the numbers of Germans in Persia.

It would seem very desirable that the Soviet and British Ambassadors in Angora should be authorised, when making this communication to the Turkish Government on the 14th August, to convey to them assurances in the following terms:—

"The Soviet Government [and His Majesty's Government] wish to assure the Turkish Government, as they have also assured the Persian Government, that they fully accept and endorse the Persian policy of neutrality. They have themselves no designs against Persia's political independence or territorial integrity. It is their sincere desire to maintain that policy of friendship and co-operation with Persia which they believe to be in the best interests of both Persia and Soviet Russia [the British Empire]."

It is suggested that the Soviet Government, if they see no objection, should send immediate instructions to their Ambassador at Angora to address such an assurance to the Turkish Government on the 14th August and to communicate in advance with Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen regarding the manner of addressing this proposed communication to the Turkish Government.

[20-32]

TURKEY. *lussia*

August 11, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[R 7615/112/44]

Copy No. 070

Mr. Eden to Viscount Halifax (Washington).

(No. 607.)

My Lord,

I ASKED the United States Ambassador to come and see me this morning, when I recalled that I had previously mentioned to him my keen desire that the Soviet Government should give some assurances to the Turkish Government to allay the latter's suspicions of the Soviet's future intentions. I was the more anxious to ensure that this should be done in view of the pressure which both the Soviet and ourselves were now compelled to put upon Persia to ensure a drastic reduction in the number of Germans there. In order to make the position easier for the Soviet Government, I had told M. Maisky that we were willing to associate ourselves with any such *démarche*. The matter had now made rapid progress, and I was glad to be able to tell the Ambassador that Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen and the Soviet representative in Angora had now given assurances to the Turkish Government in the terms of the attached memorandum, of which I gave Mr. Winant a copy.

2. I added that there had now been a further welcome development in that the Turkish Foreign Minister had expressed a desire that the assurances should be made public. I was myself in favour of such a course and had only refrained from suggesting it lest it should arouse Turkish suspicions. If the Soviet Government agreed, the Ambassador might therefore expect the publication of the assurances shortly.

3. Mr. Winant thanked me for this information and said that he would report the information to his Government, who, he felt sure, would be glad to learn of this development.

I am, &c.
ANTHONY EDEN.

Enclosure.

Declaration by His Majesty's Government to Turkish Government.

Oral Preamble.

IN view of anti-Russian propaganda by the Germans, His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government have considered it right to reaffirm categorically their attitude towards Turkey in order that the Turkish Government may be under no delusion in the formation of their own policies towards Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

Written Declaration.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom confirm their fidelity to the Montreux Convention and assure the Turkish Government that they have no aggressive intentions or claims with regard to the Straits. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, as also the Soviet Government, are prepared scrupulously to observe the territorial integrity of the Turkish Republic.

While fully appreciating the desire of the Turkish Government not to be involved in war, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, as also the Soviet Government, would nevertheless be prepared to render Turkey every help and assistance in the event of her being attacked by any European Power.

[20-26]

His Majesty's Ambassador has at the same time addressed a note to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that, as far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, the declaration is intended to be merely a repetition of our undertaking towards Turkey as set out in article 1 of the Anglo-Turkish Treaty of the 19th October, 1939. The declaration does not in any way modify, extend or detract from the Anglo-Turkish Treaty.

Declaration by Soviet Government to Turkish Government.

Oral Preamble.

As late as March 1941, that is to say during the period of well-known treaty relations between the U.S.S.R. and Germany, the Soviet Government exchanged assurances with the Government of the Turkish Republic in connexion with reports that were then being spread to the effect that if Turkey were compelled to enter the war Russia would take advantage of Turkey's difficulties to attack her. It will be recalled that the Soviet Government for their part considered it necessary at that time to declare that such reports in no way corresponded to the attitude of the U.S.S.R., and that, if Turkey were in fact attacked and compelled to enter the war for the defence of her territory, she could count on full understanding and neutrality of the U.S.S.R. on the basis of the non-aggression pact between the two countries.

It is known that after the treacherous attack of Nazi Germany on the U.S.S.R., the Germans conducted and are still conducting a malicious propaganda against the U.S.S.R. intended *inter alia* to bring about discord between the U.S.S.R. and Turkey.

In view of the fact that this propaganda, which is being intensively conducted by the German Government, has become even stronger at present, and considering that in the present international situation it is opportune that an exchange of views should take place between the Soviet Government and the Turkish Government on the subject of relations between the U.S.S.R., Turkey and Great Britain, the Soviet Government have instructed me, M. le Ministre, to make to your Excellency the following declaration:—

Written Declaration.

The Soviet Government confirm their fidelity to the Montreux Convention and assure the Turkish Government that they have no aggressive intentions or claims whatever with regard to the Straits. The Soviet Government, as also His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, are prepared scrupulously to observe the territorial integrity of the Turkish Republic.

While fully appreciating the desire of the Turkish Government not to be involved in war, the Soviet Government, as also His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, would nevertheless be prepared to render Turkey every help and assistance in the event of her being attacked by any European Power.

↳ SOUTHERN (GENERAL).

October 31, 1939.

↳ CONFIDENTIAL.

↳ SECTION 1.

[R 9569/2613/67]

↳ Copy No. 037

Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Hoare (Bucharest).

(No. 526.)

Sir,

THE Roumanian Minister called to see me on the 31st October in order to give me the substance of M. Saracoglu's account to the Roumanian Government of his experiences in Moscow.

2. According to M. Saracoglu's statements, it appeared that the ostensible reasons for the non-conclusion of the Russian-Turkish Agreement were twofold. In the first place, the Turkish Government had refused to accept the "German clause" proposed by the Russians, under which, in the case of a German-Turkish conflict, the Soviet would have been entitled to remain neutral; and secondly, they had objected to a clause which would have involved the closure of the Dardanelles to foreign warships and would consequently have conflicted with Turkey's obligations under the Montreux Convention. The real reason, however, according to M. Saracoglu, had been the hesitation of Russia to conclude the pact before she had had time to consolidate the advantages which she had already gained in Poland and in the Baltic.

3. M. Saracoglu had gained the impression that Russia still desired very friendly relations with Turkey. He had found in Moscow no evidence of hatred towards, or designs against, Roumania. The Russians had shown an inclination to be ready to discuss Russian-Roumanian relations after the Russian-Turkish pact had been concluded. He was convinced in any case that Russia would not attack Roumania, though she might find a favourable moment to open the Bessarabian question again for discussion. As regards Bulgaria, M. Saracoglu had found much sympathy and support for that country in Moscow. From this the Roumanians were inclined to draw the conclusion that the attitude of Russia towards Roumania could not be very friendly. M. Saracoglu had asked the Soviet Government what their attitude was towards the formation of a Balkan neutral *bloc*, but although they had shown great interest, they had not expressed either approval or disapproval of the idea. His general impression was that the Soviets had adopted now the imperialist policy and ambitions of the Tsars.

4. M. Tilea remarked that Bulgaria was the key-point in the Balkans. A Bolshevik Bulgaria, which was not at all outside the bounds of possibility, and which even M. Momtchiloff recognised as a danger, would blow up the whole Balkans. M. Tilea felt that Turkey would hardly tolerate a development of this kind, and he hoped and believed that if the situation should arise, Roumania would be assisted by Turkey against Russia.

5. M. Tilea then said that he had spoken to Sir Alexander Cadogan about the enquiries which the Italian and German Governments had made in Bucharest in regard to article 3 of the Anglo-Turkish Pact. The Roumanian Minister in Rome had been told by Count Ciano that in fact the Italian Government had not reacted at all strongly towards the pact, though they did not much like it owing to the weight which it gave to Turkey in the Balkans. The Roumanian Minister in Rome had expressed the opinion that the Italians saw in the agreement an obstacle to the formation of a Balkan *bloc* under Italian auspices. I said that I should have thought, firstly, that the pact, in so far as it assisted the neutrality of the Balkans in general, was in the interests of Italy, and, secondly, that if the Roumanians were anxious to see a neutral *bloc* formed, it was not in their interest to make difficulties about, or be nervous of, Italy's rôle in its formation. M. Tilea said that, on the contrary, his Government would have no objections to Italy assisting in the creation of Balkan unity, towards which Roumanian policy was constantly directed.

6. I then asked M. Tilea whether the Roumanian Government, and in particular the King and M. Gafencu, were disposed at the present time to review

Copied
P.M. [743 hh-1]
Min. E.A.
M. Hughes
" Casey 8/40 Jr
" Street

their policy towards Bulgaria, and whether there was any indication of their being ready to take a new line in their relations with that country. M. Tilea replied that Bucharest was at present in contact with Sofia. The trouble was that there was much difference of opinion in Sofia on the course which Bulgaria should now set. Some people were taking the line that the Dobruja, supposing Roumania were disposed to hand it back, would be of no value to a Bulgaria which might go Bolshevik at any time, and that the proper course was to work for a general improvement of relations with Bulgaria's Balkan neighbours without any attempt to negotiate revisions of the frontier. Others, of the pro-Russian party, were aiming at obtaining extensive territorial advantages through the intermediary of Russia. The Roumanians were therefore inclined to think that it was best to await the development of the internal situation in Bulgaria before attempting to make any positive suggestions.

7. I replied that, although the matter was not directly my concern, I felt that it might well be that such a policy of waiting would result in Bulgaria drifting even further into the Russian orbit, under the impression that by no other means could she obtain the advantages which she feels to be her due. I felt sure that most people in Bulgaria—certainly the King—could not want Russian influence to increase, and that it might greatly strengthen their hands if Roumania were now to show a generous disposition. M. Tilea admitted the importance of these observations, and added that he knew both the King and M. Gafencu were at present disposed to make sacrifices for better relations with Bulgaria. He himself felt that the present might be the last opportunity. I heartily concurred.

8. M. Tilea then asked me whether His Majesty's Government themselves viewed with any apprehension the possibility of Italy playing an important rôle in Balkan unification. I said that I had originally thought it would be a good idea to encourage Italy to interest herself in the formation of a neutral Balkan *bloc*, though I had recognised that this must be done with moderation in order not to discourage Turkey from playing her part. I had, therefore, asked our Ambassador in Rome to speak to Count Ciano on the subject and gently to encourage Italy to play her part. Sir Percy Loraine had, however, had certain doubts as to whether this might not be going too fast, and we had agreed to say nothing to the Italians until we had had an opportunity of discussing the matter with the Ambassador in London. M. Tilea commented on this that we had until about March next to consider these problems, but that it was essential that the interval should be fully and wisely used.

9. M. Tilea then referred to contradictory reports which were going about in regard to Italy. He had heard from several quarters that Italy was still sending troops to Libya, and asked me what I thought about this. I replied that I knew there had been certain movements of this kind, but that I did not attach great importance to them. As I saw it, the Italians were still a little afraid that something might force them into the war, and they were also perhaps more afraid of the French than the French were of them. Moreover, I had an idea that some of the troops which had recently been sent to Libya were Blackshirt militia divisions, and it might be that, in view of the well-known strained relations between these units and the regular army, it had been thought desirable to get them out of Italy. In any case, it did not perhaps make as much difference to us as was sometimes thought, whether Italian troops were in Libya or on the mainland, since they could be very rapidly moved in case of need. M. Tilea asked whether the Italians were improving their relations with Greece, to which I replied that I understood they were about to issue a non-committal statement of friendship between the two countries.

10. I asked M. Tilea what was the present condition of Roumanian relations with Hungary. He replied by reminding me of the mutual withdrawal of troops from the frontier, which had been arranged on a suggestion from Yugoslavia and which had had a good effect. In regard to the reported plot in Transylvania, he said that he was not anxious and that no serious trouble was likely at the present time.

11. M. Tilea then asked me whether I agreed with him that the Turks would be likely to regard a Russian advance through Roumania as a menace to Turkish interests. I replied that I had no sure indication. The Turks were always most careful not to commit themselves to anything which might involve hostilities with Russia, and were doing everything in their power to keep relations

friendly. On the other hand, if the Russians came through Roumania, I could not believe that the Turks would disinterest themselves. In any case, they could certainly be relied upon to do everything that was in their power to dissuade the Russians from such an adventure.

12. I asked M. Tilea whether the Germans were exercising great pressure on Roumania for the supply of oil, &c. M. Tilea replied that the difficulties of transport to Germany were so great that Germany at present was unable to obtain even those amounts which Roumania had agreed to keep available for her. The Roumanians were not sending their wagons or containers out of the country, and the Germans were obliged to fetch everything they wanted themselves. They had, for example, bought 300,000 tons of wheat early in May, of which they had only been able so far to carry 15,000 tons to Germany.

13. Finally, M. Tilea referred to Russian naval policy. He asked whether I had any confirmation of the report that Russia was about to buy up the German mercantile marine, and I said that I had none. He said that the recent Soviet note to Great Britain about contraband had struck him as not necessarily entirely favourable to Germany. If, for example, the Russians were contemplating an increase of trade with the United Kingdom, the arguments contained in their note might serve for use against any German interference on the high seas.

14. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Rome, Angora, Moscow, Athens and Sofia.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

COPY ON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(2 2046/601/67)

CONFIDENTIAL

October 18, 1939

Section 1.

Copy No. 637.

Viscount Halifax to Sir N. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 589)

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 18, 1939.

I asked the Turkish Ambassador to come to see me today in order to discuss the general situation created by the breakdown of negotiations between the Turkish Government and the Soviet Government. I took the opportunity also of expressing my gratification that the Turkish Government were now ready to sign the treaty with Great Britain and France.

2. Dr. Ares explained that the Moscow negotiations had broken down because the Soviet Government made demands which ran counter to the two fundamental rules which the Turkish Government had laid down, namely, that Turkey should not in any way interfere with the normal working of the Montreux Convention, and that she should agree to nothing which would weaken the operation of the treaty which she contemplated with Great Britain and France. The Turkish Government, he added, would continue to keep up the appearance of negotiations with Russia, and although he evidently did not hope for any results he declared that he was not in the least disturbed by the breakdown which had occurred. Moreover, he was satisfied that this breakdown would not affect relations between the two countries, since it was not the result of any fundamental disagreement between Russia and Turkey, but was due to the pressure exercised on the Soviet Government by the German Government, the Soviet Government having felt themselves obliged, in the interests of Germany, to put forward the demands which the Turkish Government had not been able to accept.

3. As regards the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Treaty, he expressed the view that even if, owing to the suspense clause did not come at once into operation, this would not affect the policy of Turkey, which was laid down in the Anglo-Turkish and Turkish declarations of last June. These declarations had been approved by the Turkish Chamber and had therefore the force of law.

4. I asked Dr. Ares whether the insistence of the Soviet Government on excluding from the proposed treaty the possibility of a conflict between Russia and Germany meant that the new agreement between Germany and Russia as regards their policy in the Balkans, and, more particularly, whether we could anticipate joint action of these two Powers against Rumania. Dr. Ares doubted whether there was any definite agreement between Germany and Russia as regards the Balkans, but he recognised that it was possible that in favourable circumstances they might be in joint action against Rumania. But he doubted whether this would happen so long as Germany was occupied in the west and Russia was occupied in the Baltic and Central Asia.

5. I then took the opportunity of sounding Dr. Ares as to the possibility of the Turkish Government taking up again the question of organising a Balkan bloc. To this Dr. Ares replied that any success on these lines was now dependent upon the attitude of Italy in this matter. The Balkan States would require to know how far they could count on Italy before they embarked upon a policy which might bring them into trouble with Germany and Russia. Dr. Ares considered, however, that it ought to be the task of our Governments during the coming winter to consolidate the position both in the Balkans and in the Mediterranean on parallel lines. The attitude of the Ambassador in relation to the possibility of Italian co-operation was interesting, and, if it correctly represents the way that his own Government are thinking, goes to show that the views of the Turkish Government and of His Majesty's Government are moving on very similar lines.

I am, Sir, N.H.

London - Turkey
COPY/EW

CONFIDENTIAL

SOUTHERN (BALKAU STATES).

October 17, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 2.

(R 6957/1716/37)

Copy No. 037

Viscount Halifax to Sir A. Hoare (Bucharest)

(No. 501)
Sir,

Foreign Office, October 17, 1939.

THE Romanian Minister came to see me to-day and raised once again the question of further credits for Romania, for which, as recorded in my despatch No. 369 of the 3rd August, he had already made a request in August last. The increase which there had been in British purchases from Romania should, he said, make it possible to reduce to a minimum the amount of the sum allotted, but a credit was nevertheless indispensable, as the Romanian Government required it for the immediate purchase in this country of certain ships which would only be available for a limited space of time, and for which they had no other means of paying. I promised to pass on this request to the proper quarter.

2. M. Tilea next asked me what we knew of the progress of the Soviet-Turkish negotiations in Moscow. I said that we knew very little. A recent telegram from Sir W. Seeds had given some account of the draft agreement which M. Sarajoglu proposed to submit to the Soviet Government, and this was not unsatisfactory. We did not, however, know how it had been received by M. Stalin. In my opinion, however, the eventual terms of the Soviet-Turkish agreement were not, perhaps, the most important element, for, whatever the Turkish Government might sign, they would, when it came to the point, surely be guided by their own interests. It was not to the interest of Turkey to quarrel with the Soviet Union, nor would it seem to be in the interest of the Soviet Union to force Turkey into so doing by adopting an over-intransigent line. I personally hoped that a compromise might be found between the two different points of view. In reply, M. Tilea expressed the fear that the Soviet Government might succeed in ensuring that Turkish obligations towards France and Great Britain would lapse if the Soviet Union were to go to war against the countries concerned, and also that the Turks might be induced to revise their obligations with regard to the Straits under the Treaty of Montreux.

3. The Minister then mentioned the question of the British guarantee to Romania and its validity in case of aggression by the Soviet Union, which he had already raised unofficially with Sir A. Cadogan. I said that I hoped that it was not the intention of the Romanian Government to raise this question with us officially, as our reply (as well as that of the French Government) was likely to be negative. In fact, the less said about the matter the better. M. Tilea said that he saw the point of this argument and that he thought that his Government also appreciated it. For His Majesty's Government to announce officially that their guarantee to Romania was not valid in case of a Soviet attack would be to offer direct encouragement to the Soviet Union to attack Romania. He felt, nevertheless, that if an affirmative answer could be given it would greatly contribute to clearing up the situation in the Balkans. I replied that, when we gave our guarantee to Romania, we had never thought that in the event of an attack by Germany we should be able to afford Romania very much direct help. It was hoped that by announcing that, if Romania were attacked, we would go to war, we should deter Germany from taking this course. We were, however, now at war with Germany, so that our guarantee had lost its deterrent value, and we did not feel that any useful

purpose would be served by starting hostilities with an additional enemy in the shape of the Soviet Union.

4. In conclusion, I said that I wished to speak to M. Tilea unofficially about the question of Germany's oil supply. The suggestion had been put forward that as Roumania, in order to avoid antagonising Germany unnecessarily, was bound to supply her with a certain quantity of oil, but was not anxious to supply her with any very large quantity, it might be to the advantage of the Roumanian Government to inform the German Government that, so long as Roumania was not invaded, they would be prepared to supply Germany with a certain fixed quantity of oil. If, on the other hand, Roumania were to be invaded, the oil wells would be blown up and the supply of oil cut off altogether. In reply, M. Tilea said that he had no doubt that the Germans were already aware of the Roumanian intention to destroy their oil wells. His information, however, was that, even if the existing plants were destroyed, the Germans would be able to install fresh ones in four to six weeks' time, and that, with the more up-to-date machinery that the Germans would install, the output of the wells would be doubled. This information was confirmed by the experts in this country. In the circumstances a German invasion of Roumania would clearly be a disaster for the Allies as well as for Roumania.

I am, &c.

HALIFAX.

Russia Turkey

TURKEY.

November 11, 1937.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[E 6634/386/44]

Copy No. 037

Sir P. Loraine to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 645. Confidential.)

Sir,

IN my telegram No. 8, Saving, of the 26th July, 1937, I had the honour to acquaint you with the account given me by the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs of the visit which he made last summer to Moscow, in company with his colleague, the Minister of the Interior, and you will remember that, although the visit was regarded as having been successful in smoothing over some misunderstandings and publicly reaffirming the solidarity of Turco-Russian friendship, Dr. Aras warned me confidentially that a slight rift had nevertheless appeared in that friendship, partly due to the fact that M. Stalin had failed to receive him himself and M. Sükrü Kaya, notwithstanding an undertaking by the Soviet Ambassador here (of which I have since learnt) that they would be so received, and partly to the determination of the Turkish Government not to accept any extensions, explicit or implicit, of their signed and public obligations to Russia.

2. Since my return from leave a week ago, certain circumstances have come to my notice which point pretty clearly to a widening of the rift to which Dr. Aras had drawn my attention. The President of the Republic, I learn, is resentful of the treatment of various prominent Soviet citizens who have come to Turkey in various capacities in recent years. M. Karakhan, for instance, the successor of M. Souritz as Soviet Ambassador at Angora in 1934, who had previously been in Turkey on a special Soviet mission, in whom M. Kemal Ataturk had been invited to place the utmost confidence, and to whom the President had, indeed, shown marks of especial favour, admitting him to a personal intimacy unusual with foreign Ambassadors at this post, is in disgrace and in prison, and maybe even under threat of execution. It is not impossible, moreover, that M. Karakhan, if still alive, owes his existence to discreet representations, with which I was not long ago acquainted by Dr. Aras, in the strictest confidence, made by the Turkish Government in Moscow to the effect that M. Karakhan's execution could not fail to make a disagreeable impression on M. Ataturk's mind.

3. M. Karsky, appointed in May 1937 to succeed M. Karakhan, arrived in Angora in the spring of this year, returned to Moscow only about a fortnight later, will not come back again to Angora and is equally in disgrace.

4. Marshal Toukhachevsky and M. Boubnov, who accompanied Marshal Voroshilov on the special mission sent by the Soviet Government to attend four years ago the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the foundation of the Turkish Republic, a mission which was received with great rejoicing and marked cordiality in this capital, have both been deprived of their office, branded as enemies of the present Soviet régime, and the former has been shot.

5. Thus, as M. Ataturk has not unreasonably pointed out to his advisers and intimates, one after another the Russians coming to this country, whether officially accredited or not, who are recommended to him as persons deserving his entire confidence and esteem, are disgraced or executed as persons inimical to the very Government which entrusted them with these missions. In whom, therefore, can he trust?

6. M. Horace Salkind, who, since my arrival in this post, has been counsellor of the Soviet Embassy and Chargé d'Affaires during the absences on leave, or for other reasons, of his chiefs, has always appeared until quite recently a *persona gratissima* to the Turkish Government and to the President of the Republic. During the festivities of the past week both I and many other persons have not failed to notice the difference in the Turkish attitude towards M. Salkind. Hitherto, when at a public gathering a circle has been formed round M. Ataturk, the Soviet Ambassador, or Chargé d'Affaires, as the case

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might be, has always been a natural, and one might, indeed, say an inevitable, ingredient of the company. Last Friday night, when a similar circle was formed on the occasion of the fourteenth anniversary of the republic, M. Salkind was not invited to join the group, and himself looked obviously diffident about approaching it without a specific invitation. Even less than a year ago he would have joined it without invitation and as a matter of course.

7. I fancy also that the Russian attitude in the Non-Intervention Committee in London and periodical suggestions, or even complaints, from Moscow that Turkish friendship and solidarity with Russia are lagging behind expectations have likewise contributed to a distinct cooling-off in the relations between Angora and Moscow.

8. I foresee clearly, and do not think I am likely to be mistaken, that M. Atatürk, having brought about the retirement of Ismet Inönü and having replaced him with a Prime Minister who has had little or no experience in the handling of foreign affairs, intends to act (for the immediate future at all events) as his own Foreign Minister, using, of course, Dr. Aras as the instrument of his foreign policy. There are, therefore, grounds for believing that little or no attempt will be made from the Turkish side to close the rift with Moscow. M. Atatürk is, as you know, a downright, as well as a determined, character; he has no disposition at all to compromise and still less so to keep up polite fictions. There therefore seems to be a distinct likelihood that Turco-Russian relations will deteriorate yet further.

9. On the other hand, M. Atatürk's predilection for the United Kingdom and for things British continues to grow and is openly expressed.

10. No doubt in certain quarters we are already reproached with having deliberately undermined Turco-Russian friendship. Should we continue to incur that reproach, we can at least have the satisfaction of knowing that it is utterly unfounded and that our Turkish friends realise its complete lack of foundation as clearly and pertinently as we do.

11. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow.

I have, &c.
P. LORAIN.

TURKEY.

May 17, 1932.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 2.

[E 2383/449/44]

No. 1.

Sir E. Ovey to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 17.)
(No. 241.)

Sir,

WITH reference to Mr. Strang's despatch No. 231 of the 3rd May I have the honour to report that Ismet Pasha and his party returned to Moscow from Leningrad on the 6th May and left Moscow on the night of the 7th May for Sebastopol, where they embarked for Stamboul. M. Molotov went to the station to see them off and M. Litvinov and members of his staff accompanied them to Sebastopol.

2. I enclose a note by Mr. Bullard on proceedings at Leningrad.

3. The results of Ismet Pasha's visit were, as reported in my telegram No. 69 of the 8th May, reviewed in an official statement published here on the 8th May. This statement was as follows:—

"During his stay in the U.S.S.R. the President of the Council of Ministers of the Turkish Republic, Ismet Pasha, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tevfik Rüştü Bey, who accompanied him, had repeated conversations with all the responsible leaders of the Soviet Government. The respective Ambassadors were present at the meetings.

"These conversations were of an extremely cordial and friendly character, and permitted extensive consideration, not only of the international problems of interest to the two countries, but also of questions relating to their direct relations with each other. Complete community of view was established, permitting it to be agreed that the policy of close collaboration between the two countries in the past had fully justified itself, and that the general international situation and the interests of world peace made it necessary not merely to maintain but to extend that collaboration.

"Special attention was paid to the problems of the economic and cultural connexions between Turkey and the U.S.S.R. The personal acquaintance of the Turkish visitors with the economic construction now proceeding in the U.S.S.R., and with the work of Soviet science, revealed in many cases a great similarity in the problems facing both countries in these spheres, and the practical possibility of a much more extensive and more effective contact.

"An agreement in principle was reached as to the steps to be taken to effect this practical contact, and with this object the Soviet Government has opened a long-term credit to the amount of 8 million dollars, to be repaid in kind by yearly instalments, for the acquisition of the latest types of equipment of Soviet manufacture.

"It was also agreed that it would be useful to strengthen the cultural connexion between the two countries, in particular, by a more vital and direct connexion between the scientific institutes of the two countries."

4. The eventual possibility of some such business agreement had been foreshadowed at the time of M. Litvinov's visit to Angora last October, when the "Izvestiya," as reported in Mr. Strang's despatch No. 554 of the 23rd October, 1931, spoke of the time, now approaching, when the Soviet Union would be strong enough industrially to afford economic assistance to countries struggling for their national independence, and this for the first time in the world's history upon a basis of equality and not of exploitation. And though this is obviously what Ismet Pasha had in mind when he spoke to the All-Union Chamber of Commerce (paragraph 12 of Mr. Strang's despatch under reference), the announcement came as a surprise. The meaning of the arrangement is not, of course, that the Soviet Government will place \$ million dollars at the full disposal of the Turkish Government, because the Soviet Government certainly

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have not so much foreign exchange to spare. The sum in dollars is merely introduced for purposes of account. The effect of the arrangement will be, I imagine, that the Soviet Union will supply to Turkey, over a fairly short period, machinery, &c., of Soviet manufacture of a value which both sides will agree to be 8 million dollars. In return, Turkey will supply to the Soviet Union, over a longer period, food and raw material, &c., which both sides will also agree to be worth 8 million dollars, possibly with interest. The valuation of a Soviet-produced motor lorry in terms of, say, Turkish tobacco will present a pretty problem.

5. The agreement is, however, a notable one. The Soviet Government appear for the first time in the world market on any considerable scale as a supplier of machinery, which may even conceivably include aircraft and arms. The Turks, who cannot find foreign exchange to meet their existing commitments to foreign contractors, will be able to buy further equipment in return for, say, wool or tobacco or fruit, of which they have presumably no lack. And the Soviet Union being one big firm, the arrival of the Turkish merchandise will disturb no internal market and damage no local private interest, and will be of direct benefit to the community.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Angora, and to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

(For the Ambassador),

WILLIAM STRANG.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

Memorandum by Mr. Bullard.

ON the 5th May the local authorities in Leningrad gave a dinner in honour of the Turkish delegation, to which the heads of the foreign consular posts were invited. The President of the Leningrad Soviet, M. Kadatski, made a warm but conventional speech, and Ismet Pasha replied in a speech which, with the halting translation made by a Russian Tatar, sentence by sentence, took over three-quarters of an hour to deliver. No report of the speech was published in Leningrad during the following few days, and it is only to-day (the 10th May) that I find a report in the Moscow "Izvestiya." The report follows the speech closely, except that a passage about the Red army is omitted. The Soviet audience applauded many points in the speech very warmly, but the references to Belov, the officer commanding the Leningrad troops, and to the Red army, its past successes and its expected glorious future, called forth the greatest enthusiasm. It is unusual for Red army officers to be present at functions in Leningrad to which the consular corps are invited. Possibly Belov and some of his staff may have been invited on this occasion because Ismet Pasha is a soldier, and like the Red army had to fight "interventionists." Similarly, Ismet Pasha's feelings as a soldier for other soldiers may have moved him to make warmer statements than the parties afterwards thought it wise to set down in print. The impression I got was that the Soviet audience was taken by surprise by the warmth of Ismet Pasha's speech. In their enthusiasm at his compliments—in particular, his compliments to Leningrad, which aroused local patriotism—they appeared to pay no attention to a phrase which my Turkish neighbour at dinner pointed out to me as the essential part of the speech. This phrase reads in the published report: "We wish each other well. Each of us finds that what is done in the neighbouring friendly country is good." What Ismet Pasha said was rather stronger: "In view of the friendly relations existing between Soviet Russia and Nationalist Turkey, each must necessarily approve what the other does in its own territory." According to my neighbour (I omitted to find out his name; he is one of the members of Parliament for Istanbul and Minister of Agricultural Co-operation), the Turks have been troubled by Communist propaganda and agitation, and they wished to make it clear that this sort of thing must cease. If this was the intention, the proportion of jam to powder was too large for the dose to be fully effective, even though Ismet Pasha

emphasised the point by referring repeatedly to *Nationalist* Turkey in contradistinction to the *Soviet* Union.

Ismet Pasha laid great stress on his responsible position, and said that he spoke with the knowledge that what he was saying would soon be known to the whole world.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

Summary of a Report published in the "Isvestiya" of May 10, 1932, of a Speech made by Ismet Pasha at a Dinner given in Leningrad in Honour of the Visit of the Turkish Delegation.

ISMET PASHA said he was glad to speak among responsible representatives of Soviet society. Such a task could only be accomplished if perfect sincerity were employed. He might be inadequate to the task, but he begged his audience to believe in his sincerity.

He and his colleagues had noticed with great pleasure the cordial and sincerely friendly feelings shown towards them in Soviet Russia. On the occasion of official visits the parties usually consider it sufficient if the protocol is carried out, but on this occasion he could not fail to notice something more than that: proofs of mutual confidence.

In Leningrad they had been able to realise the great significance attached to science and art by the U.S.S.R. The beneficent influence of Soviet science was not confined to the Soviet Union, but spread over the whole of humanity. In Leningrad people were happy because they were accomplishing the tasks which had been set them. Let them not envy other towns, or departments in other places. It seemed to him that Leningrad was in the forefront of Soviet science, just as it had been in the forefront at the time of the revolutionary struggle. He noticed that his words gave his hearers pleasure. He wished not only to say how Leningrad had won his heart, but also to express, with a due sense of responsibility, the hope that through his hearers the great friendship between the U.S.S.R. and Nationalist Turkey might be widened and strengthened. He wanted the whole world to hear the secret of that friendship. The secret was simple: the friendship was founded, now as twelve years ago, on mutual confidence.

Ismet Pasha then said: "We wish each other well. Each of us finds that what is done in the neighbouring friendly country is good." Whatever the difference in their institutions and in the means they used to solve their problems, psychological factors played a great part, with other factors, in international relations as in relations between individuals.

If Soviet Russia and Turkey wished to establish their friendship it would be artificial if they proceeded from outer forms alone. It must rest in real interests, in mutual confidence.

If after his return home a foreigner asked him, a Nationalist, what he thought about the Soviet Union, he would reply: "The Soviet system is not ours, but that does not prevent its being the most suitable for the Soviet Union."

What he was saying there he was prepared to repeat in any other place whatsoever. Nothing seemed to him simpler and more natural than this declaration. In international affairs friendships were strong when they corresponded to geographical conditions, common interests and other factors. The friendship between the U.S.S.R. and Turkey owed its solidity to the fact that it rested on these conditions. The Turks were convinced that in all circumstances the U.S.S.R. would be guided by the friendship which bound them together. Similarly, Turkey would in all circumstances remember her friendship with the U.S.S.R.

In conclusion, Ismet Pasha proposed a toast to the local representatives (including Belov, officer commanding the troops), and to Stalin and other leaders.

TURKEY.

June 3, 1932.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[E 2711/449/44] No. 1.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 3.)
(No. 170.)

Sir,

FROM my conversations with the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs since their return from Moscow it is clear that they, and the numerous Deputies and journalists who accompanied them, were deeply impressed by what they saw in Russia, but I doubt whether the Soviet Government succeeded, if indeed it hoped or tried to do so, in turning Turkey's eyes from the West or in drawing the political bonds of the two countries any tighter. Nor, save in one possible respect, to which I shall return later, do I detect in the returned travellers any wish or intention to apply to Turkey the methods they seem to have admired so much in Russia.

2. On the other hand the Turks certainly feel, and probably rightly, that the visit has served a very useful purpose. It has enabled the Turkish leaders to clear away all grounds for misunderstanding that might arise from the very different views of government and administration held in the two countries and the Turks consider that the genuine friendship between them and the Russians will now be all the stronger because both sides know and understand the points on which they differ. In nearly every public declaration that he made in Russia Ismet Pasha laid stress on the "Nationalist" character of the Turkish State and pointed out that each country should develop on the lines that best suited its characteristics, but that that was no reason why the two countries should not be sincere and loyal friends. Tevfik Rüştü told me that the two Governments now understood one another so well that when Turkey joined the League of Nations it would be the Soviet Government that would defend her action against any voices of protest that might be raised in Moscow. (The Minister said "when," not "if and when.")

3. There is, however, one outstanding result of the visit which may seem to throw doubt on its platonic character—the credit of 8 million dollars' worth of agricultural and textile machinery, to be paid for in instalments of Turkish produce. From what the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs have said to me I have the strong impression that this was a spontaneous act on the part of the Soviet Government. "C'est un magnifique cadeau qu'on nous a offert," said Tevfik Rüştü and he continued, as I reported in my despatch No. 164 of the 13th May, that it was he who had to restrain Russian generosity. I read this gesture as partly intended to bring home to Turkey the contrast between her financial difficulties with Western States and Western contractors and the real friendship of Russia and partly as a bit of calculated propaganda: "We are not so hard up that we can't afford to help a friend in need, and moreover our industrial programme is leaping ahead so fast that we can easily spare 8 million dollars' worth of machinery." Of course, by accepting the loan Turkey puts herself under a certain obligation, but while the Turkish Government is grateful for a generous and timely act, it feels no doubt about its capacity to meet the obligation and will not, I am confident, change its policy out of gratitude.

4. I think, too, that there may have been another factor to account for the Turkish readiness to accept the advance. I found both Ismet Pasha and Tevfik Rüştü tremendously impressed by the industrial development they witnessed. Probably neither of them had ever seen big industrial works before, while certainly neither of them has any technical capacity wherewith to judge the efficiency of the huge machines and what those machines produce. The sight of the machines, the gigantic cranes, the great shafts of the turbines, the clanging, the bustle, the "model" workmen's dwellings springing up faster than blocks of luxury flats in Pera, all seem to have shed a glamour over the travellers which still holds them in thrall. Add to this that one of Ismet's dearest wishes is the

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development of industry in this most unadapted country, and one can see that the offer of 8 million dollars' worth of machinery would be irresistible.

5. In the first paragraph of this despatch I implied that in one respect the Turkish Government might wish to apply the methods they saw in action in Russia. The tendency in this country, under the pressure of budgetary difficulties, is more and more towards the creation of State monopolies. In Russia, Ismet Pasha saw the doctrine of State monopolies pushed to the *n*th degree, and, in the Russian offer of the 8 million dollars' worth of machinery, had an example of its practical working. I have little doubt but that he felt that a similar system, adapted to the different conditions of Turkey, would enable him to meet his financial difficulties without being obliged, as is the case at present, to restrict the industrial development of the country on which he has set his heart. It seems, therefore, not impossible that we may see the policy of creating State monopolies for all classes of produce in Turkey being actively pushed on.

6. Lastly, I am pretty sure that neither Ismet Pasha nor Tevfik Rüştü, especially the former, was quite blind to the other side of the Russian shield. They fully realise the sacrifices which the Russian people were being called upon to endure and the terrific strain which the Soviet policy imposed on the country, and they felt that not a five-year, nor a ten-year, nor a fifteen-year plan, would achieve the aims of the Soviet Government. But they received a deep impression of the ability of that Government to maintain its hold over the country, of its capacity to adapt itself to changes in circumstances and to follow the line of least resistance, of its skill to gauge the precise moment when to slacken the tension, and, above all, of the genuine idealism which inspires the Communist party and which will enable them to come out successful in the end. They feel that there is no danger of internal revolution, nor of the Soviet régime being upset by attack from outside, for foreign aggression would unite the 160 million Russians as never before in history and must inevitably fail. The one danger they see to this Soviet edifice is if Russia seeks adventure beyond her frontiers. If the Red army met with defeat, the whole structure might collapse and the Soviet Union break up into its component parts. But they are both convinced that the Soviet authorities are fully alive to this and have no aggressive intentions whatever, and they know that in spite of Soviet fears to the contrary the danger of a foreign attack on Russia is negligible. They sympathised with Russian feelings towards foreign nations with their possibilities of intervention or domination, and they were impressed by seeing how Russia is making herself independent of foreign material—especially war material—by creating her own factories and in many cases by seizing factories of foreigners and turning them to national use.

7. Time alone will show if the estimate of Russia, which I have ventured to attribute to the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs is just, I think that in many respects, and to a certain degree, it is, but I also think that they over-estimate both the effect and the proportion of industrialisation. Say that the Russian Government have $4\frac{1}{2}$ million people now occupied in industry and that it succeeds in another five or ten years in raising the number to 12 million, which will in itself be a remarkable achievement, that still leaves 148 million peasants, who constitute the real problem. Nor do I think that Ismet or Tevfik Rüştü allow enough for the Russian character. The very characteristics of the Russian people which alone made the Soviet experiment possible are those which make them, and will keep them, inefficient by comparison with other peoples in the complicated technical and mechanical work which modern civilisation demands.

8. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

TURKEY.

May 20, 1932.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[E 2450/449/44]

No. 1.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 164.)

Sir,

Angora, May 13, 1932.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 154 of the 28th April last reporting the departure of Ismet Pasha for Russia, I have the honour to report that he and the majority of the Turkish delegates, who accompanied him, returned to Constantinople on the 11th instant on the Soviet steamer "Gruzin." The remainder of the Turkish delegation, which includes representatives of the Ministry of National Economy, are prolonging their stay in Russia in order to have further opportunities of studying and profiting by Russian methods and results in the branches in which they specialise.

2. It is as yet too early to gauge the results of the visit of the President of the Council to Russia. The letters of Yunus Nadi, who accompanied the delegation, reveal an astonishment at and admiration for Russia's immense resources and its military strength, and a sincere pleasure at the existence and durability of Turco-Russian friendship. Yunus Nadi seems to have been greatly touched by the hospitality and marks of friendship lavished on the delegation and surpassing all their expectations. Other Turkish journalists show less enthusiasm than Yunus Nadi. They insist that the Soviet system is not suitable for Turkey, and that friendship with Russia must not preclude friendship with Western Powers. Enthusiasm is entirely absent from an article in the "Milliyet," which on the day of the return of the delegation from Russia, strongly criticised the Soviet Government for creating continual difficulties for Turkish merchants in Russia, and for continuing to carry on Communist propaganda in Turkey.

3. One event which took place during Ismet Pasha's stay in Russia has given rise to much speculation here. This was the conclusion on the 6th May of an agreement, given wide publicity in the Turkish press, in virtue of which the Soviet Government will open for Turkey a credit of 8 million dollars for textile, sugar-refining and other machinery, to be repaid in Turkish goods, without interest, in twenty years. The Soviet Government further makes Turkey a present of a tractor, three large and two small tanks, two motor-lorries and a motor-bus. It is my impression that the suggestion that this credit should be opened came from the Soviet side, possibly as a hint that, although Turkey was pleasantly engaged in flirting with Western Powers and the League, there was still nothing like Moscow for real solid friendship. My impression is encouraged by an observation of Tevfik Rüştü that it was Turkey who fixed the limit of 8 million dollars, for the Russians were prepared to give a much bigger sum.

4. It is certain that the credit will ease the financial situation, now faced with a large gap in the budget, as it will save Turkey paying for material which would otherwise have had to be met out of revenue, and it is possible that both Russia and Turkey hope that it will avert the calamity of Turkey's applying to Paris for a loan. I have even heard it suggested that the desire of Turkey to enter the League of Nations is not unconnected with the hope of obtaining a loan on less irksome conditions than those which France may offer. In this connexion, it is possibly significant that Saracoglu Sukru Bey, who was reported to have been on the point of leaving for Paris, some two or three weeks ago, has, on one pretext or another, put off his journey and, when Ismet Pasha returned from Russia, was still in Turkey, doubtless for the purpose of learning the decisions at which Ismet Pasha had arrived on the conclusion of his Russian tour.

5. The effect of the credit remains to be seen. It is fairly clear that Turkey, which is postponing payment for the war and railway material supplied to it

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by foreign firms, and which has recently ordered every individual in Turkey to declare the amount of foreign currency in his possession, is acutely feeling the financial pinch, and may have preferred to borrow from its Soviet friend before applying to its French foe. On the other hand, the operation may be but the beginning of series of agreements founded on barter, which Turkey is prepared to conclude with any State that may so desire.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

TURKEY.

May 17, 1932.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[E 2381/449/44]

No. 1.

Mr. Strang to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 231.)

Sir,

Moscow, May 3, 1932.

I HAVE the honour to report that Ismet Pasha and Tevfik Rüştü Bey, accompanied by their wives and a large party of other Turkish notables, arrived at Odessa on the morning of the 26th April on an official visit to the Soviet Union. The party included, in addition to the persons enumerated in Sir George Clerk's despatch No. 142 of the 16th April, Ismet Pasha's brother and nephew, Hayri Bey and Hasan Bey, and also Hüseyin Bey, described as attached to the Presidency of the Council, and Kazim Pasha, former commander of the 8th Division. The party was accompanied by M. Surits, Soviet Ambassador at Angora, and was met at Odessa by Hüseyin Ragip Bey, Turkish Ambassador at Moscow, and a number of Soviet officials. The Soviet steamer "Gruziya," with the visitors on board, was escorted into port by the cruiser "Profintern," which fired a salute of twenty-one guns. Ismet Pasha inspected the guard of honour and greeted them in Russian. The party were entertained to a banquet, visited factories and other institutions, were taken to the ballet, and left for Moscow, via Kiev, by special train at midnight.

2. In his speech of welcome at the banquet, the president of the Odessa District Executive Committee, recalled the victorious resistance of both countries to foreign intervention and their common work in the cause of peace. In his reply Ismet Pasha thanked his hosts for the hearty reception he had received as the representative of "national and revolutionary Turkey." Soviet-Turkish friendship, of which he brought a new assurance in the name of Turkey and the Gazi, was the expression of the sincere desire of the two peoples. It was the fruit of common interests and of the logic of events, and it replaced the misunderstanding of two régimes that had passed away.

3. The visitors were met on arrival in Moscow on the morning of the 28th April by M. Molotov, chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, M. Litvinov, Commissar for Foreign Affairs, who had come back from Geneva for the purpose, and other prominent civil and military officials. The Italian and Persian Ambassadors alone of the foreign representatives in Moscow were present at the station. The two Ministers were accommodated in the official house of reception of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, the remainder in hotels. In the course of the day, Ismet Pasha and Tevfik Rüştü Bey paid visits to M. Kalinin, president of the Central Executive Committee, and to M. Molotov and M. Litvinov, and laid a wreath on Lenin's tomb in the mausoleum in the Red Square. Groups of the Turkish party visited the Commissariats of Heavy Industry, Light Industry, Supply, Foreign Trade, Agriculture, Education, and Health.

4. On the evening of the 28th April M. Molotov gave a banquet for the Turkish visitors, which was attended by the chief Soviet notables. The dinner was followed by a reception, to which the staffs of foreign missions and their wives, foreign press correspondents, and numbers of Soviet officials were invited. The men wore lounge suits, the women evening dress. The reception was, on this occasion for the first time, held in the Kremlin palace itself, in the Hall of St. George, a great hall of white marble reached by a long, straight staircase, on the upper landing of which still hangs a large picture of Alexander III and his court. The names and arms of the Knights of St. George are graven on the stone panels and pillars of the hall. The reception was a rather dreary affair. The hall was much too big for the 500 or so people invited. A good many of the guests arrived before the hosts had finished dinner, and M. Molotov, who lacks the heartiness of his predecessor, M. Rykov, made little attempt to establish contact with his guests other than the Turks. Many more Soviet

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officials than usual were invited, but except for the few (whether Commissars, Foreign Commissariat officials or theatrical managers) who are accustomed to meet foreigners, they kept to themselves, either walking round and round the hall, as they are accustomed to do in the foyers of the theatres, or congregating in groups in corners of the hall. There was a little dancing. Supper was served in the adjoining Hall of St. Andrew, a larger and more exotic version of the Locarno room at the Foreign Office, decorated in red and white and gold. The supper was of the stock Moscow type, plentiful and well presented, but, apart from the caviare, not very appetising.

5. The speeches delivered by M. Molotov and Ismet Pasha at the banquet were of no special note. Molotov stressed the importance of the occasion, the establishment of personal contact with the Prime Minister of a friendly country accompanied by a large and representative delegation. Soviet-Turkish friendship was of historic importance, established at a time when both countries were struggling for independent existence against the forces of imperialism, and now tested and confirmed by twelve years' experience, and fortified by repeated personal contacts between the political leaders. The Soviet-Turkish Treaty of 1925 was a political agreement of a new type, a pact of neutrality and non-aggression, which had already served, and would serve again, as a model for others. Notwithstanding the differences in the social and economic systems of the two countries, economic relations would continue to be strengthened. The exchange of views made possible by the present visit was of special importance for the cause of peace, falling as it did at a moment when influences hostile to peace were playing an increasingly powerful part in the world. He concluded with compliments and toasts.

6. In his reply Ismet Pasha said that he was touched by the warmth of his welcome, and would never forget the precious tokens of friendship he had received on the hospitable soil of a great and friendly nation. He was glad to be able by personal contact to enter into relations with Soviet leaders and to see the Soviet economic achievements for himself. For the rest, he did little more than associate himself with M. Molotov's remarks on the character and significance of Soviet-Turkish friendship, but he made no reference to that bogey of the Soviet mind, the imminent threat of a new imperialist war. Translations of the two speeches are enclosed in my immediately following despatch.

7. Earlier in the day Ismet Pasha gave an interview to a representative of the Tass Agency, in the course of which, in reply to a question as to future developments in Turkey, he emphasised that Turkey was a land of peasants, and that future policy would be based on the hopes and needs of the peasantry. This may have been disappointing to the questioner, for in Soviet Russia, although it is a peasant country, the emphasis is laid on industrialisation, and the peasants are exploited for the benefit of the urban workers.

8. On the 29th April M. Kalinin entertained Ismet Pasha and others of the party at luncheon to meet Stalin. They subsequently paid an official call on the President and Presidium of the Moscow Soviet, and visited motor-car and ball-bearing works in the neighbourhood of Moscow.

9. In the evening M. Litvinov gave a dinner in honour of the Turkish visitors. The heads of foreign missions and their wives were invited, though the press notices of the function exclude all reference to this fact. The host was nearly half an hour, and some of the guests as much as an hour, late. Dinner jackets were worn. I found myself seated between Yunus Nadi Bey, editor of the "Cumuriet," and Ruşen Esref Bey, secretary of the Assembly. Yunus Nadi Bey had had a heavy day and was rather incoherent. On having the Japanese Ambassador pointed out to him, he made some venomous remarks about the Japanese, and said that if there was war between Japan and Russia, Turkey would break off relations with Japan, or, rather, this is what he would advocate in his newspaper when he returned to Angora. It would be much more useful than anything the League of Nations had done, and would have a tremendous moral effect. Rather inconsequentially he added: "We have given our word." At this point Ruşen Esref Bey, with apologies for his condition, shut him up. I cannot judge whether his remarks are likely to have any significance.

10. M. Litvinov's dinner was followed by a gala performance at the Opera—one act of "Prince Igor," one act of "Sadko," and one act of the ballet "Don Quixote." M. Molotov appeared at the opening of the second act, and he and Ismet Pasha drew the cheers of the house by standing for a few moments hand

in hand. Some of the party attended a reception given by the "Izvestiya" after the performance.

11. On the 30th April, the visitors lunched with Voroshilov, Commissar for War and Marine, together with members of the Revolutionary Military Council and leading military personalities. In the course of his reply to Voroshilov's speech of welcome, Ismet Pasha said: "As an old soldier I know that, however far military technique may advance, the essential element in war is the man. The Soviet and Turkish people are inspired by the great ideals of revolution and peace, and are, therefore, unconquerable. I am firmly convinced that if it should come to a military conflict, the Red Army would be victorious." In the evening there was a Soviet-Turkish dinner at the Turkish Embassy, followed by a reception for the staffs of foreign missions and others. This was, I believe, M. Molotov's first appearance at a foreign Embassy.

12. The whole Turkish delegation witnessed the May Day parade in the Red Square from a special stand, and, unlike the rest of us, remained for the civil demonstrations which followed the parade. They must have been on their feet for nearly five hours. Later in the day Ismet Pasha attended a reception organised by the All-Union Chamber of Commerce. He told the company that he rejoiced to see the successes achieved by the Soviet Union in the economic and cultural field, and that he could also, for his part, give an account of Turkish achievements which, in spite of differences of scale, would equally rejoice his hearers. Soviet-Turkish relations should be developed in the cultural, technical and commercial as well as the political sphere. It could not, however, be denied that here there might sometimes be insurmountable difficulties, though not necessarily serious ones. Turkey desired to utilise Soviet achievements in the development of Turkish national economy. Soviet industry had already learnt to produce excellent goods, which Turkey would prefer to take from Soviet Russia than buy abroad. There was no reason why commercial relations should not be successfully developed.

13. A reception was given by the Tass Agency for the Turkish journalists and men of letters accompanying the delegation. Yunus Nadi Bey and Rusen Esref Bey spoke. They were both, as they were intended to be, powerfully impressed by the parade and demonstrations they had just witnessed.

14. On the evening of the 1st May the Italian Ambassador gave a dinner for the chief Soviet and Turkish personalities, followed by a reception attended by heads of foreign missions. The Ambassador told me that his reason for giving this entertainment was that Ismet Pasha was shortly to visit Rome. Some people think it an unnecessarily pointed demonstration of Soviet-Turkish-Italian solidarity.

15. On the following day the Turkish party witnessed a gymnastic display followed by a football match in the Stadium of the Dinamo (G.P.U.) Sporting Club. In the evening they were taken to the ballet. On the evening of the 3rd May they left for Leningrad.

16. Tevfik Rüştü told me that the visit was simply one of friendship. In these troubled times it was valuable to exchange views at first hand on problems of the day, and this was what they were doing. The German Ambassador tells me that M. Krestinsky spoke to him to similar effect a week or two ago. I had a short talk with Ismet Pasha, who seemed at that particular moment to be more interested in the Far Eastern situation than in anything else.

17. Tevfik Rüştü was rather less talkative than when he was here in 1930. Ismet Pasha carried through his rather trying ordeal with dignified courtesy. Mme. Ismet was unfortunately ill for a good part of the visit. The licensed gossip of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs told me that of the Turkish party they liked Tevfik Rüştü and the Ambassador best, as being people with whom it was possible to talk. They found Ismet rather unresponsive and rustically minded ("il est trop berger"), and I suppose not sufficiently impressed with their new world.

18. As may be gathered from the above, the Soviet Government have spared no pains to do honour to their guests. The Russians, I should imagine, attach more importance to the relations between the two countries than do the Turks. For Turkey, Russia is a make-weight; for Russia, Turkey is an only friend. If Turkey were about to become a member of the League of Nations, it would be natural that she should make a reassuring demonstration of amity to her friend in the other camp. Russia, for her part, is in real or imagined danger of an

attack upon her rights and interests in Manchuria, or even upon her territorial integrity in the Far East, and is suffering from a more than usually violent attack of nerves as to the danger of an attack from the West. The value of Turkey to her in this situation is that of the one Power who, geographically and racially, and by the very character of her political relations with other countries, can be confidently counted on neither to engage in nor to become involved by force of circumstances, in anti-Soviet political or economic combinations.

19. The Soviet view of the visit was stated in a leading article in the official "Izvestiya" on the 28th April, a translation of which is enclosed in my immediately following despatch. The visit of Ismet Pasha differs, apparently, from the ordinary run of visits among imperialist statesmen, in that while the latter are but stages on the road to the preparation of a new world war and an attack on the Soviet Union, it represents a stage in the struggle for peace. After drawing the parallel between the early history of the two régimes and recalling their mutual aid in their fight for independence against the imperialists in the early days of their existence, the article goes on to say that the Soviet Union and an independent nationalist Turkey are each in their own way obstacles to the fulfilment of imperialist plans. The imperialist States have, therefore, formed groups of a military character, the object of which is to destroy not only the Soviet Union, but the nationally independent States of the East. They are sparing no pains, but in vain, to break the connexion between the proletarian revolution in Europe and the nationalist movement in the East, of which Soviet-Turkish friendship is a symbol. The result of Ismet Pasha's visit will be to strengthen that friendship and serve the cause of peace.

20. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Angora.

I have, &c.
WILLIAM STRANG.

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TURKEY.

November 9, 1931.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION 3.

[E 5545/1234/44]

No. 1.

below

Sir G. Clerk to the Marquess of Reading.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 361. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Angora, November 1, 1931.

MY despatches Nos. 353 and 358 of the 28th October and the 1st November have recorded the outward form of the official visit of the Soviet Commissary for Foreign Affairs to Turkey. The inner meaning of the event is harder to set forth, and I can only give a personal impression, which is that M. Litvinoff has gone away rather annoyed than otherwise.

2. Although a visit this autumn was vaguely arranged last March, I am fairly confident that it only became a certainty—from the Russian side, a necessity—after the striking reception given to the Earl of Athlone and Her Royal Highness Princess Alice in April; and, as a counter-blast, it has fallen distinctly flat. True, the press has paid its full meed of lip-service, but no impartial observer could describe the general attitude as other than apathetic. If I wanted confirmation of this, I had it half an hour ago, when I was listening to the Gazi opening the first session of the Fourth Grand National Assembly. His Excellency's warm allusion to the visit of M. Litvinoff and to Turkey's "grande amie," Soviet Russia, was listened to in complete silence by the Deputies, normally only too eager to take the Gazi's signal for a storm of handclaps.

3. Again, I have reason to believe that M. Litvinoff expressed considerable disapproval of Turkey's flirtation with the League of Nations and received a reply that was far from satisfying him, while, in one instance, of a direct proposal—namely, that Turkey should close the Dardanelles if Russia were at war—I am told from a good source that he met with a direct refusal. Lastly, the general election at home certainly threw a shadow over the occasion, at least so far as M. Litvinoff was concerned. My Swedish colleague, who was for years in Moscow and in close personal relations with M. and Mme. Litvinoff, told me that the latter, evidently echoing her husband, called the election a tragedy for Russia, and he also said that M. Litvinoff, whom he saw off on Friday, left here depressed and in a bad temper. I should in justice add that M. Heidenstam found M. Litvinoff very troubled about the condition of things in Russia, so that his depression may not have been entirely due to disappointment with the visit to Angora, but it is probably equally true that he found little here to cheer him up.

4. By what I have written above I do not wish to convey that there has been any serious weakening of the friendship between Russia and Turkey. What I think has happened has been that M. Litvinoff has learnt that Turkey is definitely out of Russian leading-strings, and that he does not like it.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

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4 JAN 1932

TURKEY.

November 9, 1931.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[E 5543/1234/44]

No. 1.

Sir G. Clerk to the Marquess of Reading.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 358.)

My Lord,

Angora, November 1, 1931.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 353 of the 28th October regarding the visit to Turkey of M. Litvinoff, Soviet Commissary for Foreign Affairs, I have the honour to report that the ceremonial on the occasion of his stay followed the usual lines. He was received by the President of the Republic, was entertained at luncheon or dinner by the Prime Minister, by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and by the President of the Grand National Assembly, and in his turn entertained these and other notable personages at the Soviet Embassy. On the eve of his departure he was the principal guest of honour at the review held on the national holiday of the republic.

2. According to the Turkish press the visit has no other object than that of consolidating the long-established friendly relations between Turkey and Russia. Such relations had rarely been possible when Tsars and Sultans reigned, for the two peoples had then been stirred to artificial hostility against one another. Turkey could not forget that Soviet Russia had been her friend in her hour of need—a kindness reciprocated by Turkey when Soviet Russia was menaced on all fronts. The friendship of the two peoples was a powerful factor for peace in the Near East. The "Son Posta" suggests that Soviet Russia fears that Turkey, under the pressure of financial need, may yield to the imperialistic Powers in Europe and America and come to an understanding with them, and join the League of Nations, and that, in consequence, M. Litvinoff has come to Turkey to tell its statesmen and the Turkish press and people that the time is not far off when Russia will be able to help Turkey economically. The "Hakimiyet Milliye" too expresses a hope that M. Litvinoff's remarks about wider economic co-operation signify something in the nature of financial help.

3. At a dinner given in honour of M. Litvinoff by Dr. Tevfik Rüştü on the 27th October, speeches were delivered by these two Ministers. The Turkish Minister described the profound feelings of friendship and sympathy of the Turkish people for their great neighbour and friend, and his firm conviction that the recently concluded commercial treaty would give a new impetus to mutual economic relations. In regard to the foreign policy of the two countries he declared that each of them was working for peace, which was vitally necessary for the cause of the interior progress and welfare of both peoples. He stated also that advantage would be taken of M. Litvinoff's visit to extend the duration of the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality of the 17th December, 1925, and its appendices.

4. In reply M. Litvinoff expressed his pleasure at his reception in Angora—so closely linked with Turkey's most brilliant success in her national struggle and her development in recent years. Turco-Soviet friendship had its roots in the hearts of the people of the two countries. It was founded on mutual confidence and was strengthened by collaboration in the cause of universal peace. He referred to the recently-concluded commercial treaty as a proof of the respect of each party for the social and economic organisation of the other, and praised the energy of the Gazi and of Ismet Pasha in economic organisation and in developing the natural resources of Turkey. As the time approached when the economic development of Turkey and the Soviet Republics reached its zenith, the field of economic collaboration between the two countries would widen. M. Litvinoff concluded by expressing his pleasure at being afforded the opportunity during his visit of signing the extension of the period of validity of the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality of the 17th December, 1925.

5. The signature of the Protocol of Extension of the treaty and its annexes took place on the 30th October, and its effect is to prolong for five years from the

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dates when they would otherwise have expired the validity of the following instruments:—

- (a) The Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality concluded at Paris on the 17th December, 1925, and its appendices—three protocols of the same date;
- (b) The protocol, signed at Angora on the 17th December, 1929, extending the treaty of 1925; and
- (c) The Naval Protocol of the 7th March, 1931.

References to these acts will be found in Constantinople despatches Nos. 930 of the 23rd December, 1925, 491 of the 18th December, 1929, and 81 of the 12th March, 1931. The text of the Protocol of Extension is being forwarded to your Lordship in a separate despatch.

6. M. Litvinoff left Angora on the 30th October and a communiqué, of which the following is a translation, was issued:—

"Very cordial conversations took place between M. Litvinoff, Commissary for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., on the one hand, and Ismet Pasha, Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic, and Tevfik Rüştü Bey, Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the other. In these conversations, in which M. Suritz, Ambassador in Turkey of the Soviet Union, and Hüseyin Raçip Bey, Ambassador of Turkey in Moscow, participated, there was an exchange of ideas about questions connected with the relations of the two countries and on big international questions. As a result of these conversations the soundness of the basis on which Turco-Soviet friendship—sealed ten years ago—reposed was once more verified and the possibilities of great development which the present Turco-Russian economic relations offered were recognised. In the course of these conversations, which had for their object the preservation of peace and the continuation of cordial and close relations existing between the two countries, the most complete and absolute concordance of ideas of both parties was shown.

"M. Litvinoff repeated the invitation given to Ismet Pasha to visit Moscow by M. Suritz some time ago in the name of the Government of the Soviet Union, an invitation which was accepted with great pleasure. The date of the visit will be fixed later.

"One of the happiest results of the above fruitful interviews is the extension of the period of validity of the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality, signed at Paris on the 17th December, 1925, and the three protocols of the same date which are attached to it; of the Protocol of Extension signed at Angora and dated the 17th December, 1929, and of the Naval Protocol also signed at Angora on the 7th March, 1931."

7. I understand that M. Litvinoff will take advantage of a short stay in Venice to meet certain Italian personalities and will then return, probably via Berlin, to Moscow.

8. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

TURKEY.

October 7, 1930.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 2.

[E 5383/324/44]

No. 1.

below.

Mr. Strang to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 578.)

Moscow, September 30, 1930.

Sir, WITH reference to my despatch No. 577 of the 29th September, I have the honour to report that I had two conversations with Tevfik Rüstü during his stay. The first at the reception given by the Turkish Ambassador and the second when the Minister received the heads of missions individually. I found him talkative and very cordial. He spoke in terms of warm friendship for Sir George Clerk, and said that the relations of our two Governments could not be better. There was absolutely no question of serious importance now outstanding. He said that the new Anglo-Iraq treaty might stand as an example of how His Majesty's Government kept their word. By the conclusion of that treaty the Mosul question was now finally dead and buried. The Russians had asked him about the treaty, and this is what he had told them.

2. He said that relations between the Turkish and Soviet Governments were excellent. He had come to Moscow to return Karakhan's visit and to develop personal contact with members of the Soviet Government, which was the best possible way of preventing misunderstandings. The Soviet Government appreciated his policy, and M. Litvinov had gone out of his way in his speech to pay him a quite unsolicited compliment for striking out a new line by the Soviet-Turkish treaty of 1925.

3. The fundamental idea of his policy was to establish good relations with all other countries, but to be bound to none. Turkish foreign policy was clear for all to read in the treaties which she had concluded with other countries, all of which had been published. It was essential to avoid all special or regional combinations or groups. Such political devices were out of date and entirely out of harmony with the new spirit now abroad in the world. He was sorry to see that this view was not more generally accepted in the world to-day; and, in fact, he might say that it was only in London and in Washington that the value of a policy of avoiding such entanglements was really understood. The virtue of his policy was proved by the fact that at the present moment there was no Government, not even the Persian Government, with whom the Turkish Government was not on good terms. One by one he had liquidated outstanding problems. Graeco-Turkish relations, to take an outstanding example, had never been so cordial. The treaty of neutrality signed with Soviet Russia in 1925 had been a starting-point, and he had continued on that road ever since. Tevfik Rüstü then made some remarks about disarmament, which I report in my despatch No. 579 of the 30th September.

4. I have little comment to make on the general question of Soviet-Turkish relations. It is clearly to the interest of both countries to make the most of their friendship. The Soviet Union finds in Turkey her only friend. The two countries were once both outcasts, and the Soviet Union would like to maintain the old ties on that basis, or, if that is at this date impossible, to prevent Turkey, now that she has re-established her international position, from being seduced through dangerous intimacy with the enemies of the Soviet régime. Turkey's problem is, I suppose, to walk the tightrope between friendship with her powerful and potentially dangerous neighbour and good relations with the Great Powers who are equally her neighbours. She may even aspire, if she is ambitious, to act as a bridge between them.

5. I should add that I drew his Excellency's attention to the message from its correspondent in Turkey published in the "Times" of the 17th September, from which it appeared that there was some anxiety in Turkey at the continued presence in the Black Sea of the two Soviet warships, "Parishkaya Kommuna" and "Profintern," and to the leading article in the same issue, in which it was suggested

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that this anxiety was shared, not only by the other States bordering the Black Sea, but by the great Mediterranean Powers also. Tevfik Rüstü made light of this report, which he had not seen. He said that his Government had no naval ambitions. They had no money to spare for armaments, for they were not going to fight anybody. They did not regard these Soviet ships as in any way threatening their security.

I have, &c.

WILLIAM STRANG.

TURKEY.

October 7, 1930.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[E 5382/324/44]

No. 1.

Mr. Strang to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 577.)

Sir,

Moscow, September 29, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to report that Tevfik Rüstü Bey, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, arrived in Moscow for a short visit on the 24th September. He left Moscow on the 27th September for Leningrad, where he intended to spend a day or two before returning home via Moscow. The immediate purpose of the visit was to return M. Karakhan's visit to Angora last December.

2. Tevfik Rüstü was entertained on the evening of his arrival at a banquet given by the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, which was followed by a Government reception to which members of foreign missions were invited. On the evening of the 25th September there was a reception at the Turkish Embassy. On the morning of the 26th September, Tevfik Rüstü received the heads of foreign missions individually, and in the evening of the same day there was a gala performance at the opera, at which a box was placed at the disposal of each foreign mission. I submit some remarks on these functions in my despatch No. 580 of the 30th September.

3. Immediately on his arrival Tevfik Rüstü gave an interview to the Tass agency, a record of which is enclosed.* In his statement, Tevfik Rüstü said that the strengthening of Soviet-Turkish friendship was a natural process. He defined the basis of Turkish foreign policy as peace and equality among nations. He evaded, as well he might in Moscow, a question as to the effect of Fethi Bey's new party upon Turkish foreign policy. He stated, in reply to another question, that M. Briand's Pan-Europa was of no interest to Turkey. He expressed his pleasure at the warmth of his reception and at the prospect of renewing his acquaintance with Soviet statesmen, and summed up the aim of the collaboration between the two countries as the struggle for peace and the reduction of armaments.

4. Speeches were exchanged at the official banquet on the 24th September, records of which are enclosed.* In his speech of welcome, M. Litvinov reminded his guest of the days when both their countries had heroically withstood the armed attacks of world imperialism. Out of that common peril, successfully overcome, had grown the friendship which now united them and which was an important element in world politics. He complimented Tevfik Rüstü for striking out a new line in the conduct of foreign relations by the Treaty of Neutrality signed with the Soviet Government in 1925. He warned him that, though the imperialists had failed to destroy the Soviet and Turkish revolutions by armed intervention, they were still threatening the life of both countries in a new way and with fresh means under the guise of peace (that is to say, presumably, the so-called united economic front against the U.S.S.R., and the possibility of foreign financial control in Turkey). Soviet-Turkish friendship was, therefore, a matter of great historical importance, and was the most powerful safeguard of peace. Besides, both Turkey and Russia needed peace in order to pursue their intensive internal reconstruction. The "Izvestiya" of the 24th September had a leading article which is little more than an amplification of M. Litvinov's speech. I enclose a translation for purposes of record.*

5. Now, if I have rightly understood the aims of Turkish foreign policy as Tevfik Rüstü was good enough to explain them to me, this is not quite what he wants. His policy is to be on good terms with all other Governments, but to be bound to none, and, above all, to enter no group. If M. Litvinov asks him not to join the supposed anti-Soviet front, he can easily, I should think, promise not to do so; but if M. Litvinov goes further and asks for solidarity with the Soviet Union against the rest of the world, the request is in contradiction with present Turkish policy. In his reply to M. Litvinov's speech, Tevfik Rüstü naturally, therefore, emphasised the positive aspect of Soviet-Turkish friendship, its value to the two countries themselves, and tacitly declined to see in it any manifestation of solidarity as against foreign countries. He thanked his hosts for the warmth of his reception and for

* Not printed.

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27 NOV 1930*

the friendly atmosphere in which he found himself. Soviet-Turkish friendship had grown up during a heroic period and had been tested and not found wanting during a time of great difficulty. The closeness of their relations was a guarantee of peace, and it was the aim of both countries, each in its own way (he was careful to add), to defend what was sacred to them and to eliminate war from the world. He was following with great interest the efforts of the Soviet Government to raise the moral and cultural level of the people of the Union, to whom he brought a message of greeting from the Turkish nation.

I have, &c.
WILLIAM STRANG.

TURKEY.

January 20, 1936.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION 2.

[E 324/324/44]

No. 1.

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 14.)

Angora, January 14, 1930.

Sir, HAVING been confined to my bed by a chill, I was not able to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs on my return from leave until yesterday evening.

2. I found his Excellency as discursive as ever, though during the hour and a half his eloquence endured not much of real importance emerged.

3. The most interesting part of his discourse was his reference to M. Karakhan's visit. His Excellency practically admitted that Moscow had for some time been made uneasy by Turkey's "Occidental" leanings and that Karakhan's visit had been inspired by this feeling. The resultant renewal of the Turco-Russian Treaty, with its new mutual obligation not to make political agreements with the immediate neighbours of the other country without its consent, had, according to Tevfik Rüstü, completely soothed Russian suspicions, while it contained nothing contrary to the Turkish policy, openly professed and steadfastly pursued, of friendship all round with those who were ready to be friends. It was unthinkable that Turkey ever would make a political agreement with Poland or Roumania directed against Russia, for to do so would at once invite a Russian attack, but if it pleased Moscow to see this stated in a political instrument, Turkey was quite ready to oblige.

4. Tevfik Rüstü's manner was that of a man who has got out of a rather difficult situation cheaper than he hoped, and confirmed the impression recorded in Mr. Edmonds's despatch No. 494 of the 20th December last—an impression shared by my French colleague—that M. Karakhan had arrived with something much further-reaching in his portfolio, and had to content himself with the new treaty and a promise of a return visit from Tevfik Rüstü to Moscow in the course of this year. I find that my German colleague looks on the treaty as a considerable success for the Soviet Government, which has, he thinks, always had a lurking fear of a Roumanian-Polish-Turkish combination, and, as his great ambition was to be Ambassador in Moscow, he may be presumed to speak with some of an expert's authority, but I cannot say that I share his view.

5. The Minister for Foreign Affairs concluded his remarks about Russia by expressing the fervent hope that our newly re-established relations with Moscow would prosper and not be lightly broken again. The way to treat Russia, he said in effect, was by kindness, for she felt herself a pariah among the nations and was grateful for a friendly hand, but bitter against, and suspicious of, those who kept aloof. And as for Communist propaganda, that should be dealt with purely as a matter for the police, as was done in Turkey, not as a political question. Russian Communists often tried to get to work in Turkey and were promptly suppressed by the police, but Angora never thought of complaining to Moscow, and political relations remained quite undisturbed. It seemed idle to point out to his Excellency that Russian intensity of purpose and Russian methods of propaganda differed considerably in the case of Turkey and in that of the British Empire.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

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TURKEY.

December 30, 1929.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[E 6768/474/44]

No. 1.

Mr. Edmonds to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 494.)

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 491 of the 18th instant, I have the honour to report that M. Karakhan arrived at Constantinople in a destroyer on the 12th instant, reached Angora the next day and left Angora on the 17th. During his few days' stay he was the object of the utmost courtesy and hospitality on the part of the authorities. It is safe to say that it is a long time since any particular attention paid to an Armenian in Turkey has been of this nature. If by the protocol which he took away in his pocket M. Karakhan has in any measure humbled Turkey, it is to be hoped that members of his race see some poetic justice therein.

2. The visit was certainly a success. The Government and the Soviet Embassy sustained an intensive exchange of official hospitality. At the two balls, at which members of the Diplomatic Corps were present, M. Karakhan, with his back to the wall, watched the dancing beys and hanums with a sphinx-like air. He talked to people through an interpreter or in pretty good English, and was shadowed himself by his own Assistant Director of the Protocol. As soon as the date of M. Karakhan's visit was fixed, the Ghazi had suddenly gone off with his cronies to see how his new hobby, the development of a watering-place at Yalova, was getting on. He seemed to have done nothing particular while there, and he returned to Angora only just in time to give M. Karakhan an audience. This absence caused a little speculation. The Ghazi may have wished to be associated as little as possible with pro-Russian demonstrations. Or he may have wanted to reduce to a minimum his contact with the representative of a State which he cannot consider innocent of agitation against his own person. Again, he may have been influenced by his particular aversion for Armenians. Apart from the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, members of the Cabinet were rather conspicuous by their absence from the various functions.

3. The truth seems to be that Angora regarded this visit as a thing it was obliged to be happy about. When the Turks say through the glib lips of Tewfik Rushdi Bey how much they love the Russians, what they really mean is that potentially they fear them so much that they are delighted to be friends with them. The bullying of the Tsars is not forgotten. It is an enormous relief to be on such friendly terms with Russia. The Turks have no fear of her at present. They merely dread the day when internal consolidation will allow her to resume her old pushfulness in the south. In the meantime they regard it as of paramount importance to keep Russia well-disposed.

4. There is not much doubt that the initiative for this visit was taken by Russia. It was not surprising that after Admiral Field's visit Russia should see in Turkey a westward tendency which needed checking. The idea of renewing the Paris treaty of 1925 had been in the air for some time, but I gather that M. Karakhan sprang on the Turks the self-denying clause regarding the other's neighbours. I believe that he demanded considerably more, but I have little doubt that he and M. Surits had to bring all their guns to bear to get as much as they did. In the last resort the Turks are probably always brought to book by the military consideration that, until their relations with the rest of the world are secure beyond all possibility of doubt, they must be able to count on having the moral and material support of Russia in an emergency. They remember that their struggle after the Great War was only possible because Russia helped them. Indeed, references to this help have been noteworthy in recent utterances on both sides.

5. Many Turks seem to have thought at first sight that the new protocol meant a kind of vassalage. But it is quite certain that the Ghazi and Ismet Pasha, whose policy is westernisation, have no such intention. The Government probably argues that, in undertaking to get Russian permission before making political agreements with Russia's neighbours, it is only renouncing a right which it has no intention of

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10/16/20

exercising, at any rate within the next three years. On the other hand, the Government very likely comforts itself with the hope that on balance it will gain thanks to the check it will have on Russia's treaty-making powers in Persia and Afghanistan. These seem to be the two countries where the protocol may prove of some practical importance. In particular, the Turks are uneasy about the strength of Russian influence in North-Western Persia, where they have affinities with most of the population, or where the Kurds may be used to make the Kurds on the Turkish side of the frontier disaffected. Tewfik Rushdi Bey tried to make out to the Roumanian Chargé d'Affaires that, as article 2 deals only with the two countries and their immediate neighbours, the protocol, by implication, makes it easier for Turkey to cultivate close relations with the Western Powers. But this argument is an indication of his ingenuousness rather than his ingenuousness.

6. The authorities know that Communist propaganda continues unabated, but, as it has no field outside the few places which are in a measure industrial, they can keep it within safe bounds. Several recent articles in the Turkish press contained a passing warning about each country minding its own business, and M. Karakhan was careful to echo this seemly maxim in a speech. The Under-Secretary told me that negotiations for a further commercial treaty would be pursued in Moscow. He said that the Russians treated Turkish traders abominably, but that the difference between the economic systems of the two countries being so great he had no real hope that a fresh commercial treaty would make things any better. These things show how much the Turks feel obliged to put up with.

7. Believing that they have successfully avoided any really embarrassing commitment, the Turks are, on the whole, probably well satisfied with the results of the visit. In his parting message to the press M. Karakhan said that his five days in Angora had seemed like ten years, but that was probably one of those things which might have been expressed otherwise.

8. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow.

I have, &c.
W. S. EDMONDS.

P.S.—M. Karakhan and his destroyer were storm-bound in the Bosphorus for some days after his return from Angora, but left for Sevastopol on the 23rd December.

W. S. E.

TURKEY.

December 9, 1929.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 2.

[E 6377/474/44]

No. 1.

Mr. Edmonds to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 476.)
Sir,

Constantinople, December 4, 1929.

WITH reference to Sir G. Clerk's despatch No. 479 of the 6th November, 1928, I have the honour to inform you that I have received an interesting report from His Majesty's consul at Trebizond on the subject of Russian activities in his consular district. Mr. Matthews reports that while the number of Russian consular posts in the district has remained unchanged during the past year, two further trade delegations have since then been established at Kars and Baiburt respectively. Moreover, the trade delegation at Trebizond itself has been increased from three members in 1928 to eight this year, the staff now consisting of the head of the delegation, five Russians (one of whom is a woman) and two Turks. This increase is not to be explained by the increase in imports, which is negligible, but must presumably be ascribed to political motives. A similar idea may be seen in the strong and successful effort now being made to push the sale of cotton goods, which are sold at half or even less than half the price ruling in Russia. The same applies to sugar, which is, nevertheless, barely obtainable in Transcaucasia.

2. During the past year the Russian trade delegation at Trebizond, notwithstanding its increased membership, has appointed a number of local Turks to conduct various activities hitherto managed directly by the delegation, such as the sale of sugar, rubber, mineral oils and cement, and the agency of the Russian Steamship Line or "Krasniflot." These agents receive six months' credit as well as a commission on sales, and (according to the head of the local custom house) a fixed salary in addition. It seems clear that the Russians mean to use such agents as instruments of propaganda. Mr. Matthews is, moreover, confirmed in the view he expressed a year ago that the Russian consular and trade representatives in the district are themselves engaged chiefly in espionage and the diffusion of Soviet propaganda. It seems probable that Russian intrigue may have been responsible for the brigandage which has been rife in the Rizeh district during the last two years, and Mr. Matthews has learnt from a good source that Turkish subjects in Russian pay are carrying on an agitation in the district, particularly in Lazistan, against the Turkish Government. Their task is facilitated by the unpopularity of most of the innovations of the last few years and the distress existing in certain districts such as Of and Kerasund. They point out to villagers that although the Government calls itself the People's Government, it is doing nothing for them, and adapt their remarks to the mentality and prejudices of the people whom they are trying to lead astray.

3. The present Russian consul-general at Trebizond, Comrade Detistoff, is, on the other hand, probably doing less propaganda work than either of his immediate predecessors, Comrade Ettingoff and Comrade Ahmeroff. In the first place, he has only two languages, Russian and German, neither of which are generally spoken locally; and in the second place the local press is useless for such purposes since the introduction of the new characters. It finds difficulty in printing a few news telegrams and local advertisements and has practically no readers. Were it not for a grant from the Government, it would have ceased to exist.

4. As for relations between the two countries generally, they appear to be passing, again through a somewhat troubled phase. The Soviet Embassy, strong though its influence still is, lost ground as a result of the advice it gave to the Turkish Government a year ago to give blind support to Amanullah. While the immediate result of the latter's downfall was to cause some bitterness against His Majesty's Government, who were believed to have been chiefly instrumental in bringing it about, the Turkish Government seems slowly to have realised that it had backed a very poor horse, and resentment against His Majesty's Government gave place to a similar feeling against the Soviet Government, which had been largely responsible for the line the Turkish Government had taken in the question. The fillip given to Anglo-Turkish friendship by the visit of Admiral Field and his squadron last October no doubt gave rise to a counter-move in the shape of the proposal that M. Karakhan should visit Angora. This has now been postponed for reasons undivulged.

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5. Possibly it was felt in Turkey that the commercial situation should be cleared up before the visit took place. Complaints have long been rife again in the Turkish press at the disabilities placed in the way of Turkish merchants endeavouring to sell goods in Russia. The Turkish Government has been seeking to overcome these difficulties in two ways. In the first place, it has decided to entrust the whole export trade to Russia to two Turkish banks, the Banque agricole and the Banque industrielle et minière, which according to the press will form a limited liability company for the purpose. In the second place, it has been negotiating with the Soviet Embassy a new commercial treaty intended, it is understood, to replace that of 1927. Some difficulties appear to have arisen in the conclusion of this treaty. I believe the Turks demanded the right to establish trade delegations in Russia and that the Russians feared consequent Turkish propaganda in Azerbaijan and other districts where the population is of Turkish origin. But it was announced in the local press of the 2nd December that a provisional agreement had been concluded which would permit of the immediate exportation of Turkish goods to Russia.

6. The general indication then seems to be that Turco-Russian relations have lately been going through a somewhat unsatisfactory phase. That any great significance is to be attached to this is hardly to be believed. As has often been indicated in despatches from this Embassy, Turkey neither can nor will alienate the goodwill of the Soviet Government, and within a short period M. Karakhan will, presumably, pay his visit to Angora.

I have, &c.
W. S. EDMONDS.

RUSSIA.

November 11, 1929.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 2.

[N 5149/280/38]

No. 1.

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 443.)

Sir,

Angora, November 3, 1929.

IN the course of an interview yesterday on current business with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, his Excellency made certain references to Russia and Afghanistan which may be of passing interest.

2. During my recent stay in Angora, various colleagues have pointed out to me, what I had already expected and noticed, a certain swing of the Turkish pendulum towards Moscow, just to soothe any uneasiness that might be felt there at the cordial reception given to Admiral Field and the British squadron. Tevfik Rüstü evidently wanted to reassure me in this respect, and he brought the point up by telling me of three important visits that he was expecting in the near future.

3. First of all, there was Count Volpi, a personal friend and an outstanding financial authority, on whose wise counsel the Turkish Government placed great reliance. Tevfik Rüstü gave me to understand that the Government was waiting for Count Volpi's visit in order to settle the final plans for the creation of a State bank next spring. The next visit was that of M. Walko, the Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, purely one of international friendship and courtesy. Lastly, there was M. Karahan, whom Tevfik Rüstü knew intimately, and with whom he hoped to have many interesting discussions.

4. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Chicherin had the greatest mind of those who directed Russia's foreign policy, but he was a very sick man, and at the moment Russia's foreign policy was entirely in the hands of Litvinoff and Karahan, Litvinoff taking Europe and America, and Karahan Asia, each of them pursuing an independent policy. Litvinoff was all for entering into relations with the Western Powers and ending Russia's isolation, while Karahan considered that Russia was big enough to suffice for herself, and though she did not seek to isolate herself from the other Powers, it was for those other Powers to approach Russia and accept Russia's terms. He looked on Russia as an Asiatic Power and held as the basis of his policy close and friendly relations with China. The two countries were essential to one another, and Karahan felt that both countries understood this, and that such incidents as the present situation in Manchuria were only passing breezes of no intrinsic importance. Such a view does not seem likely to make relations between Great Britain and Russia any easier, and Tevfik Rüstü admitted that this was a difficulty in the way of those good relations between the two countries, which he professed to consider essential to the peace and progress of the world.

5. The thought of Great Britain and Russia in Asia led his Excellency to speak of Afghanistan. The Turkish Government is in close touch with Kabul, and has, I gather, already been approached by Nadir Khan for advice and help. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he had considerable belief in Nadir Khan's sense and capacity, but his Excellency was not going to be at all forthcoming in the provision of Turkish military and other instructors. Turkey could ill spare the few capable people of this sort that she possessed; he was still uncertain as to whether Nadir Khan would succeed in establishing himself definitely, and he did not want a repetition of the job of getting a Turkish mission safely out of Kabul. The rivalry of the Afghan tribes was notorious and they were all amply supplied with arms, and any chance rising might easily develop into a movement which would overthrow Nadir Khan. He himself thought that since a peaceful and settled Afghanistan was to the interest of everyone, the really wise course would be for Great Britain, Russia and Turkey, the Powers most directly interested, to join together in helping Nadir Khan to establish an efficient force of gendarmerie—5,000 armed and disciplined men would do—to collect the rifles from the various tribes and establish law and order in the country, but he admitted that this was a counsel of perfection. He had, however, pressed on the Afghan Government the fact that Afghanistan required gendarmerie and not soldiers, and he had further sought to drive home the rather harsh truth that Afghan independence depended upon a rigid maintenance of the position of a well-ordered buffer State between Russia and India, free from obligations or engagements to either country.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

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TURKEY.

September 2, 1929.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 2.

[E 4374/474/44]

No. 1.

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 369.)

Sir,

Constantinople, August 29, 1929.

Below

IN my despatch No. 299 of the 9th July last I had the honour to report upon Russo-Turkish relations and upon the Turkish attitude to communism in Turkey. The prosecution at Smyrna of various Communists which I then mentioned has, as I anticipated, led to comparatively light sentences, some seventeen persons being condemned to terms of imprisonment not exceeding four and a half years each. They applied for a reversal of this sentence, but the Court of Cassation proved inexorable.

2. Early last month the Turks found another reason for being irritated with the Bolsheviks. Under the cry of "Smash the old idols," a movement started among the students at Constantinople which seemed at first the perennial treading of youth on the heels of age, and took the fairly harmless form of decrying the men who have hitherto passed as the national poets of Turkey—Abdul Hakk Hamid, Mehmed Emin, and Yakub Kadri, the latter of whom had injudiciously uttered the opinion that the youth of Turkey to-day were not worth their salt. The authorities took a serious view of the incipient movement. They sent Mehmed Emin, Yakub Kadri and other leading persons down from Angora to confer with the students. In the result the students agreed that those who fostered the movement were Communists and persons without love of country, and order was restored in the students' union, which the agitators had tried to capture.

3. The incident gave a fillip to the tendency of the press to criticise the Russian attitude. The "İkdam" said that the incident might not mean Communist propaganda, but that the ground was certainly being prepared for an attack on the security of the State. The "Jumhuriyet" attempted to pour water on the flames by recalling that boys would be boys, and reverting to the polemics of the "Pravda" it remarked that the grand fact was Turco-Russian friendship. But, it continued, Turks did not interfere in Russian affairs any more than Russians were entitled to interfere in Turkish affairs; Turks did not say the Soviet régime was barbaric, and Turks did not complain if Russia entered into negotiations with Western capitalists. Shortly afterwards a leading article in the semi-official "Milliet" replied to the "İzvestiya's" assertion that certain forces in Turkey were trying to separate Russia and Turkey so as to force Turkey into the arms of capitalist Europe. The "Milliet's" answer was that Turco-Russian friendship was a fact, that it thanked the "İzvestiya" for pointing out the pitfall, but that a distinction must be drawn between honest collaboration by capital and unfair exploitation. Russia herself invited the former. Turkey could be relied on to defend herself from the latter. On the 9th of this month the "Akşam," a paper usually well enough disposed to Russia, contained an article written against communism in general and denouncing it in Russia as synonymous with terrorism.

4. Of all the articles which irritation with the Bolsheviks has produced the most remarkable is an outburst from the pen of Hamdullah Subhi Bey, taking up the text of smashing idols. Once Minister of Education at Angora and still a leader of opinion there, he can be taken as saying what Angora really thinks, and having no position more official than that of president of the Turkish "Ojak" organisation he cannot easily form the subject of official remonstrances from Moscow. His article seems to me so significant that I append a translation of certain passages.* While anxious no doubt to maintain her alliance with a Russia which she knows she need not fear, Turkey is fully aware of the meaning of communism within Russia and of the activities of communism in Turkey.

I have, &c
GEORGE R. CLERK.

* Not printed.

[919 b-2]

10/15.11.29

TURKEY.

July 15, 1929.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 2.

[E 3534/474/44]

No. 1.

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 15.)

(No. 299.)

Sir,

Constantinople, July 9, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your herewith a copy of an article in which the semi-official "Milliett" of the 6th instant takes the "Pravda" to task for its recent unfriendly remarks about Turkey.* The article is interesting, since it is written in a sharp tone, the like of which Angora has never yet adopted towards Moscow. It looks almost as if Angora, feeling the resumption of Anglo-Russian relations to be likely, found itself able to treat Moscow with greater independence.

2. The "Milliett," as will be seen, takes exception to the suggestion of the "Pravda" that communism is spreading in Turkey. It also resents another report of the "Pravda," to the effect that discontent in Turkey is growing under the burden of taxation and bad times. It bids the "Pravda" mind its own business, both by seeing that Russia carries out the terms of the Russo-Turkish Treaty of Commerce and by refraining from meddling in communism in Turkey. In conclusion, it draws an odious comparison between Russian and Turkish justice.

3. The inference may perhaps be drawn that Russo-Turkish relations are passing through an unhappy phase. For some weeks past there has been a good deal of resentment in this country at the treatment accorded to Turkish citizens and goods in Russia. Turkish merchants are said to be unfairly taxed in Russia, and Turkish goods—notably a cargo of hides—held up in the Russian customs, and ultimately refused admission as not being genuinely of Turkish origin. Influential Deputies, who have received export licences from the Russian Embassy, are interested in this trade, and at the end of May Yunus Nadi Bey was allowed to hint in his unofficial "Jumhuriyet" that there would be advantages in friendship with Great Britain rather than Russia, and to beg Russia rather to abrogate the Russo-Turkish Commercial Treaty than to risk her friendship with Turkey by continually violating the agreement. I suspect that my Soviet colleague is spending some of his leave in trying to smooth this difficulty over, and that it has something to do with the sudden return, for a few days, of the Turkish Ambassador from Moscow.

4. The enclosed despatch from the acting British consul-general at Smyrna reports on the Communist trial now proceeding there.* It has been dragging on for months, the accused are alleged to have been active in Angora and Constantinople, as well as in Smyrna. It is probable that beneath the "communism" with which they are charged there is in many cases not much more than general discontent. For one reason why the "Milliett" is so incensed with the "Pravda" is that the latter is really right when it speaks of discontent. Even the Turk may be expected to grumble, when on the top of very bad times, although the limit of taxation was thought to have been reached, he finds, as has just happened, that income tax has been put up 20 per cent. and house property tax 100 per cent. In any case, the Communists on trial at Smyrna hardly represent a serious movement. Their prosecution is undertaken both to nip any possible subversion in the bud and to discourage any others who might be inclined to let their discontent outrun their discretion. This has been the practice of the Angora Government in dealing with communism and the present trial will probably result in light sentences.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK.

* Not printed.

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TURKEY.

January 30, 1928.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 2.

[E 470/127/44]

No. 1.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 51.)

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the trial of the Communists reported in my despatch No. 579 of the 22nd November last came to an end on the 23rd instant. The fifty-seven accused were mostly Constantinople men, but some came from Smyrna, Adana and Eskishehr, which are industrial centres in a very small way. A few were from the professional classes, but the great majority were working men—fitters, joiners, factory hands, barbers, &c. Most again were Moslem Turks, but there was a sprinkling of Greeks and Armenians. Of all this crowd eighteen have been acquitted and the rest have been sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from two and a half to four months, except a certain Dr. Shefik Husni, who is regarded as the ringleader and receives a sentence of a year and a half.

2. At first sight it is surprising that such light sentences were imposed; but it appears that there was little evidence forthcoming to substantiate the charge of attempting by conspiracy to change the form of government. Dr. Shefik Husni, who had started Communist papers in Turkey, ran away to Vienna in 1925 to escape a sentence of the Independence Tribunal. From there he directed the activities of another Turk—one Vedat Nedim—who was given a post in "Arcos," formed a central Communist committee in Constantinople, distributed funds and sent agents to form branches in Smyrna, Adana and Eskishehr. That they went beyond that point no proof was produced.

3. It can hardly be supposed that such a sentence as this will carry out the intention Tewfik Rushdi Bey announced of clearing up every Communist cell in the country. Doubtless the main Communist organisation in Turkey is composed of Russians and, as will be observed, not a single Russian was arrested. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that the Turkish Government should have gone even so far as it did in an anti-Communist direction. Two years ago such action would have been out of the question, but to-day Turkey has sufficient confidence in the general stability of her internal situation not to hesitate to take action which may be displeasing to Moscow.

4. Not that Turkey feels yet entirely free from Russian trammels. It is rumoured, and likely enough, that the Soviet Embassy brought pressure to bear in favour of the accused. Without such pressure the sentences would probably have been less lenient.

5. On the other hand, a leading article in the "République" of the 23rd January denounces Communism as the antithesis of the Nationalism which saved Turkey, denies that there is any class struggle, asks what country has ever been made happy by Communism and characterises as crazy all who count such a scourge or chimera. Such language in the press was unthinkable even a few months ago.

6. I am also informed that the Turkish Government is quietly deporting 110 Hungarian workmen at Angora, whom the Soviet Embassy had inoculated with its virus. The Turkish Government is in effect showing unmistakably, both to the population of Turkey and to the outside world, that within Turkey at any rate it has no use for Communism.

7. Meanwhile, it would seem that friction is still arising from the Turco-Russian commercial treaty. The Turks are annoyed at the restrictions and vexations which their exports encounter. They are also conscious that the Russians are conducting a certain amount of propaganda across their common frontier. The Russians, on the other hand, must look askance at the anti-Bolshevik Moslems from Caucasia with their so-called "philanthropic" societies, whom the Turks are not sorry to have here.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK.

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TURKEY.

November 28, 1927.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 2.

[E 5073/402/44]

No. 1.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 581.)

Sir,

Constantinople, November 23, 1927.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 579 of the 22nd instant, I have the honour to enclose a leading article in the "République"** of the 21st instant, describing the struggle in Russia between Communist ideals and hard facts. The conclusions are sensible and worthy of note as coming from a Turkish Deputy.

2. Possibly as an answer to this outspoken statement, the "Milliet" to-day published a laudatory account by Mahmoud Bey, Deputy for Sert, of his experiences at Moscow, where he has been apparently impressed both by M. Chicherin's intimate knowledge of Turkish affairs and by the necessity for keeping a united Turco-Russian front during the next few troubled years. Mahmoud Bey ends his article with M. Chicherin's last words to him:—

"Bref, les complications survenant dans les relations internationales sont incomparablement plus graves qu'il y a deux ans. La Russie et la Turquie doivent plus que jamais être sur le qui-vive."

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK.

* Not printed.

[306 ee—2]

TURKEY.

November 28, 1927.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[E 5071/402/44]

No. 1.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 579.)

Sir, *Angora, November 22, 1927.*
WITH reference to my despatch No. 487 of the 21st September last, I have the honour to report that three days ago the police arrested some fifty-seven Communists in Constantinople, Smyrna and Adana, and a list of the most important names appeared in the press next day. Three of these people are employees of Arcos and two of the Soviet Navigation Company, though all five are apparently Turkish subjects.

2. Yesterday, at the close of a farewell visit before my departure on leave, I asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs what answer I should make to my friends in London, who would be wondering whether Turkey was going to follow our example. His Excellency laughed and said I must not encourage false hopes; Turkish relations with Moscow were as good as ever, but—and here he spoke with earnestness—the Turkish Government were resolutely determined not to allow the existence of the smallest Communist cell in the republic.

3. The incident is an interesting example of the very definite limits put by the Turkish Government to Russian influence here.

4. I might add that I have been informed by a member of the Hungarian Legation that the Soviet Embassy in Angora has wasted no time in organising the large number of Hungarian workmen into Communist cells, and that the Hungarian Minister, as well as the Turkish authorities, are having a considerable amount of trouble in consequence, as these workmen constitute the only cheap and efficient skilled labour available for the hurried programme of construction in which the Government and municipality are at present engaged.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK.

[506 ee-1]

10/11/28

TURKEY.

[October 12, 1925.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[E 6197/1944/44]

No. 1.

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 751. Confidential.)

Constantinople, October 6, 1925.

Sir,

IN the conversation with the German Ambassador recorded in a preceding despatch (my No. 749 of the 4th October), I brought the talk round to the question of Russo-Turkish relations, touched on in your telegram No. 126 of the 2nd October, where it is suggested that the terms of a treaty between the two Governments have been drafted ready for signature if wanted. Herr Nadolny has spent years of his life in Russia; he speaks the language well, and for his own purposes he keeps on better terms with the Russian Embassy here than any other member of the Diplomatic Body.

2. He quite agreed that Comrade Suritz is now in a position of considerable influence at Angora, and that the Russian and Turkish Governments have drawn together; he volunteered the information, which I myself had only seen in your telegram under reference, that a treaty between the two Governments was being talked of. This was a matter, he said, in which he was closely interested, and he watched it very carefully. He was quite confident that no such treaty existed, and he was emphatically convinced that the Turks would not think of taking any such step. Their rapprochement with Russia was a purely temporary affair, and the Turks had no intention of committing themselves at present to the Russians in any definite or permanent manner. They were still obstructing all progress in the negotiation of the commercial treaty, which had been under discussion for eighteen months at least.

3. Herr Nadolny expressed his view with confident conviction, and I attach some importance to it.

4. M. Filality, the Roumanian Minister, has also spoken to me about Russo-Turkish relations. He tells me that M. Duca has come back from Geneva convinced that there is an understanding between the Turkish and Russian Governments, in virtue of which the former will offer its mediation for the settlement of the Bessarabian question.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

[1107 m-1]

TURKEY.

[June 18.] 1923

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION 4.

[E 6312/5286/44]

No. 1.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received June 18.)

(No. 347.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, June 13, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that Comrade Souritz, the newly appointed Soviet Ambassador to Angora, has been spending the last week in Constantinople, and left on the 10th instant to take up his post, which has been vacant since the recall of Aralof some two months ago.

2. Little is known about Souritz except that during the past three years he has occupied several important posts in the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and has latterly been trade representative at Christiania. He was originally appointed to China, but did not proceed owing to his nomination to Angora.

3. Souritz has taken the opportunity of his stay here to accord a series of interviews, which have received a large measure of publicity. In the course of these declarations he has been at great pains to demonstrate the community of Russian and Turkish interests, and to belittle the difficulties which have recently threatened to render Russo-Turkish relations somewhat strained. Indeed, he went so far as to say that he only became aware of these differences after his arrival in Constantinople, a statement which even the most gullible Turk must have found extremely difficult to swallow. His language regarding the Russian exiles at present in Constantinople was on the whole conciliatory, being to the effect that on the signature of peace the Soviet Government would grant a general amnesty to such exiles as returned within a certain fixed period, after which they would be no longer regarded as Russian nationals. As regards Anglo-Russian relations, Comrade Souritz was absolutely reticent, and though repeated efforts were made to draw him he contented himself with saying that the Soviet point of view was completely explained in the latest note to the Foreign Office.

4. According to another statement, the chief object of the new Ambassador's mission is the conclusion of a commercial and consular convention which would be to the mutual advantage of both countries. It remains to be seen whether his efforts in this connection will meet with greater success than did those of his predecessor. At the time of Aralof's recall Russo-Turkish relations had already been affected by the rift which had first become apparent when the Turkish delegation at Lausanne refused to identify itself with the Russian scheme for the settlement of the Straits question. The interval has only served to widen the breach thus created. Minor incidents have become of common occurrence, and the Turkish official world has not been averse from declaring its dislike of Soviet methods and ideas. One of these minor incidents arose some weeks ago out of the refusal of the Soviet authorities to allow the Turkish steamer "Gul Djemal" to disembark cargo at Batoum, a step which was followed by a similar prohibition against Russian ships visiting Turkish ports. This mutual prohibition is still continued, and its removal will doubtless be one of Souritz's first objects after his arrival at Angora.

5. It is in the realm of propaganda, however, that the situation has become most difficult. When the Nationalist Government was struggling for existence and ready even "to grasp at a serpent," Angora was compelled to accept or to profess to accept some at least of the Soviet ideas. Following on the reoccupation of Smyrna, the removal of the Constantinople Government and the summoning of delegates of the Angora Government to meet those of the Allies at Lausanne, the Turkish attitude of subservience to Moscow gave place, however, to one of greater independence. Citizens of the Soviet Republic entering Anatolia became subject to the same regulations as other foreigners, and an extensive Turkish propaganda campaign was launched in the Caucasus, which was answered by considerable Russian military concentrations there. These in turn were followed by wide Communist activities in Anatolia, which, though not favourable ground, caused the Turkish Government a certain disquiet. Repressive measures were commenced, and during the last two months numerous arrests and trials of Communist agents have been reported. These measures are stated to have been the subject of repeated Soviet protests to the Angora Government. The Communist propaganda,

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however, continues, and the Turkish press has recently published a report that information has reached the Angora Government of the decision of the Soviet Government to expend a further sum of 100,000 gold roubles in Anatolia in this connection.

6. Nor have these Communist activities been confined to Anatolia. In Constantinople, as your Lordship is aware, Russia has for some time had a trade delegation as well as a branch of the Russian diplomatic mission at Angora, for both of which she has so far been unable to obtain complete recognition. Both establishments are, of course, centres of Bolshevik intrigue, which was carried to such a point that about a month ago the Turkish police arrested in Constantinople some twenty Communists, principally Turks. These were duly brought to trial under the recent treason law passed by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, but were released on its being established that, owing to the failure to give it the necessary publicity, the law was not valid in Constantinople. Steps have now been taken to remedy this defect, but I have so far been unable to ascertain whether or not the discovery of the legal quibble was the result of strong Russian pressure at Angora.

7. It would seem, therefore, that the task of Souritz in placating the Angora authorities and bringing Russo-Turkish relations back to a state of mutual friendship will not be easy. He will have the assistance as military attaché of Trotsky, an ex-general of the Russian army, who commanded an infantry brigade during the war. The appointment of an officer of such high rank to what can only be an inferior post has doubtless been made as a sop to Turkish susceptibilities and as a means of strengthening the position of the Soviet representative at Angora. It also appears to show that Soviet Russia still attaches no little importance to her relations with Turkey, though it is too early yet to state whether her policy will be one of peaceful penetration or of threats backed by military concentrations. Much will depend on the result of the Lausanne Conference and of the events immediately following it. Kemalist Turkey has in the last three years been able to profit much, with little loss to herself, from Russian support. For the moment, though the relations between the two Governments have lost much of their former cordiality, Turkey can still re-enter the Russian fold, and will doubtless do so unless, on the conclusion of peace, her Government feels sufficiently confident of her own position or of the support of the Western Powers to stand alone.

I have, &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.



TURKEY.

September 10, 1928.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 4.

[E 4469/127/44]

No. 1.

Sir G. Clerk to Lord Cushendun.—(Received September 10.)
(No. 408.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, September 5, 1928.

IN my despatch No. 386 of the 14th August last I had the honour to report on a certain uneasiness which appeared to be discernible in Russo-Turkish relations. Shortly after that date the reciprocal exports and imports agreement was renewed as between the two countries. Although Russian exports to Turkey had fallen, Turkish exports to Russia, it was cheerfully announced, were to be allowed up to the previous maximum. But this renewal of the agreement has been far from stopping all friction. There have been bitter complaints in the press at the treatment accorded to Turkish traders in Russia who seem to have tried to evade the Soviet restrictions on the remittance of funds abroad and then to have been dealt with severely by the Soviet authorities.

2. From Trebizond Mr. Matthews reports the announcement by the local governor that in retaliation for the confiscation of Turkish properties in Russia the properties of Soviet nationals in Turkey are to be sequestered. A first step in this direction has actually been taken by the official sale at auction of the house occupied by the French consul, but as the Soviet national who owned it was by race a Greek, perhaps too serious an inference should not be drawn.

3. Arrests of persons suspected of Communist sympathies and activities continue —half a dozen here, one near the Russian frontier, two workmen who were charged with distributing pamphlets and collecting money at Angora. Mr. Matthews also reports that several officers are under arrest at Sarikamish for selling military documents. I have now been shown a copy of the manifesto mentioned in the last paragraph of my previous despatch as having been placarded at Angora. It announces the sixth congress of the Third International and calls on the Turkish Communist party—which, of course, cannot be said to exist—for support. It describes the Angora Government as imperialists who prostitute the word “people,” the Grand National Assembly as *bourgeois* parasites, and the Ghazi, though it does not mention him by name, as an intolerable *bourgeois* dictator. This, of course, is about as near blasphemy as one can get in this lay republic. It may explain the rumour—for which I cannot vouch—that my Soviet colleague recently distributed the sum of 500,000 dollars amongst the great ones of Angora.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

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